Kansas Statutes Annotated homeSearch Kansas
K.S.A.Chapter 08

K.S.A. § 8-1522 (2026)

Driving on roadways laned for traffic; driving in right lane required; exceptions

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1983–2026 87citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 87 opinions since 1983, 11 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (43 cases).

8-1522. Driving on roadways laned for traffic; driving in right lane required; exceptions. Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply.

(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.

(b) Upon a roadway which is divided into three lanes and provides for two-way movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be driven in the center lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the same direction when such center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance, or in preparation for making a left turn or where such center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the same direction that the vehicle is proceeding and such allocation is designated by official traffic-control devices.

(c) Upon a highway located outside the corporate limits of any city divided into two lanes of traffic proceeding in the same direction, all vehicles shall be driven in the right lane except when:

(1) Overtaking and passing another vehicle;

(2) preparing to make a proper left turn;

(3) otherwise directed by official traffic-control devices; or

(4) otherwise required by other provisions of law.

(d) Upon a highway located outside the corporate limits of any city divided into three or more lanes of traffic proceeding in the same direction, vehicles shall not be driven in the far left lane except when:

(1) Overtaking and passing another vehicle;

(2) preparing to make a proper left turn;

(3) otherwise directed by official traffic-control devices; or

(4) otherwise required by other provisions of law.

(e) The provisions of subsections (c) and (d) shall not apply to authorized emergency vehicles, law enforcement vehicles, Kansas turnpike authority vehicles or department of transportation vehicles performing construction or maintenance work.

(f) Official traffic-control devices may be erected directing specified traffic to use a designated lane or designating those lanes to be used by traffic moving in a particular direction regardless of the center of the roadway and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such device.

(g) Official traffic-control devices may be installed prohibiting the changing of lanes on sections of roadway and drivers of vehicles shall obey the directions of every such device.

(h) From and after July 1, 2009, and prior to July 1, 2010, a law enforcement officer shall issue a warning citation to anyone violating the provisions of subsection (c) or (d).

History: L. 1974, ch. 33, § 8-1522; L. 2009, ch. 108, § 1; July 1.

The 20 cases that cite K.S.A. § 8-1522 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Marx, 215 P.3d 601 (Kan. 2009).
cites § 8-1522 95×subsections: (a) 63×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“The reversal was based on the Court of Appeals' determination that the initial traffic stop was lawful because the detaining officer had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle driver had violated K.S.A. 8-1522. The State cross-petitions for review of the Court of Appeals'…”
The case’s holding
A violation of the single lane rule requires more than an incidental and minimal lane breach to establish reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.
Later courts cite it for
“a violation of k.s.a. 8-1522(a) requires more than an incidental and minimal lane breach.” · 6 citing courts
2
GREENUnited States v. Jones, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (D. Kan. 2007).
cites § 8-1522 73×subsections: (a) 44×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“First, did Trooper Nicholas have reasonable suspicion to make the initial traffic stop? The defendants contend that Trooper Nicholas did not have reasonable suspicion that the defendant Blanchard in crossing over the fog line once violated K.S.A. § 8-1522, as that statute has…”
Later courts cite it for
“an extended trip, the likelihood of overnight travel, the pre-dawn hour, and the sudden swerve are enough, though just barely, for a reasonable suspicion that the driver was having difficulty staying awake as to justify a stop for safety reasons.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENState v. Arceo-Rojas, 458 P.3d 272 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 8-1522 21×subsections: (c) 15× (a) 2× (c)(1)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“S.A. 2018 Supp. 8-1522. The trial court also concluded that Lieutenant Stopper had "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that Arceo-Rojas failed to maintain a safe distance between her car and the car behind her.”
4
GREENState v. Garza, 286 P.3d 554 (Kan. 2012).
cites § 8-1522 16×subsections: (a)cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“But Garza argued the applicable law was K.S.A. 8-1522, which is the statute for failing to maintain a single lane.”
The case’s holding
A stop for driving left of center must be evaluated under the statute the State alleges was violated, and appellate courts may not make their own factual findings on reasonable suspicion.
5
GREENState v. Ross, 149 P.3d 876 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 8-1522 10×subsections: (a) 8×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“” K.S.A. 8-1522. Ross argues that because the statute only requires a driver to maintain a single lane “as nearly as practicable,” his failure to maintain a single lane does not necessarily constitute a violation of K.”
The case’s holding
Reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop regarding lane violations requires the totality of circumstances to show the vehicle left its lane when it was not safe to do so.
Later courts cite it for
“in articulating reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense has occurred in order to justify the traffic stop, the totality of the circumstances must make it appear to the officer that not only did the defendant's vehicle move from its lane of travel, but it left its lane when it was not safe to do so.” · 8 citing courts
6
GREENState of Tennessee v. Linzey Danielle Smith, 484 S.W.3d 393 (Tenn. 2016).
cites § 8-1522 4×subsections: (a) 3×cited by 61 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522 (as quoted in Marx, 215 P.”
The case’s holding
An officer may have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop based on the totality of the circumstances when observing a motorist crossing a clearly marked fog line.
Later courts cite it for
“individuals do not lose their constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures by getting into an automobile.” · 7 citing courts
7
REDState v. Marx, 171 P.3d 276 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 8-1522 23×cited by 5 cases
Reversed in part by State v. Marx (2009): the Supreme Court of Kansas's own opinion in this case ("Affirmed in part and reversed in part.").
Where it cites § 8-1522
“However, we disagree with the district court’s finding that the sheriff s deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the Marxes’ vehicle for failure to maintain a single lane, in violation of K.S.A. 8-1522. The motions to suppress raised other issues which the district court did…”
The case’s holding
An inherently unsafe maneuver involving crossing a lane line without a legitimate defense like weather or an obstacle provides reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.
Later courts cite it for
“a legitimate defense for moving from her lane of traffic, such as to avoid an obstacle in the road, this would not invalidate the stop as long as doudican reasonably believed in good faith that a traffic violation had occurred.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENUnited States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 1999).
cites § 8-1522 6×cited by 143 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“Ozbirn based on an observed violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522 . This statute provides that “[w]henever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic .”
The case’s holding
An officer possesses probable cause to stop a vehicle after observing the driver drift onto the shoulder multiple times within a short distance under optimal road and weather conditions.
Later courts cite it for
“adverse physical conditions existed” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Knight, 241 P.3d 120 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 8-1522 12×subsections: (a) 10×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“8-1522(a) requires that “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”
Later courts cite it for
“a failure to object to the imposition of bids fees has not disallowed parties from raising the issue for the first time on appeal.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Knight, 218 P.3d 1177 (Kan. 2009).
cites § 8-1522 12×subsections: (a) 10×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“K.S.A. 8-1522 applies “[w]henever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic.”
Later courts cite it for
“the heller court specifically mentioned prohibitions on concealed firearms in the sentence before its list of presumptively lawful prohibitions. the heller court began the paragraph stating that 'the right secured by the second amendment is not unlimited' and, two sentences later, noted prohibitions on carrying concealed firearms as an example. this clearly shows that the heller court considered concealed firearms prohibitions to be presumptively constitutional under the second amendment.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENUnited States v. Cline, Timothy, 349 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2003).
cites § 8-1522 3×cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“In this case, Cline was stopped for violating Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522 , which provides that “[w]henever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic .”
The case’s holding
A single instance of a vehicle drifting onto the shoulder of a road provides reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop.
Later courts cite it for
“succeed in showing that the necessity requirement was not met, evidence seized pursuant to the wiretap must be suppressed.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENUnited States v. Lopez, 485 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Kan. 2007).
cites § 8-1522 21×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“Lopez first argues that the officers lacked justification to stop him for violating K.S.A. § 8-1522. In order to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the traffic stop “ ‘must be based on an observed traffic violation’ or a ‘reasonable articulable…”
13
GREEN– State v. Jenkins –, 455 P.3d 779 (Kan. 2020).
cites § 8-1522 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“(K.S.A. 8-1522[a]) • Driving in the left lane while approaching a hill, curve, intersection, or railroad grade crossing.”
The case’s holding
Audio recordings qualify as writings and are authenticated by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter is what the proponent claims.
Later courts cite it for
“the burden of authentication is 'minimal' or 'slight,' and there is 'no precise formula' for district judges to determine authenticity.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENDods v. State, 2010 WY 133, 240 P.3d 1208.
cites § 8-1522 4×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“1999) ("The use of the phrase `as nearly as practicable' in [ Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522 (a)] precludes .”
15
GREENUnited States v. Valenzuela-Rojo, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1252 (D. Kan. 2015).
cites § 8-1522 11×subsections: (a) 7×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“for the proposition that K.S.A. 8-1522 is only vio *1258 lated when a driver literally crosses the line.”
16
GREENUnited States v. Herrell, 41 F. App'x 224 (10th Cir. 2002).
cites § 8-1522 5×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“Gregory on the grounds that the road and weather conditions in Meyer were optimal, Meyer drifted across the lane twice, not just once as in Gregory , and affirming the district court’s conclusion that the troopers had probable cause to stop Meyer’s vehicle for an observed…”
17
GREENUnited States v. Harmon, 785 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D.N.M. 2011).
cites § 8-1522 3×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“2001) (finding that trooper had probable cause to stop vehicle for an observed violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522 after vehicle drifted across the lane twice onto the shoulder in optimal road and weather conditions); United States v.”
18
GREENState v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110 (Kan. 1992).
cites § 8-1522 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 73 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“8-262(a)(1); one count of lane straddling, contrary to K.S.A. 8-1522(a); and one count of driving left of center, contrary to K.”
The case’s holding
Horizontal gaze nystagmus test results constitute scientific evidence and require a Frye foundation for admissibility.
Later courts cite it for
“an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may be horizontal, vertical, rotatory, or mixed.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENUnited States v. Neeley, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (D. Kan. 2007).
cites § 8-1522 11×subsections: (a) 5×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“*1335 In the latter case, one panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals declined to follow Ross’s interpretation of K.S.A. 8-1522, written by another panel of that same court.”
20
GREENUnited States v. Brown, 234 F. App'x 838 (10th Cir. 2007).
cites § 8-1522 5×subsections: (a) 5×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 8-1522
“Brown for violating K.S.A. § 8-1522(a), which provides: [wjhenever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, .”

Show all 87 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320042026

One bar per year. Tallest: 10 cases in 2007. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D. Kan.2310th Cir.22Kan. Ct. App.22Kan.11Mich. Ct. App.2D.N.M.2Tenn.26th Cir.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 10 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)43 cases
State v. Marx, 215 P.3d 601 (Kan. 2009).“The reversal was based on the Court of Appeals' determination that the initial traffic stop was lawful because the detaining officer had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle driver had violated K.S.A. 8-1522. The State cross-petitions for review of the Court of Appeals'…”
United States v. Jones, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (D. Kan. 2007).“First, did Trooper Nicholas have reasonable suspicion to make the initial traffic stop? The defendants contend that Trooper Nicholas did not have reasonable suspicion that the defendant Blanchard in crossing over the fog line once violated K.S.A. § 8-1522, as that statute has…”
State v. Ross, 149 P.3d 876 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).“” K.S.A. 8-1522. Ross argues that because the statute only requires a driver to maintain a single lane “as nearly as practicable,” his failure to maintain a single lane does not necessarily constitute a violation of K.”
State of Tennessee v. Linzey Danielle Smith, 484 S.W.3d 393 (Tenn. 2016).“Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522 (as quoted in Marx, 215 P.”
State v. Knight, 241 P.3d 120 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010).“8-1522(a) requires that “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”
Showing the top 5 of 43. More in the list view →
(c)3 cases
State v. Arceo-Rojas, 458 P.3d 272 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).“S.A. 2018 Supp. 8-1522. The trial court also concluded that Lieutenant Stopper had "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that Arceo-Rojas failed to maintain a safe distance between her car and the car behind her.”
State v. Robinson, 500 P.3d 1225 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
State v. Shimer, 495 P.3d 414 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
(c)(1)2 cases
State v. Arceo-Rojas, 458 P.3d 272 (Kan. Ct. App. 2020).
State v. Robinson, 500 P.3d 1225 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
(c)(3)1 case
State v. Robinson, 500 P.3d 1225 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).
(c)(4)1 case
State v. Robinson, 500 P.3d 1225 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021).

Show all 87 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

Kansas Statutes Annotated Home  |  Search Kansas  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com