cites § 60-3412 70×cited by 22 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “The Court of Appeals found that K.S.A. 60-3412 requires that an expert witness in a medical malpractice action be licensed in the same profession in which the defendant health care provider is licensed and reversed the district court in Tompkins v.”
- The case’s holding
- A medical malpractice expert need not be licensed by the same professional board as the defendant, only engaged in similar clinical practice.
cites § 60-3412 24×cited by 19 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “The district court granted the motion in limine because Cooper did not meet the requirements of K.S.A. 60-3412. In the absence of expert testimony on the standard of care, Schlaikjer could not, as a matter of law, carry her burden of proof; and summary judgment in Kap-lan’s…”
- Later courts cite it for
- “stopped short of testifying that defendant's methods constituted unsound medical practice,” · 1 citing court
cites § 60-3412 14×cited by 30 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “Lawton argued that K.S.A. 60-3412 required Diggdon’s disqualification because Diggdon had retired approximately 3 months before Lawton treated Williams.”
- The case’s holding
- Attorneys may discuss a trial with willing jurors after their discharge from jury duty without prior court approval.
- Later courts cite it for
- “attorneys may discuss a trial with willing jurors after their discharge from jury duty.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 60-3412 27×cited by 13 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “: This medical malpractice case focuses on the K.S.A. 60-3412 “actual clinical practice” requirement for standard of care expert testimony.”
cites § 60-3412 14×cited by 22 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “Costello was guilty of negligence in (1) failing to direct and monitor nurse Mahoney in the administration of anesthesia, (2) beginning surgery after the failure of a spinal anesthesia administered under his direction, (3) ignoring the oral representation of Mahoney that Cathy…”
- The case’s holding
- A licensed physician who spends at least half of professional time in clinical practice may testify on the standard of care of another physician regardless of specialty; same-specialty testimony is not required.
- Later courts cite it for
- “abrogates vicarious liability where both health care providers ... are covered by the health care stabilization fund.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 60-3412 24×cited by 4 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “After the district court concluded Williams' standard of care witness qualified as an expert under K.S.A. 60-3412, Philip Diggdon, M.D., testified he had completed thousands of such surgeries, including hundreds on adults, and that Williams should have been checked for diabetes…”
- Later courts cite it for
- “would be an abandonment of long-time practice, severely limit counsel in their search for the truth and integrity of a jury's verdict, and make misconduct of a jury unduly difficult to be discovered and rectified.” · 1 citing court
cites § 60-3412 8×cited by 18 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “Simon, defendants sought summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim on the ground that Dawson’s designated expert witness on standard of care did not spend *375 at least 50% of his professional time in actual clinical practice for the 2 years preceding the incident giving…”
- Later courts cite it for
- “expert testimony is necessary to prove a deviation from the standard of care by a health care provider.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 60-3412 6×cited by 61 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “" In so instructing, the trial court was applying its interpretation of K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 60-3412, which provides: "In any medical malpractice liability action, as defined in K.”
- The case’s holding
- Errors regarding the admission of evidence are immaterial if the jury finds the plaintiff more than fifty percent at fault and does not reach the stage of calculating damages.
- Later courts cite it for
- “in any medical malpractice liability action, as defined in k.s.a. 60-3401 and amendments thereto, in which the standard of care given by a practitioner of the healing arts is at issue, no person shall qualify as an expert witness on such issue unless at least 50 of such person's professional time within the two-year period preceding the incident giving rise to the action is devoted to actual clinical practice in the same profession in which the defendant is licensed.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 60-3412 18×cited by 3 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “Kansas Standards For Expert Witness Testimony In Medical Malpractice Actions K.S.A. § 60-3412 provides that a physician must meet certain requirements to qualify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case.”
cites § 60-3412 2×cited by 129 cases
Overruled by Bair v. Peck on other grounds: 4 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “65-4922); and limitations were placed on the qualifications of expert witnesses in medical malpractice actions (K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 60-3412). Finally, the legislature attempted to limit the liability of health care providers in medical malpractice actions by capping recovery for…”
- The case’s holding
- Statutory limits on noneconomic damages in tort actions are constitutional under a form of intermediate scrutiny (finding statutory limit on noneconomic tort damages constitutional under a form of intermediate scrutiny).
- Later courts cite it for
- “not violated; unimpaired; unbroken; unprofaned.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 60-3412 12×cited by 4 cases
Reversed by Tompkins v. Bise (1996): the Supreme Court of Kansas's own opinion in this case.
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “The court ruled oral and maxillofacial surgery was the "profession" referred to by K.S.A. 60-3412, as applied to this case. At trial, the court allowed Captline to testify over Bise's objection.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “the expert witness must be licensed in the same profession a's the defendant.” · 1 citing court
cites § 60-3412 2×cited by 28 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “Moser cites K.S.A. 60-3412, which addresses the standard of care for a practitioner of the healing arts.”
- The case’s holding
- A physician with extensive labor and delivery experience may testify regarding nursing standards of care.
- Later courts cite it for
- “cox found it improper for a doctor to testify regarding his or her own preferred method of treatment in determining whether another doctor deviated from the appropriate standard of care.” · 1 citing court
cites § 60-3412 1×cited by 87 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “After plaintiffs lost one expert standard-of-care witness due to a conflict problem, defendant Baeke filed motions to (1) strike plaintiffs’ remaining standard-of-care witness, who did not have the requisite level of recent clinical practice, and then (2) grant summary judgment…”
- The case’s holding
- A district court does not abuse its discretion when granting a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) subject to conditions that mitigate prejudice to the opposing party.
- Later courts cite it for
- “falls within the district court's discretion and 'reversal requires a clear abuse of discretion.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 60-3412 6×cited by 6 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “The Hospital’s principal argument is that, in light of the undisputed facts, the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses is not sufficient to establish a cause of action against it. The Hospital argues that Dr.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “practitioners of healing arts,” · 1 citing court
cites § 60-3412 2×cited by 8 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “However, if a district court’s decision to admit expert testimony is based upon an interpretation of K.S.A. 60-3412, we have de novo review. Endorf v.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “taper-off' the paxil drug regimen, logan's deposition testimony is not sufficient to survive a summary judgment challenge. " 'expert witnesses should confine their opinions to relevant matters which are certain or probable, not those which are merely possible.” · 1 citing court
cites § 60-3412 1×cited by 23 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3412 (2005). In calculating the percentage of time a doctor devoted to active clinical practice, the Kansas Supreme Court considered all of the following activities to be included in “professional time”: direct patient care, group therapy, time spent on-call…”
- The case’s holding
- Professional activities for the twenty percent rule must contribute to or advance the profession and exclude passive activities such as reading journals.
- Later courts cite it for
- “information about the lack of fda approval is something that a patient could reasonably want to consider in deciding whether to place her confidence and trust in his or her physician about the treatment he or she is about to undertake.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 60-3412 2×cited by 6 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “Bain has filed a cross-appeal concerning the trial court’s disquahfication of one of her witnesses for failing to qualify as an expert pursuant to K.S.A. 60-3412. Bain’s husband Micky suffered from kidney failure in 1992.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “a trial court's order granting a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not a final order and, as such, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that order.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 60-3412 2×cited by 37 cases
Flagged on editorial review. Superseded by statute on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds and 1 says superseded outright. As recognized in Kelly v. Vinzant.
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “10); and the requirements for expert witnesses in K.S.A. 60-3412. The broad-sweeping act was apparently "prompted by the fear that the escalating cost of medical liability insurance would drive health care providers out of certain areas of practice, or even out of the state.”
- The case’s holding
- A failure to disclose a material fact constitutes a deceptive act under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act only if a duty to disclose that fact exists.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the well-established test for determining whether expert testimony is required is whether the subject matter is too complex to fall within the common knowledge of the jury and is 'beyond the capability of a lay person to decide.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 60-3412 1×cited by 5 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “2d 185 (quoting K.S.A. § 60-3412) (emphasis added). The defendant physician had been trained in surgeiy, plastic surgery, and cranial maxillofacial surgery; also, before attending medical school, he had graduated from dental school and had practiced dentistry.”
- The case’s holding
- Oral and maxillofacial surgery is not a related specialty to family medicine or radiology for certifying a standard of care breach regarding the initial diagnosis of facial fractures.
- Later courts cite it for
- “front line health care providers” · 1 citing court
cites § 60-3412 1×cited by 4 cases
- Where it cites § 60-3412
- “K.S.A. 60-3412. Endorfv. Bohlander, 995 P.”
Show all 25 citing cases (list view) →
The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.