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Kansas Statutes Annotated

K.S.A. § 33-209 (2026)

Extinguishment of cause of action

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33-209. Extinguishment of cause of action. A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under this act is extinguished unless action is brought:

(a) Under subsection (a)(1) of K.S.A. 33-204, within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant;

(b) under subsection (a)(2) of K.S.A. 33-204 or subsection (a) of K.S.A. 33-205, within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or

(c) under subsection (b) of K.S.A. 33-205, within one year after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.

History: L. 1998, ch. 13, § 9; January 1, 1999.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2013–2022 · leading case: Foxfield Villa Assocs. v. Robben, 449 P.3d 1210 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019).
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Foxfield Villa Assocs. v. Robben, 449 P.3d 1210 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 43× “A fraudulent transfer claim based on actual intent may still survive the four-year limitation period because K.S.A. 33-209(a) includes a savings clause.”
Finn v. All. Bank, 838 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013). “9 (2001) (adopting the UFTA's discovery provision, changing time limit to five years rather than four); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 33-209 (2000); Me.Rev.Stat.”
Redmond v. NCMIC Fin. Corp. (In re Brooke Corp.), 568 B.R. 378 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2017). “-in-chief 16th ed.). Mr. Redmond’s testimony that such claims against Brooke Franchise exist is unchallenged, (Doc.”
Williamson TR v. Smith, No. 22-07002 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 2, 2022). · cites it 2× “23 28 U.S.C. § 3306 (b). 9 For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Defendants do not challenge the Trustee’s assertion that she may step into the shoes of the IRS, as the holder of an allowable unsecured claim,24 but do challenge the Trustee’s position as to the applicable…”
McNamara v. Hallinan, No. 2:17-cv-02967, 2019 WL 4752265 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2019). “See K.S.A. 33-209. That statute also includes an iteration of the discovery rule, 18 pursuant to which claims accrue either when the transfer was made, or “within one year after 19 the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.”
McNamara v. Intercept Corp., No. 2:18-cv-02281 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2020). “’”) (emphasis added) (quoting 7 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 33-209 ). As a result, unless McNamara’s claims have been equitably tolled, 8 they are time barred.”
K.S.A. § 33-209(a): 2 cases
Foxfield Villa Assocs. v. Robben, 449 P.3d 1210 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019). “A fraudulent transfer claim based on actual intent may still survive the four-year limitation period because K.S.A. 33-209(a) includes a savings clause.”
Williamson TR v. Smith, No. 22-07002 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 2, 2022). “23 28 U.S.C. § 3306 (b). 9 For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Defendants do not challenge the Trustee’s assertion that she may step into the shoes of the IRS, as the holder of an allowable unsecured claim,24 but do challenge the Trustee’s position as to the applicable…”
K.S.A. § 33-209(b): 2 cases
Foxfield Villa Assocs. v. Robben, 449 P.3d 1210 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019). “A fraudulent transfer claim based on actual intent may still survive the four-year limitation period because K.S.A. 33-209(a) includes a savings clause.”
Redmond v. NCMIC Fin. Corp. (In re Brooke Corp.), 568 B.R. 378 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2017). “-in-chief 16th ed.). Mr. Redmond’s testimony that such claims against Brooke Franchise exist is unchallenged, (Doc.”
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