Kansas Statutes Annotated

K.S.A. § 44-510e (2026)

Compensation for temporary or permanent partial general disabilities; whole body injury; extent of disability; computation thereof; functional impairment defined; termination upon death from other causes; limitations; other remedies excluded

✓ current as of May 2026
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44-510e. Compensation for temporary or permanent partial general disabilities; whole body injury; extent of disability; computation thereof; functional impairment defined; termination upon death from other causes; limitations; other remedies excluded. (a) In case of whole body injury resulting in temporary or permanent partial general disability not covered by the schedule in K.S.A. 44-510d, and amendments thereto, the employee shall receive weekly compensation as determined in this subsection during the period of temporary or permanent partial general disability not exceeding a maximum of 415 weeks.

(1) Weekly compensation for temporary partial general disability shall be 662/3% of the difference between the average weekly wage that the employee was earning prior to the date of injury and the amount the employee is actually earning after such injury in any type of employment. In no case shall such weekly compensation exceed the maximum as provided for in K.S.A. 44-510c, and amendments thereto.

(2) (A) Permanent partial general disability exists when the employee is disabled in a manner which is partial in character and permanent in quality and which is not covered by the schedule in K.S.A. 44-510d, and amendments thereto. Compensation for permanent partial general disability shall also be paid as provided in this section where an injury results in:

(i) The loss of or loss of use of a shoulder, arm, forearm or hand of one upper extremity, combined with the loss of or loss of use of a shoulder, arm, forearm or hand of the other upper extremity;

(ii) the loss of or loss of use of a leg, lower leg or foot of one lower extremity, combined with the loss of or loss of use of a leg, lower leg or foot of the other lower extremity; or

(iii) the loss of or loss of use of both eyes.

(B) The extent of permanent partial general disability shall be the percentage of functional impairment the employee sustained on account of the injury as established by competent medical evidence and based on the 6th edition of the American medical association guides to the evaluation of permanent impairment, if the impairment is contained therein.

(C) An employee may be eligible to receive permanent partial general disability compensation in excess of the percentage of functional impairment ("work disability") if:

(i) The percentage of functional impairment determined to be caused solely by the injury is equal to or exceeds 7½% to the body as a whole or the overall functional impairment is equal to or exceeds 10% to the body as a whole in cases where there is preexisting functional impairment; and

(ii) the employee sustained a post-injury wage loss, as defined in subsection (a)(2)(E), of at least 10% which is directly attributable to the work injury and not to other causes or factors.

In such cases, the extent of work disability is determined by averaging together the percentage of post-injury task loss demonstrated by the employee to be caused by the injury and the percentage of post-injury wage loss demonstrated by the employee to be caused by the injury.

(D) "Task loss" means the percentage to which the employee, in the opinion of a licensed physician, has lost the ability to perform the work tasks that the employee performed in any substantial gainful employment during the five-year period preceding the injury. The permanent restrictions imposed by a licensed physician as a result of the work injury shall be used to determine those work tasks which the employee has lost the ability to perform. If the employee has preexisting permanent restrictions, any work tasks which the employee would have been deemed to have lost the ability to perform, had a task loss analysis been completed prior to the injury at issue, shall be excluded for the purposes of calculating the task loss which is directly attributable to the current injury.

(E) "Wage loss" means the difference between the average weekly wage the employee was earning at the time of the injury and the average weekly wage the employee is capable of earning after the injury. The capability of a worker to earn post-injury wages shall be established based upon a consideration of all factors, including, but not limited to, the injured worker's age, physical capabilities, education and training, prior experience, and availability of jobs in the open labor market. The administrative law judge shall impute an appropriate post-injury average weekly wage based on such factors. Where the employee is engaged in post-injury employment for wages, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the average weekly wage an injured worker is actually earning constitutes the post-injury average weekly wage that the employee is capable of earning. The presumption may be overcome by competent evidence.

(i) To establish post-injury wage loss, the employee must have the legal capacity to enter into a valid contract of employment. Wage loss caused by voluntary resignation or termination for cause shall in no way be construed to be caused by the injury.

(ii) The actual or projected weekly value of any employer-paid fringe benefits are to be included as part of the worker's post-injury average weekly wage and shall be added to the wage imputed by the administrative law judge pursuant to this subparagraph.

(iii) The injured worker's refusal of accommodated employment within the worker's medical restrictions as established by the authorized treating physician and at a wage equal to 90% or more of the pre-injury average weekly wage shall result in a rebuttable presumption of no wage loss.

(F) The amount of compensation for whole body injury under this section shall be determined by multiplying the payment rate by the weeks payable. As used in this section: (1) The payment rate shall be the lesser of: (A) The amount determined by multiplying the average weekly wage of the worker prior to such injury by 662/3%; or (B) the maximum provided in K.S.A. 44-510c, and amendments thereto; (2) weeks payable shall be determined as follows: (A) Determine the weeks of temporary compensation paid by adding the amounts of temporary total and temporary partial disability compensation paid and dividing the sum by the payment rate above; (B) subtract from 415 weeks the total number of weeks of temporary compensation paid as determined in (F)(2)(A), excluding the first 15 such weeks; and (3) multiply the number of weeks as determined in (F)(2)(B) by the percentage of functional impairment pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(B) or the percentage of work disability pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(C), whichever is applicable.

(3) When an injured worker is eligible to receive an award of work disability, compensation is limited to the value of the work disability as calculated above. In no case shall functional impairment and work disability be awarded together.

The resulting award shall be paid for the number of disability weeks at the payment rate until fully paid or modified. In any case of permanent partial disability under this section, the employee shall be paid compensation for not to exceed 415 weeks following the date of such injury. If there is an award of permanent disability as a result of the compensable injury, there shall be a presumption that disability existed immediately after such injury. Under no circumstances shall the period of permanent partial disability run concurrently with the period of temporary total or temporary partial disability.

(b) If an employee has sustained an injury for which compensation is being paid, and the employee's death is caused by other and independent causes, any payment of compensation already due the employee at the time of death and then unpaid shall be paid to the employee's dependents directly or to the employee's legal representatives if the employee left no dependent, but the liability of the employer for the payments of compensation not yet due at the time of the death of such employee shall cease and be abrogated by the employee's death.

(c) The total amount of compensation that may be allowed or awarded an injured employee for all injuries received in any one accident shall in no event exceed the compensation which would be payable under the workers compensation act for 100% permanent total disability resulting from such accident.

(d) Where a minor employee or a minor employee's dependents are entitled to compensation under the workers compensation act, such compensation shall be exclusive of all other remedies or causes of action for such injury or death, and no claim or cause of action against the employer shall inure or accrue to or exist in favor of the parent or parents of such minor employee on account of any damage resulting to such parent or parents on account of the loss of earnings or loss of service of such minor employee.

(e) In any case of injury to or death of an employee, where the employee or the employee's dependents are entitled to compensation under the workers compensation act, such compensation shall be exclusive of all other remedies or causes of action for such injury or death, and no claim or action shall inure, accrue to or exist in favor of the surviving spouse or any relative or next of kin of such employee against such employer on account of any damage resulting to such surviving spouse or any relative or next of kin on account of the loss of earnings, services, or society of such employee or on any other account resulting from or growing out of the injury or death of such employee.

History: L. 1968, ch. 102, § 7; L. 1970, ch. 190, § 4; L. 1974, ch. 203, § 14; L. 1987, ch. 187, § 7; L. 1993, ch. 286, § 34; L. 1996, ch. 79, § 6; L. 2011, ch. 55, § 9; L. 2013, ch. 104, § 9; L. 2024, ch. 27, § 7; July 1.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 187 cases (18 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case: Graham v. Dokter Trucking Grp., 161 P.3d 695 (Kan. 2007).
Graham v. Dokter Trucking Grp., 161 P.3d 695 (Kan. 2007). · cites it 20× “This figure was based on the wages earned between June 12, 2003, and September 25, 2004, when claimant was working part-time on a regular basis; and it supported calculation of a 24 percent wage loss under K.S.A. 44-510e. The ALJ also specifically found that claimant “does not…”
Bergstrom v. Spears Mfg. Co., 214 P.3d 676 (Kan. 2009). · cites it 12× “In reducing the amount of her award, the Board found that Bergstrom did not exercise good faith when she failed to perform alternate job duties that Spears offered her after her injury.”
Messner v. Cont'l Plastic Containers, 298 P.3d 371 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 35× “The Board stated: “Here, K.S.A. 44-510e is clear and unambiguous. Once claimant is no longer receiving compensation for wages equal to 90 percent or more of her average gross weekly wage from the date of injury, she becomes entitled to compensation for work disability.”
Casco v. Armour Swift-Eckrich, 154 P.3d 494 (Kan. 2007). · cites it 9× “K.S.A. 44-510e, on the other hand, calculates the award for any injury not included on the schedule.”
Fernandez v. McDonald's, 292 P.3d 311 (Kan. 2013). · cites it 16× “But the ALJ denied the claim for permanent partial general work disability under K.S.A. 44-510e based upon public policy grounds.”
Redd v. Kansas Truck Ctr., 239 P.3d 66 (Kan. 2010). · cites it 8× “] K.S.A. 44-510e, on the other hand, calculates the award for any injury not included on the schedule.”
Hughes v. Inland Container Corp., 799 P.2d 1011 (Kan. 1990). · cites it 9× “All the parties agree that the amendments to K.S.A. 44-510e that became effective July 1, 1987, altered the method for determining permanent partial general disability for those injuries covered by the Kansas Workers Compensation Act.”
Foulk v. Colonial Terrace, 887 P.2d 140 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 5× “Claimant argues the Board erred in its application of K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 44-510e in her case; she contends that because the manner in which a statute should be applied is a matter of law, this court should engage in an unlimited review of the Board’s decision.”
Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995). · cites it 2× “of Workers' Compensation Rule 263; Kan.Stat.Ann. § 44-510e; Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann.”
Roskilly v. Boeing Co., 116 P.3d 38 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 11× “Accordingly, it is only in the situation where the injured worker had worked exclusively in the same job for the entire fifteen years preceding the accident that tire successful return to that same unaccommodated job would establish a prima facie case for no work disability.”
Copeland v. Johnson Grp., Inc., 944 P.2d 179 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 6× “” K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 44-510e(a). The 1993 amendments removed the term “presumption” and attempted to clarify the situation by providing that “[a]n employee shall not be entitled to receive permanent partial general disability compensation in excess of the percentage of functional…”
Dirshe v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 382 P.3d 484 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 6× “See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510e(a)(2)(E)(i) (providing that a wage loss “caused by.”
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a) — 108 cases
Graham v. Dokter Trucking Grp., 161 P.3d 695 (Kan. 2007). “This figure was based on the wages earned between June 12, 2003, and September 25, 2004, when claimant was working part-time on a regular basis; and it supported calculation of a 24 percent wage loss under K.S.A. 44-510e. The ALJ also specifically found that claimant “does not…”
Bergstrom v. Spears Mfg. Co., 214 P.3d 676 (Kan. 2009). “In reducing the amount of her award, the Board found that Bergstrom did not exercise good faith when she failed to perform alternate job duties that Spears offered her after her injury.”
Messner v. Cont'l Plastic Containers, 298 P.3d 371 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013). “The Board stated: “Here, K.S.A. 44-510e is clear and unambiguous. Once claimant is no longer receiving compensation for wages equal to 90 percent or more of her average gross weekly wage from the date of injury, she becomes entitled to compensation for work disability.”
Hughes v. Inland Container Corp., 799 P.2d 1011 (Kan. 1990). “All the parties agree that the amendments to K.S.A. 44-510e that became effective July 1, 1987, altered the method for determining permanent partial general disability for those injuries covered by the Kansas Workers Compensation Act.”
Foulk v. Colonial Terrace, 887 P.2d 140 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). “Claimant argues the Board erred in its application of K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 44-510e in her case; she contends that because the manner in which a statute should be applied is a matter of law, this court should engage in an unlimited review of the Board’s decision.”
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(1) — 1 case
Roberts v. Midwest Mineral, Inc., 204 P.3d 1177 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(2) — 5 cases
Mitchell v. Petsmart, Inc., 239 P.3d 51 (Kan. 2010).
Bohanan v. U.S.D. No. 260, 947 P.2d 440 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
Munoz v. Sw. Med. Ctr. (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).
Garcia v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (Kan. Ct. App. 2022).
Martinez v. Haverkamp Bros. Inc. (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(2)(A) — 3 cases
Morris v. Shilling Constr. Co. (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
Zimero v. Tyson Fresh Meats (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
Mitchell v. CNH Indus. Am. (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(2)(B) — 13 cases
Morris v. Shilling Constr. Co. (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
Garcia v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (Kan. Ct. App. 2022).
Pile v. Textron Aviation (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(2)(C) — 6 cases
Morris v. Shilling Constr. Co. (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
Gilkey v. Frederick Waterproofing, 419 P.3d 49 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018).
Johnson v. U.S. Food Serv., 427 P.3d 996 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018).
Garcia v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (Kan. Ct. App. 2022).
Williams v. Wellco Tank Truck (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(2)(C)(i) — 1 case
Garcia v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. (Kan. Ct. App. 2022).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(2)(C)(ii) — 2 cases
Williams v. Wellco Tank Truck (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
Garcia v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 430 P.3d 995 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(2)(D) — 3 cases
Jones v. U.S.D. No. 259, 419 P.3d 62 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018).
Gilkey v. Frederick Waterproofing, 419 P.3d 49 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018).
Martinez v. Haverkamp Bros. Inc. (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(2)(E) — 3 cases
Williams v. Wellco Tank Truck (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
Martinez v. Haverkamp Bros. Inc. (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).
Willming v. Atchison Hosp. (Kan. Ct. App. 2023).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(2)(E)(i) — 7 cases
Dirshe v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 382 P.3d 484 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016). “See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 44-510e(a)(2)(E)(i) (providing that a wage loss “caused by.”
Rickson v. Kerns Constr. (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).
Garcia v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 430 P.3d 995 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018).
Oliver v. Nat'l Beef Packing Co. (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(2)(E)(iii) — 1 case
Martinez v. Haverkamp Bros. Inc. (Kan. Ct. App. 2026).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(2)(ii) — 1 case
Williams v. Wellco Tank Truck (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(3) — 1 case
Ponder-Coppage v. State, 83 P.3d 1239 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(a)(l) — 4 cases
Berry v. Boeing Military Airplanes, 885 P.2d 1261 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
Condon v. Boeing Co., 903 P.2d 775 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
Ward v. Allen Cnty. Hosp., 324 P.3d 1122 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014).
Deguillen v. Schwan's Food Mfg., Inc., 172 P.3d 71 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(b) — 1 case
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(b)(2) — 1 case
Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (D. Kan. 1999).
— K.S.A. § 44-510e(h) — 1 case
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