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Ky. Rev. Stat.Chapter 189

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.390 (2026)

Speed -- Secretary authorized to increase speed limit in certain areas by

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1943–2024 57citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 57 opinions since 1943, 7 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (10 cases).

official order -- Parking.

(1) As used in this section, unless the context requires otherwise:

(a) "Business district" means the territory contiguous to and including a highway if, within six hundred (600) feet along the highway, there are buildings in use for business or industrial purposes that occupy three hundred (300) feet of frontage on one (1) side or three hundred (300) feet collectively on both sides of the highway;

(b) "Residential district" means the territory contiguous to and including a highway not comprising a business district if the property on the highway for a distance of three hundred (300) feet or more is improved with residences or residences and buildings in use for business; and

(c) "State highway" means a highway or street maintained by the Kentucky Department of Highways.

(2) An operator of a vehicle upon a highway shall not drive at a greater speed than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the traffic and for the condition and use of the highway.

(3) The speed limit for motor vehicles on state highways shall be as follows, unless conditions exist that require lower speed for compliance with subsection (2) of this section, or the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet establishes a different speed limit in accordance with subsection (4) of this section:

(a) Sixty-five (65) miles per hour on interstate highways and parkways;

(b) Fifty-five (55) miles per hour on all other state highways; and

(c) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour in a business or residential district.

(4) (a) If the secretary of transportation determines, upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation, that any speed limit is greater or less than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any intersection, or upon any part of a state highway, the secretary of transportation may establish by official order a reasonable and safe speed limit at the location. The secretary shall not increase any speed limit established by subsection (3) of this section in excess of sixty-five (65) miles per hour, except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3)(a) of this section, the secretary may increase the speed limit on any of the following segments of highway to seventy (70) miles per hour:

1. Interstate 24 (entire length);

2. Interstate 64 from Interstate 264 to the West Virginia state line;

3. Interstate 65 from Interstate 264 to the Tennessee state line;

4. Interstate 69 (entire length);

5. Interstate 71 from Interstate 264 to Interstate 275;

6. Interstate 75 from the Tennessee state line to Interstate 275;

7. Interstate 165 (entire length);

8. The Audubon Parkway (entire length);

9. The Julian M. Carroll Purchase Parkway (entire length);

10. The Bert T. Combs Mountain Parkway (entire length);

11. The Bert T. Combs Mountain Parkway Extension (entire length);

12. The Edward T. Breathitt Pennyrile Parkway (entire length);

13. The Wendell H. Ford Western Kentucky Parkway (entire length);

14. The Louie B. Nunn Cumberland Expressway (entire length);

15. The Martha Layne Collins Bluegrass Parkway (entire length); and

16. The William H. Natcher Parkway (entire length).

(b) In a highway work zone, the Transportation Cabinet may temporarily reduce established speed limits without an engineering or traffic investigation. A speed limit established under this paragraph shall become effective when and where posted. The Transportation Cabinet shall post signs notifying the traveling public of the temporary highway work zone maximum speed limit. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prevent the Transportation Cabinet from using moveable or portable speed limit signs in highway work zones.

(5) (a) A city or a county may by ordinance establish speed limits within its own jurisdiction, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection.

(b) The alteration of speed limits on state highways within a city or a county shall not be effective until the alteration has been approved by the secretary of transportation. The secretary shall not approve any alteration that could increase any speed limit established by subsection (3)(b) or (c) of this section in excess of fifty-five (55) miles per hour.

(c) If a county determines, upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation and study, that it is unsafe to park motor vehicles on or along any highway, other than a state highway, within the unincorporated areas of the county, or that in any business district the congestion of traffic justifies a reasonable limitation on the length of time any one (1) motor vehicle is permitted to park in such district so as to reduce the congestion, the fiscal court may by ordinance establish "no parking" areas on the highway, or limit the length of time any motor vehicle may be parked in any business district.

(6) The speed limit for motor vehicles in an off-street parking facility offered for public use, whether publicly or privately owned, shall be fifteen (15) miles per hour.

(7) Except as outlined in KRS 189.940, a person shall not drive a motor vehicle at a speed that will impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.

(8) In every charge for a violation of any speed limit specified in this section, the warrant or citation shall specify the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have driven, and the lawful speed limit applicable at the location where the violation is charged to have occurred. Effective: July 14, 2022 History: Amended 2022 Ky. Acts ch. 35, sec. 2, effective July 14, 2022. -- Amended 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 186, sec. 3, effective June 29, 2021. -- Amended 2019 Ky. Acts ch. 168, sec. 1, effective June 27, 2019. -- Amended 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 25, sec. 1, effective July 12, 2012. -- Amended 2007 Ky. Acts ch. 43, sec. 1, effective June 26, 2007. -- Amended 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 130, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1998. -- Amended 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 37, sec. 4, effective July 15, 1996. -- Amended 1992 Ky. Acts ch. 143, sec. 1, effective July 14, 1992. -- Amended 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 177, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1988. -- Amended 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 230, sec. 1, effective June 17, 1978. -- Amended 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 46, sec. 2; and ch. 74, Art. IV, sec. 20(10). -- Amended 1970 Ky. Acts ch. 93, sec. 10. -- Amended 1966 Ky. Acts ch. 18, sec. 4. -- Amended 1964 Ky. Acts ch. 13, sec. 1. -- Amended 1962 Ky. Acts ch. 150, sec. 1. -- Amended 1954 Ky. Acts ch. 143, sec. 1. -- Amended 1950 Ky. Acts ch. 97, sec. 1. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. sec. 2739g-43, 2739g-86. Legislative Research Commission Note. This section was also amended in the reviser's bill, Acts 1978, ch. 384, sec. 336, however, Acts 1978, ch. 230, HB 211, sec. 1 prevailed. See KRS 7.136(3).

The 20 cases that cite Ky. Rev. Stat. § 189.390 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
YELLOWBurns v. Level, 957 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1998).
cites § 189.390 2×subsections: (6) 2×cited by 49 cases
Abrogated by Nami Res. Co. v. Asher Land & Mineral, Ltd. on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 189.390
“Instruction 4(d) was premised upon the language of KRS 189.390(6), which provides that “[a] person shall not drive a motor vehicle at a speed that will impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in…”
The case’s holding
An unpreserved constitutional challenge to a statute does not constitute palpable error, and a subsequent ruling invalidating that statute applies non-retroactively to the case.
Later courts cite it for
“easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.” · 9 citing courts
2
GREENLloyd v. Commonwealth, 324 S.W.3d 384 (Ky. 2010).
cites § 189.390 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“[34] See KRS 189.390 (stating maximum permissible speed of sixty-five or seventy miles per hour, depending on the location, for interstate highways in Kentucky).”
Later courts cite it for
“for theft by unlawful taking to be subsumed into robbery.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENBarnes v. Commonwealth, 204 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App. 1947).
cites § 189.390 4×subsections: (3) 4×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“KRS 189.390(3). Pace testified that appellant was driving the truck at a speed of fifty to fifty-five miles per hour.”
4
GREENFayette Cnty. v. Hill, 201 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. Ct. App. 1947).
cites § 189.390 8×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“It is argued that subsection (4) (a) was intended to apply to all emergency vehicles owned by a governmental agency whether a city, county, school district or other subdivision of the state, and that a construction of the statute limiting the exemption therein provided to city…”
Later courts cite it for
“absurdity which may follow one construction or another may properly be considered.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENMurphy v. City of Lake Louisvilla, 303 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
cites § 189.390 7×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“” The City asserts, and we think correctly so, that KRS 189.390 is controlling. This section deals with speed and parking on highways.”
6
GREENHealthwise of Kentucky, Ltd. v. Anglin, 956 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1997).
cites § 189.390 1×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“Under this definition, Anglin was committing the crimes of speeding, KRS 189.390, drag racing, KRS 189.505, and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), KRS 189A.”
The case’s holding
An insurance exclusion for injuries sustained while under the influence of alcohol requires a formal criminal adjudication of legal intoxication to be triggered.
Later courts cite it for
“sustained as a result of being under the influence of alcohol (legal intoxication as defined by kentucky law)” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENClardy v. Robinson, 284 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).
cites § 189.390 4×subsections: (5) 3×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“We construe this statute as having implicit in it what is expressly stated in KRS 189.390 (5); that is, if stopping is necessary for the safe operation of a vehicle (or in compliance with law) it is not prohibited.”
8
GREENChambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
cites § 189.390 1×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“The statute regulating the speed of motor vehicles does not apply to city fire and police vehicles, now KRS 189.390(4a) ; Carroll’s Kentucky Statutes, Section 2739g-51(9), effective at the time of this accident, and police cars have the right of way while being operated as such…”
The case’s holding
Police officers performing their lawful duty are not liable for injuries caused by a fleeing driver's own negligent speed during the pursuit.
9
GREENGasparac v. Castle, 330 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959).
cites § 189.390 2×subsections: (6)cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“The statute relating to speed of motor vehicles, KRS 189.390, exempts from the application of the speed limitations an “emergency vehicle when responding to an emergency call * * * and the driver thereof sounds audible signal by bell, siren, or exhaust whistle, and when such…”
10
GREENWilburn v. Simons Legg v. Simons, 196 S.W.2d 356 (Ky. Ct. App. 1946).
cites § 189.390 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“” And if he was so traveling over or near the crest of a hill, such may have been negligence under all the proven circumstances and may have been a violation of his duty to drive reasonably and prudently.”
11
GREENCity of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967).
cites § 189.390 1×subsections: (6)cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“KRS 189.390(6) exempts emergency vehicles from speed regulations when answering an emergency and provides for visibility of signal lights of at least 500 feet in normal atmospheric conditions, but this section concludes with this admonition of safety: “This provision shall not…”
12
GREENBerry v. Jorris, 199 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. Ct. App. 1947).
cites § 189.390 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“See KRS 189.390. This accident happened in what is called the “highlands ’ ’ section of Louisville, many blocks from the business hub of the city.”
Later courts cite it for
“a boy cannot kill his own parents and then plead for mercy upon himself because he is a poor orphan boy.” · 1 citing court
13
GREENHenderson v. Watson, 262 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
cites § 189.390 3×subsections: (6) 3×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“” KRS 189.390(6) exempts an authorized emergency vehicle when responding to an emergency call from the speed limitations applicable to an ordinary motor vehicle when the driver thereof sounds an audible signal and when the vehicle is equipped with and flashes a red light visible…”
14
GREENRoberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960).
cites § 189.390 1×subsections: (8)cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“The instruction was based upon a determination by the trial court that the place of the accident was a residential district, which is defined in KRS 189.390(8) (b) as being: “The territory contiguous to and including a highway not comprising a business district when the property…”
Later courts cite it for
“where the defendants in a personal injury action are charged with independent acts of negligence ... the interests of the defendants are most always antagonistic, because each may escape liability or reduce his liability by convincing the jury that the other was solely or primarily responsible.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENWilliams v. Chilton, 427 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
cites § 189.390 2×subsections: (5) 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“” KRS 189.390(5) : “No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal or reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.”
16
NO FLAGCommonwealth of Kentucky v. Kevin Charles Curry, 607 S.W.3d 618 (Ky. 2020).
cites § 189.390 33×subsections: (3) 13× (4) 2× (1) (2)cited by 0 casesunknown
Where it cites § 189.390
“Subsequently, Curry moved the Jefferson District Court to find that KRS 189.390 was unconstitutional: Curry claimed the statute was void for vagueness because a reasonable person could not read the statute and understand which speed limit applied on a given road in Kentucky.”
17
NO FLAGCommonwealth of Kentucky v. Kevin Charles Curry, 607 S.W.3d 618 (Ky. 2020).
cites § 189.390 33×subsections: (3) 13× (4) 2× (1) (2)cited by 0 casesunknown
Where it cites § 189.390
“Subsequently, Curry moved the Jefferson District Court to find that KRS 189.390 was unconstitutional: Curry claimed the statute was void for vagueness because a reasonable person could not read the statute and understand which speed limit applied on a given road in Kentucky.”
18
GREENBumpus v. Drinkard's Adm'x, 279 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).
cites § 189.390 3×subsections: (1) (2)cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“1950, KRS 189.390 made a violation of the statutory speed limit only prima facie evidence of unreasonable and improper driving.”
19
GREENLever Bros. Co. v. Stapleton, 233 S.W.2d 1002 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950).
cites § 189.390 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“The estimates of three witnesses that it was being driven at 50 or 60 miles an hour, the terrific impact upon the child, the undenied skidding after the brakes were applied, all indicate an illegally excessive speed.”
20
GREENRiggs v. Miller, 396 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
cites § 189.390 1×subsections: (1)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 189.390
“See KRS 189.390(1) (a). Besides there is the undisputed testimony of John J.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
194219832024

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 6 cases in 1954–1955. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ky. Ct. App.23Ky. Ct. App.21Ky.6W.D. Ky.5E.D. Ky.2
By subsection
(1)10 cases
Riggs v. Miller, 396 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).“See KRS 189.390(1) (a). Besides there is the undisputed testimony of John J.”
Lucas v. Davis, 409 S.W.2d 297 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966).
Galloway v. Patterson, 229 S.W.2d 960 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950).
Bumpus v. Drinkard's Adm'x, 279 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).“1950, KRS 189.390 made a violation of the statutory speed limit only prima facie evidence of unreasonable and improper driving.”
Strode v. Campbell, 224 S.W.2d 673 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949).
Showing the top 5 of 10. More in the list view →
(2)5 cases
Sparks v. Doe, 379 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
Bumpus v. Drinkard's Adm'x, 279 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Kevin Charles Curry, 607 S.W.3d 618 (Ky. 2020).“Subsequently, Curry moved the Jefferson District Court to find that KRS 189.390 was unconstitutional: Curry claimed the statute was void for vagueness because a reasonable person could not read the statute and understand which speed limit applied on a given road in Kentucky.”
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Kevin Charles Curry, 607 S.W.3d 618 (Ky. 2020).“Subsequently, Curry moved the Jefferson District Court to find that KRS 189.390 was unconstitutional: Curry claimed the statute was void for vagueness because a reasonable person could not read the statute and understand which speed limit applied on a given road in Kentucky.”
Zettler v. Hughes, 283 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).
(2)(a)1 case
Johnson v. Hunt, 122 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Ky. 1954).
(2)(d)1 case
Gravatt v. B. F. Saul Real Est. Inv. Trust, 601 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1980).
(3)6 cases
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 204 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App. 1947).“KRS 189.390(3). Pace testified that appellant was driving the truck at a speed of fifty to fifty-five miles per hour.”
Brown v. Crumpton, 252 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
Fentress v. Hardin's Adm'x, 273 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(4)3 cases
Evans v. Lorenz, 454 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
(5)3 cases
Clardy v. Robinson, 284 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).“We construe this statute as having implicit in it what is expressly stated in KRS 189.390 (5); that is, if stopping is necessary for the safe operation of a vehicle (or in compliance with law) it is not prohibited.”
Williams v. Chilton, 427 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).“” KRS 189.390(5) : “No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal or reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.”
Tupts ex rel. Dawson v. Judy, 272 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
(5)(a)2 cases
(5)(b)2 cases
(6)6 cases
Burns v. Level, 957 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1998).“Instruction 4(d) was premised upon the language of KRS 189.390(6), which provides that “[a] person shall not drive a motor vehicle at a speed that will impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in…”
City of Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967).“KRS 189.390(6) exempts emergency vehicles from speed regulations when answering an emergency and provides for visibility of signal lights of at least 500 feet in normal atmospheric conditions, but this section concludes with this admonition of safety: “This provision shall not…”
Henderson v. Watson, 262 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).“” KRS 189.390(6) exempts an authorized emergency vehicle when responding to an emergency call from the speed limitations applicable to an ordinary motor vehicle when the driver thereof sounds an audible signal and when the vehicle is equipped with and flashes a red light visible…”
Gasparac v. Castle, 330 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959).“The statute relating to speed of motor vehicles, KRS 189.390, exempts from the application of the speed limitations an “emergency vehicle when responding to an emergency call * * * and the driver thereof sounds audible signal by bell, siren, or exhaust whistle, and when such…”
Fayette Cnty. v. Veach, 294 S.W.2d 541 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(8)5 cases
Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960).“The instruction was based upon a determination by the trial court that the place of the accident was a residential district, which is defined in KRS 189.390(8) (b) as being: “The territory contiguous to and including a highway not comprising a business district when the property…”
Mayer v. Dickerson, 321 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959).
Bowling Green-Hopkinsville Bus Co. v. Adams, 261 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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