Kansas Statutes Annotated

K.S.A. § 60-513 (2026)

Actions limited to two years

✓ current as of May 2026

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60-513. Actions limited to two years. (a) The following actions shall be brought within two years:

(1) An action for trespass upon real property.

(2) An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including actions for the specific recovery thereof.

(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the fraud is discovered.

(4) An action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, and not herein enumerated.

(5) An action for wrongful death.

(6) An action to recover for an ionizing radiation injury as provided in K.S.A. 60-513a, 60-513b and 60-513c, and amendments thereto.

(7) An action arising out of the rendering of or failure to render professional services by a health care provider, not arising on contract.

(b) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), the causes of action listed in subsection (a) shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.

(c) A cause of action arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services by a health care provider shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action, unless the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall such an action be commenced more than four years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.

(d) A negligence cause of action by a corporation or association against an officer or director of the corporation or association shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable to the injured party, but in no event shall such an action be commenced more than five years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action. All other causes of action by a corporation or association against an officer or director of the corporation or association shall not be deemed to have accrued until the act giving rise to the cause of action first causes substantial injury and there exists a disinterested majority of nonculpable directors of the corporation or association, or, if the fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the initial act, then the period of limitation shall not commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably ascertainable and there exists a disinterested majority of nonculpable directors of the corporation or association, but in no event shall such an action be commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action. For purposes of this subsection, the term "negligence cause of action" shall not include a cause of action seeking monetary damages for any breach of the officer's or director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or association, for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, for liability under K.S.A. 17-5812, 17-6410, 17-6423, 17-6424 or 17-6603 and amendments thereto, or for any transaction from which the officer or director derived an improper personal benefit.

(e) The provisions of this section as it was constituted prior to July 1, 1996, shall continue in force and effect for a period of two years from that date with respect to any act giving rise to a cause of action occurring prior to that date.

History: L. 1963, ch. 303, 60-513; L. 1968, ch. 6, § 1; L. 1976, ch. 254, § 1; L. 1987, ch. 222, § 1; L. 1996, ch. 127, § 1; July 1.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 806 cases (126 in the last 5 years), 1965–2026 · leading case: Martin v. Naik, 300 P.3d 625 (Kan. 2013).

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Martin v. Naik, 300 P.3d 625 (Kan. 2013). · cites it 56× “The court concluded: “[Bjecause Curley could not reasonably ascertain the fact of his injury, his medical malpractice claim (the survival action) did not accrue so as to start the statute of limitations clock running until his death, so the 2-year limitation period of K.S.A.…”

Gilger v. Lee Constr., Inc., 820 P.2d 390 (Kan. 1991). · cites it 72× “Thus, the court found appellants' action was time barred by K.S.A. 60-513 and granted summary judgment.”

Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 631 P.2d 222 (Kan. 1981). · cites it 56× “The district court held that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (K.S.A. 60-513). On this appeal, we will assume that the following facts are true: The plaintiff-appellant, Linda Rae Stephens, is a resident of Topeka, Kansas.”

Harding v. K.C. Wall Prods., Inc., 831 P.2d 958 (Kan. 1992). · cites it 42× “Wall motioned for summary judgment, arguing Harding’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations, K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-513. The district court denied K.”

Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991). · cites it 29× “Finding no constitutional infirmity in the statute, federal law dictates that the court find plaintiffs’ state claims to be timely under the two-year limitation period of K.S.A. § 60-513. Accordingly, it shall be unnecessary for plaintiffs to establish at trial the timeliness of…”

Bradley v. Val-Mejias, 379 F.3d 892 (10th Cir. 2004). · cites it 8× “K.S.A. § 60-513. Memorandum and Order, 238 F.”

Tomlinson v. Celotex Corp., 770 P.2d 825 (Kan. 1989). · cites it 33× “His injuries due to this exposure, however, did not become reasonably ascertainable until approximately 15 years later.”

Baughn v. Eli Lilly & Co., 356 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Kan. 2005). · cites it 76× “- When Ruthrauff was decided in 1974, Section 60-513 provided a two:year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”

Kerns Ex Rel. Kerns v. G.A.C., Inc., 875 P.2d 949 (Kan. 1994). · cites it 17× “K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-513 contains both a statute of limitations, subsection (a), and a statute of repose, subsection (b).”

City of Wichita v. United States Gypsum Co., 828 F. Supp. 851 (D. Kan. 1993). · cites it 26× “Statute of Limitations All defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs tort claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations of K.S.A. § 60-513, which provides, in pertinent part: “(b) .”

Ripley v. Tolbert, 921 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1996). · cites it 18× “115 , in upholding K.S.A. 60-513, is applicable to K.S.A. 1982 Supp.”

Speer v. Wheelabrator Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Kan. 1993). · cites it 54× “2 Our analysis begins with the general statute of limitations for tort actions in Kansas, K.S.A. 60-513. 3 K.S.A. 60-513(a) provides for a two-year limitation for tort actions and 60-513(b) and (c) explain how to determine when a cause of action accrues and serve to bar actions…”

Show all 806 citing cases →

— K.S.A. § 60-513(2) — 2 cases

Schoenholz v. Hinzman, 289 P.3d 1155 (Kan. 2012).

Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. Bowers, 36 F. Supp. 2d 915 (D. Kan. 1998).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(3) — 5 cases

Law v. Law Co. Bldg. Assocs., 289 P.3d 1066 (Kan. 2012).

Haag v. Dry Basement, Inc., 732 P.2d 392 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987).

Jones v. B. C. Christopher & Co., 466 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1979).

Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 714 (D. Kan. 1974).

Andale Equip., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 985 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Kan. 1997).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(4) — 10 cases

Kansas Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 941 P.2d 1321 (Kan. 1997).

Lewis v. Shuck, 623 P.2d 520 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).

Donnie R. Chappell & S. Eugene Schrock v. Noble J. Rouch, & Mid-Continent Cas. Co., Appellee-Intervener, 448 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1971).

Sullivan v. LaMunyon, 572 F. Supp. 753 (D. Kan. 1983).

Lawton v. Medevac Mid-Am., Inc., 138 F.R.D. 586 (D. Kan. 1991).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(5) — 2 cases

Webb v. Pomeroy, 655 P.2d 465 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).

Lawton v. Medevac Mid-Am., Inc., 138 F.R.D. 586 (D. Kan. 1991).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(7) — 1 case

Bloomer v. Topeka Operations Assoc LLC (D. Kan. 2024).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(a) — 91 cases

Harding v. K.C. Wall Prods., Inc., 831 P.2d 958 (Kan. 1992). “Wall motioned for summary judgment, arguing Harding’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations, K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 60-513. The district court denied K.”

McAlister v. Atl. Richfield Co., 662 P.2d 1203 (Kan. 1983).

Wanjiku v. Johnson Cnty., 173 F. Supp. 3d 1217 (D. Kan. 2016).

Ripley v. Tolbert, 921 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1996). “115 , in upholding K.S.A. 60-513, is applicable to K.S.A. 1982 Supp.”

Kerns Ex Rel. Kerns v. G.A.C., Inc., 875 P.2d 949 (Kan. 1994). “K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-513 contains both a statute of limitations, subsection (a), and a statute of repose, subsection (b).”

— K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(1) — 4 cases

John Doe v. M.J., 508 P.3d 368 (Kan. 2022).

City of Shawnee, Kan. v. AT & T CORP., 910 F. Supp. 1546 (D. Kan. 1995).

John Doe v. M.J., 482 P.3d 596 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).

Armstrong v. Bromley Quarry & Asphalt, Inc. (Kan. 2016).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(2) — 17 cases

Bigs v. City of Wichita, 23 P.3d 855 (Kan. 2001).

Dunn v. Dunn, 281 P.3d 540 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012).

Cline v. S. Star Cent. Gas Pipeline, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Kan. 2005).

Nancy Kathleen Prince, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Leesona Corp., Inc., Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant, 720 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1983).

Hemphill v. Shore, 289 P.3d 1173 (Kan. 2012).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3) — 75 cases

Miller v. Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, 790 P.2d 404 (Kan. 1990).

Kelly v. Vinzant, 197 P.3d 803 (Kan. 2008).

Unified Sch. Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 629 P.2d 196 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).

Hemphill v. Shore, 289 P.3d 1173 (Kan. 2012).

Law v. Law Co. Bldg. Assocs., 289 P.3d 1066 (Kan. 2012).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(3)(4) — 1 case

Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 690 P.2d 1343 (Kan. 1984).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4) — 250 cases

Marvin D. Baker v. The Bd. of Regents of the State of Kansas & Univ. of Kansas Med. Sch.--Sch. of Med., 991 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1993).

Lasley v. Hershey Foods Corp., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (D. Kan. 1999).

Burnett v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., 151 P.3d 837 (Kan. 2007).

Lowe v. Surpas Resource Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Kan. 2003).

Hallam v. Mercy Health Ctr. of Manhattan, Inc., 97 P.3d 492 (Kan. 2004).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(5) — 16 cases

Martin v. Naik, 300 P.3d 625 (Kan. 2013). “The court concluded: “[Bjecause Curley could not reasonably ascertain the fact of his injury, his medical malpractice claim (the survival action) did not accrue so as to start the statute of limitations clock running until his death, so the 2-year limitation period of K.S.A.…”

Davidson v. Denning, 914 P.2d 936 (Kan. 1996).

John Doe v. M.J., 508 P.3d 368 (Kan. 2022).

Whaley v. Sharp, 343 P.3d 63 (Kan. 2014).

Sleeth v. Sedan City Hosp., 317 P.3d 782 (Kan. 2014).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(7) — 34 cases

Williamson v. Amrani, 152 P.3d 60 (Kan. 2007).

Martindale v. Tenny, 829 P.2d 561 (Kan. 1992).

Bradley v. Val-Mejias, 379 F.3d 892 (10th Cir. 2004). “K.S.A. § 60-513. Memorandum and Order, 238 F.”

Smith v. Graham, 147 P.3d 859 (Kan. 2006).

Thurston v. Page, 931 F. Supp. 765 (D. Kan. 1996).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(l) — 2 cases

Bonin v. Vannaman, 929 P.2d 754 (Kan. 1996).

Deisher v. Kansas Dep't of Transp., 958 P.2d 656 (Kan. 1998).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(b) — 190 cases

Gilger v. Lee Constr., Inc., 820 P.2d 390 (Kan. 1991). “Thus, the court found appellants' action was time barred by K.S.A. 60-513 and granted summary judgment.”

Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991). “Finding no constitutional infirmity in the statute, federal law dictates that the court find plaintiffs’ state claims to be timely under the two-year limitation period of K.S.A. § 60-513. Accordingly, it shall be unnecessary for plaintiffs to establish at trial the timeliness of…”

Baughn v. Eli Lilly & Co., 356 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Kan. 2005). “- When Ruthrauff was decided in 1974, Section 60-513 provided a two:year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”

Tomlinson v. Celotex Corp., 770 P.2d 825 (Kan. 1989). “His injuries due to this exposure, however, did not become reasonably ascertainable until approximately 15 years later.”

— K.S.A. § 60-513(b)(c) — 1 case

Hall v. Miller, 36 P.3d 328 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(c) — 56 cases

Bradley v. Val-Mejias, 379 F.3d 892 (10th Cir. 2004). “K.S.A. § 60-513. Memorandum and Order, 238 F.”

Martindale v. Tenny, 829 P.2d 561 (Kan. 1992).

See v. Hartley, 896 P.2d 1049 (Kan. 1995).

Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 631 P.2d 222 (Kan. 1981). “The district court held that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (K.S.A. 60-513). On this appeal, we will assume that the following facts are true: The plaintiff-appellant, Linda Rae Stephens, is a resident of Topeka, Kansas.”

— K.S.A. § 60-513(c)(2) — 1 case

Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 662 P.2d 1301 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(c)(4) — 3 cases

Olson v. State High. Comm'n, 679 P.2d 167 (Kan. 1984).

Farmers Ins. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 608 P.2d 923 (Kan. 1980).

Johnson v. Miller, 655 P.2d 475 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(d) — 6 cases

Admire Bank & Trust v. City of Emporia, 829 P.2d 578 (Kan. 1992).

Four Seasons Apts., Ltd. v. AAA Glass Serv., Inc., 152 P.3d 101 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).

Tomlinson v. Celotex Corp., 770 P.2d 825 (Kan. 1989). “His injuries due to this exposure, however, did not become reasonably ascertainable until approximately 15 years later.”

— K.S.A. § 60-513(e) — 4 cases

Bradley v. Val-Mejias, 379 F.3d 892 (10th Cir. 2004). “K.S.A. § 60-513. Memorandum and Order, 238 F.”

Marzolf v. Gilgore, 924 F. Supp. 127 (D. Kan. 1996).

The Acquisition of Prop. by Eminent Domain, Unified Sch. Dist. No. 365 v. Diebolt, 320 P.3d 955 (Kan. 2014).

Asselin v. Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1454 (D. Kan. 1995).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(fc) — 1 case

Friends Univ. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 608 P.2d 936 (Kan. 1980).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(h) — 2 cases

Kristek v. Catron, 644 P.2d 480 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).

Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 662 P.2d 1301 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983).

— K.S.A. § 60-513(o)(4) — 2 cases

Clawson v. Garrison, 592 P.2d 117 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979).

Miller v. City of Overland Park, 646 P.2d 1114 (Kan. 1982).

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