Kansas Statutes Annotated

K.S.A. § 58-2506 (2026)

Termination of farm or pastureland tenancy; notice

✓ current as of May 2026

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58-2506. Termination of farm or pastureland tenancy; notice. (a) Except as may be otherwise provided by this section or by a written lease signed by the parties thereto, in cases of tenants occupying and cultivating farms or occupying or leasing pastureland, the notice to terminate such a farm or pastureland tenancy must be given in writing at least 30 days prior to March 1 and must fix the termination of the tenancy to take place on March 1. For purposes of this act, "pastureland" means land used for livestock grazing or hay production, or both, which includes perennial vegetation, including, but not limited to, native vegetation, grass-like plants, forbs, shrubs, savannas, shrublands, marshes and meadows.

(b) When a notice of termination is given pursuant to subsection (a) after a fall seeded grain crop has been planted, as to that part of the farm which is planted to a fall seeded grain crop on cropland which has been prepared in conformance with normal practices in the area, the notice shall be construed as fixing the termination of the tenancy of such portion to take place on the day following the last day of harvesting such crop or crops, or August 1, whichever comes first.

(c) When a notice of termination is given pursuant to subsection (a) after the 30th day preceding March 1 and prior to the planting of a fall seeded grain crop on cropland which has been prepared in conformance with normal practices in the area, in any year in which a fall seeded grain crop has been or will be harvested, the notice shall be construed as fixing the termination of the tenancy of that part of the farm devoted to fall seeded grain crops on the day following the last day of harvesting such crop or crops in the succeeding year or August 1 of such succeeding year, whichever comes first.

(d) Subject to the provisions of this section, a farm or pastureland tenant becomes a tenant from year-to-year by occupying the premises after the expiration of the term fixed in a written lease, in which case the notice of termination of tenancy must fix the termination of tenancy to take place on the same day of the same month following the service of the notice as the day and month of termination fixed in the original lease under which the tenant first occupied the premises. Such notice shall be written and given to the tenant at least 30 days prior to such termination date.

History: G.S. 1868, ch. 55, § 6; L. 1919, ch. 224, § 1; R.S. 1923, 67-506; L. 1975, ch. 294, § 1; L. 1978, ch. 215, § 2; L. 1979, ch. 175, § 1; L. 1981, ch. 225, § 1; L. 2002, ch. 81, § 1; July 1.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 13 cases, 1972–2020 · leading case: In Re the Est. of Sauder, 156 P.3d 1204 (Kan. 2007).

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In Re the Est. of Sauder, 156 P.3d 1204 (Kan. 2007). · cites it 13× “” The phrase “occupying and cultivating” is not defined in the statute. However, guidance as to the intended meaning of the phrase is provided through two other statutory provisions relating to the timing and effect of notices of termination.”

Mendenhall v. Roberts, 831 P.2d 568 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 13× “The answer to this question requires us to interpret and give meaning to K.S.A. 58-2506. While this may seem a simple task, it is far from that.”

Grey v. Schmidt, 581 P.2d 1180 (Kan. 1978). · cites it 26× “" K.S.A. 58-2506, in the form in effect at the time, provides: "In cases of tenants occupying and cultivating farms, the notice must fix the termination of the tenancy to take place on the first day of March: Provided, however, That as to that part of the farm which is planted…”

Geren v. Geren, 29 P.3d 448 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 5× “Kelly spends an inordinate amount of time emphasizing that K.S.A. 58-2506(a) is applicable to this case, apparently believing the district judge incorrectly applied K.”

Bearden v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins., 635 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Kan. 1986). · cites it 8× “But as to the actual year of termination, the Court found that the seminal law was Kansas’ statutory notice of termination provision; more specifically, K.S.A. §§ 58-2506 and 58-2506a. As the parties had not referred to these statutes, the Court ordered them to rebrief the issue…”

Orebaugh v. Leatherwood, 8 P.3d 55 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 6× “Orebaugh contends that he was entitled to replant the remaining 381 acres to wheat in the fall of 1998 for harvest in 1999, and he requested a declaratory judgment of the district court to establish this right.”

Buckle v. Caylor, 700 P.2d 979 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 4× “The relevant consideration is the adequacy of the notice and its compliance with the statute, K.S.A. 58-2506, which is a question of law.”

Bearden v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins., 708 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Kan. 1987). · cites it 4× “John Hancock maintains that even if Bear-den’s contentions are true, John Hancock reasonably believed that mortgage foreclosure law and not K.S.A. §§ 58-2506 and 58-2506a applied to this action.”

Thomas v. Dudrey, 494 P.2d 1039 (Kan. 1972). “(K.S.A. 58-2506.) The three separate Contracts confirmed his rights under the lease as such tenant, which was his sole means of possession and control of the farm; he had no possessory rights to the land otherwise.”

Miller v. Burnett (Kan. Ct. App. 2017). “K.S.A. 58-2506[a].) Otherwise, the key facts in this case are disputed.”

Miller v. Burnett, 430 P.3d 492 (Kan. Ct. App. 2018). “K.S.A. 58-2506 [a].) Otherwise, the key facts here are disputed.”

Jerry Claude Schepmann (Bankr. D. Kan. 2020). “Schepmann has title to the Land, Jerry has improved it and lives there. He pays the ad valorem taxes on the farmstead while she pays them on the ground he cultivates.”

Show all 13 citing cases →

— K.S.A. § 58-2506(a) — 5 cases

Geren v. Geren, 29 P.3d 448 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001). “Kelly spends an inordinate amount of time emphasizing that K.S.A. 58-2506(a) is applicable to this case, apparently believing the district judge incorrectly applied K.”

Mendenhall v. Roberts, 831 P.2d 568 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992). “The answer to this question requires us to interpret and give meaning to K.S.A. 58-2506. While this may seem a simple task, it is far from that.”

In Re the Est. of Sauder, 156 P.3d 1204 (Kan. 2007). “” The phrase “occupying and cultivating” is not defined in the statute. However, guidance as to the intended meaning of the phrase is provided through two other statutory provisions relating to the timing and effect of notices of termination.”

Orebaugh v. Leatherwood, 8 P.3d 55 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). “Orebaugh contends that he was entitled to replant the remaining 381 acres to wheat in the fall of 1998 for harvest in 1999, and he requested a declaratory judgment of the district court to establish this right.”

Bearden v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins., 635 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Kan. 1986). “But as to the actual year of termination, the Court found that the seminal law was Kansas’ statutory notice of termination provision; more specifically, K.S.A. §§ 58-2506 and 58-2506a. As the parties had not referred to these statutes, the Court ordered them to rebrief the issue…”

— K.S.A. § 58-2506(b) — 2 cases

— K.S.A. § 58-2506(c) — 3 cases

— K.S.A. § 58-2506(d) — 3 cases

Buckle v. Caylor, 700 P.2d 979 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985). “The relevant consideration is the adequacy of the notice and its compliance with the statute, K.S.A. 58-2506, which is a question of law.”

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