8-1528.
Stop signs and yield signs; duties of drivers.
(a) Preferential right-of-way may be indicated by stop signs or yield signs as authorized in K.S.A. 8-2008, and amendments thereto.
(b) Except when directed to proceed by a police officer, every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After having stopped, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when such driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways. Such driver shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians within an adjacent crosswalk.
(c) The driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall in obedience to such sign slow down to a speed reasonable for the existing conditions and, if required for safety to stop, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After slowing or stopping, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time such driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways. Such driver shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians within an adjacent crosswalk. If a driver is involved in a collision with a vehicle in the intersection or junction of roadways or with a pedestrian in an adjacent crosswalk, after driving past a yield sign without stopping, such collision shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the driver's failure to yield the right-of-way.
History:
L. 1974, ch. 33, § 8-1528; L. 1995, ch. 188, § 5; July 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
17
cases (
5 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case:
– State v. Jenkins –, 455 P.3d 779 (Kan. 2020).
– State v. Jenkins –, 455 P.3d 779 (Kan. 2020).
· cites it 2× “(K.S.A. 8-1528[b]) Failing to stop at a red light.”
State v. Burrell, 699 P.2d 499 (Kan. 1985).
· cites it 2× “The information stated that he had unintentionally killed two human beings while in the “wanton commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, to wit: failure to stop at stop sign as defined in K.S.A. 8-1528.” Steve Covert testified that he had been traveling along…”
Deal v. Bowman, 188 P.3d 941 (Kan. 2008).
“Running a stop sign clearly violates K.S.A. 8-1528(b). Although the violation of a traffic ordinance is not always an indication of negligence as a matter of law, this court has held that such a violation is almost always negligence when it is the proximate cause of an injury.”
State v. Trudell, 755 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1988).
“In dictum, however, we stated, “It was clearly established through the evidence at the preliminary hearing that the defendant had committed an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, namely, running a stop sign contrary to K.”
McCleary v. Boss, 955 P.2d 127 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 2× “K.S.A. 8-1528(b). Plaintiff’s argument that the ATV driver could have stopped at the stop sign where tire view was obstructed and lawfully proceeded across the intersection without again checking for oncoming traffic flies in the face of the clear language of K.”
State v. Wright, 603 P.2d 1034 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979).
“8-1567 and failure to stop at a stop sign in violation of K.S.A. 8-1528. On December 15, 1978, two Chanute police officers while on routine patrol at approximately 12:45 a.”
Ellis v. Sketers Ex Rel. Sketers, 564 P.2d 568 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977).
“8-552 (a), now K.S.A. 8-1528 (a), which provides: *326 “Preferential right-of-way at an intersection may be indicated by stop signs or yield signs as authorized in K.”
Meyer ex rel. Meyer v. Stone, 627 P.2d 1155 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
“” This instruction is an adaptation of PIK Civ. 2d 8.29 and 8.30 (1977), both of which are based on the duties of drivers as they *256 approach intersections controlled by stop signs or yield signs (K.”
Downing (D. Kan. 2026).
· cites it 11× “Additionally, we must construe statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd results, and we presume the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation.29 27 See Drake, 2016 WL 1328941 , at *4; Chavez-Matchie, 2017 WL 2378334 , at *3; Kobilan v.”
State v. Richardson, 194 P.3d 599 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
“8-1514 (driving left of center), K.S.A. 8-1528 (failing to stop at a stop sign), K.”
Downing (D. Kan. 2025).
· cites it 2× “25 While a cause of action may be available in a commercial dispute involving violations of FMCSRs, a private cause of action does not extend to personal injury actions such as Plaintiff’s.26 Because Plaintiff cannot assert a private cause of action based on a 22 K.”
United States v. Aleman (10th Cir. 2017).
“at 8 (citing Wyandotte County Ordinance § 35-374(b)); see also K.S.A. 8-1528 (substantively, though not completely, identical language).”
— K.S.A. § 8-1528(b) — 4 cases
Deal v. Bowman, 188 P.3d 941 (Kan. 2008).
“Running a stop sign clearly violates K.S.A. 8-1528(b). Although the violation of a traffic ordinance is not always an indication of negligence as a matter of law, this court has held that such a violation is almost always negligence when it is the proximate cause of an injury.”
McCleary v. Boss, 955 P.2d 127 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
“K.S.A. 8-1528(b). Plaintiff’s argument that the ATV driver could have stopped at the stop sign where tire view was obstructed and lawfully proceeded across the intersection without again checking for oncoming traffic flies in the face of the clear language of K.”
Downing (D. Kan. 2026).
“Additionally, we must construe statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd results, and we presume the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation.29 27 See Drake, 2016 WL 1328941 , at *4; Chavez-Matchie, 2017 WL 2378334 , at *3; Kobilan v.”
Downing (D. Kan. 2025).
“25 While a cause of action may be available in a commercial dispute involving violations of FMCSRs, a private cause of action does not extend to personal injury actions such as Plaintiff’s.26 Because Plaintiff cannot assert a private cause of action based on a 22 K.”
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