60-3304.
Legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory safety standards or mandatory government contract specifications; defenses.
(a) When the injury-causing aspect of the product was, at the time of manufacture, in compliance with legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory safety standards relating to design or performance, the product shall be deemed not defective by reason of design or performance, or, if the standard addressed warnings or instructions, the product shall be deemed not defective by reason of warnings or instructions, unless the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonably prudent product seller could and would have taken additional precautions.
(b) When the injury-causing aspect of the product was not, at the time of manufacture, in compliance with legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory safety standards relating to design, performance, warnings or instructions, the product shall be deemed defective unless the product seller proves by a preponderance of the evidence that its failure to comply was a reasonably prudent course of conduct under the circumstances.
(c) When the injury-causing aspect of the product was, at the time of manufacture, in compliance with a mandatory government contract specification relating to design, this shall be an absolute defense and the product shall be deemed not defective for that reason, or, if the specification related to warnings or instructions, then the product shall be deemed not defective for that reason.
(d) When the injury-causing aspect of the product was not, at the time of manufacture, in compliance with a mandatory government contract specification relating to design, the product shall be deemed defective for that reason, or if the specification related to warnings or instructions, the product shall be deemed defective for that reason.
History:
L. 1981, ch. 231, § 4; July 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
33
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1982–2021 · leading case:
Miller v. Lee Apparel Co., 881 P.2d 576 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
Miller v. Lee Apparel Co., 881 P.2d 576 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 17× “231) reveals the general intent to strengthen the position of the “product sellers/manufacturers” but indicates no intention for the provisions of § 4(a) (K.S.A. 60-3304[a]) to be construed differently than from the intent and analysis of § 108[A] set forth above.”
Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915 (Kan. 1990).
· cites it 8× “Sterling Drug's analysis is further flawed by concluding that the last clause of subsection (a) of K.S.A. 60-3304, concerning the ability of a claimant to prove what a prudent product seller could and would have done, applies only to the provision relating to adequate warnings…”
Alvarado v. JC Penney Co., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 371 (D. Kan. 1990).
· cites it 11× “In evaluating the arguments made by the plaintiff, the court has undertaken a thorough review of the MUPLA, the act upon which the KPLA is based. The parties had not previously addressed the history of either the MUPLA or the KPLA except to note that the KPLA was derived from…”
Alvarado v. JC Penney Co., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Kan. 1989).
· cites it 9× “Penney asserts that, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-3304(a), the clothing was *1391 not defective because it was in compliance with the only federal standard for flammability of adult sleepwear: CS 191-53.”
In re Accutane Litig., 194 A.3d 503 (N.J. 2018).
“2006) ); Kansas ( Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3304 (a) ); North Dakota ( N.”
Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353 (Kan. 1982).
· cites it 2× “" Under K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 60-3304, the test to be applied in products liability cases is essentially the reasonably prudent product seller test, not a test based upon the consumer's expectations.”
Gaumer v. Rossville Truck & Tractor Co., 257 P.3d 292 (Kan. 2011).
· cites it 2× “K.S.A. 60-3304 provides that a product is ‘not defective’ under certain circumstances where it was in compliance with regulatory standards when manufactured.”
Duffee Ex Rel. Thornton v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 879 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Kan. 1995).
· cites it 3× “60-3304(a) provides: When the injury-causing aspect of the product was, at the time of manufacture, in compliance with legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory safety standards relating to design or performance, the product shah be deemed not *1085 defective…”
Cooper v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Kan. 2004).
· cites it 2× “§ 60-3303 (eliminating liability for harm caused after the useful safe life of the product); K.S.A. § 60-3304 (providing that a product is not defective where it complied with regulatory standards at the time of manufacture); K.”
Martin v. MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Kan. 1994).
· cites it 4× “Plaintiff argues that defendant should not be permitted to offer evidence of compliance with the Act or regulations to establish a defense under the Kansas Product Liability Act, and specifically K.S.A. § 60-3304(a), which provides: When the injury-causing aspect of the product…”
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 397 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2005).
“Under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3304 (a), when a product complies with legislative regulatory standards that address warnings or instructions, the product shall be deemed not *918 defective by reasons of warnings, or instructions unless the claimant proves by a preponderance of the…”
— K.S.A. § 60-3304(a) — 17 cases
Miller v. Lee Apparel Co., 881 P.2d 576 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994).
“231) reveals the general intent to strengthen the position of the “product sellers/manufacturers” but indicates no intention for the provisions of § 4(a) (K.S.A. 60-3304[a]) to be construed differently than from the intent and analysis of § 108[A] set forth above.”
Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915 (Kan. 1990).
“Sterling Drug's analysis is further flawed by concluding that the last clause of subsection (a) of K.S.A. 60-3304, concerning the ability of a claimant to prove what a prudent product seller could and would have done, applies only to the provision relating to adequate warnings…”
Alvarado v. JC Penney Co., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 371 (D. Kan. 1990).
“In evaluating the arguments made by the plaintiff, the court has undertaken a thorough review of the MUPLA, the act upon which the KPLA is based. The parties had not previously addressed the history of either the MUPLA or the KPLA except to note that the KPLA was derived from…”
Alvarado v. JC Penney Co., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Kan. 1989).
“Penney asserts that, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-3304(a), the clothing was *1391 not defective because it was in compliance with the only federal standard for flammability of adult sleepwear: CS 191-53.”
— K.S.A. § 60-3304(b) — 4 cases
Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915 (Kan. 1990).
“Sterling Drug's analysis is further flawed by concluding that the last clause of subsection (a) of K.S.A. 60-3304, concerning the ability of a claimant to prove what a prudent product seller could and would have done, applies only to the provision relating to adequate warnings…”
Alvarado v. JC Penney Co., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 371 (D. Kan. 1990).
“In evaluating the arguments made by the plaintiff, the court has undertaken a thorough review of the MUPLA, the act upon which the KPLA is based. The parties had not previously addressed the history of either the MUPLA or the KPLA except to note that the KPLA was derived from…”
Alvarado v. JC Penney Co., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1389 (D. Kan. 1989).
“Penney asserts that, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-3304(a), the clothing was *1391 not defective because it was in compliance with the only federal standard for flammability of adult sleepwear: CS 191-53.”
— K.S.A. § 60-3304(c) — 2 cases
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