(1) When collection of a judgment for the payment of money has been stayed as
provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure, there shall be no damages assessed on the
first appeal as a matter of right contemplated by Section 115 of the Constitution of
Kentucky.
(2) When collection of a judgment for the payment of money has been stayed as
provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure pending any other appeal, damages of ten
percent (10%) on the amount stayed shall be imposed against the appellant in the
event the judgment is affirmed or the appeal is dismissed after having been
docketed in an appellate court.
(3) Similar damages of ten percent (10%) shall be imposed when a petition for writ of
certiorari, petition for rehearing, or other petition which stays collection of a
judgment for the payment of money is denied by an appellate court under
circumstances not constituting a first appeal under subsection (1) of this section.
(4) No additional penalty shall be imposed upon a party as a consequence of a review
subsequent to a petition or a second appeal.
(5) Damages imposed under subsection (2) or (3) of this section shall not be payable
and shall be void if the decision of the trial court awarding the payment of money is
ultimately reversed.
History: Created 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 59, sec. 1.
Formerly codified as KRS 26A.010.
Notes of Decisions
Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Resources, Inc., 163 S.W.3d 408 (Ky. 2005).
· cites it 37× “Appellant had stayed enforcement of the judgment during the appellate process by posting a supersedeas bond, and because the discretionary review motion further delayed enforcement of the judgment, the trial court, pursuant to KRS 26A.300, assessed as additional damages a…”
Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565 (Ky. 2009).
· cites it 7× “2005), wherein this Court found unconstitutional the ten percent penalty provisions of KRS 26A.300, also put into question the validity of KRS 860.”
Delahanty v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.3d 489 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 7× “In Elk Horn , the Kentucky Supreme Court determined that KRS 26A.300 violated the separation of powers provisions of the Kentucky Constitution because it limited the Kentucky Supreme Court in exercising its jurisdiction to review cases from lower courts.”
Ash v. Sec. Nat'l Ins. Co., 574 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 16× “This is an appeal from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying appellants’ motion for damages under KRS 26A.300. This case turns solely on the interpretation this Court will give to that statute.”
Coomer v. Gray, 750 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1988).
· cites it 14× “The issue in this case is whether the ten percent damage for delay provision of KRS 26A.300 applies upon the second appeal from a judgment which determines ownership of sums of money held by a Master Commissioner in an interest bearing account pursuant to an order of the court.”
Sharp v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 21 (Tax Ct. 1980).
· cites it 6× “(See note 3 supra ). These three legislative acts comprised chapter 59 of the 1976 Acts of Kentucky.”
Cheyenne Resources, Inc. v. Elk Horn Coal Corp., 265 S.W.3d 184 (Ky. 2008).
· cites it 13× “After the appellate process was completed, the Floyd Circuit Court entered an order enforcing its judgment which included, (pursuant to KRS 26A.300) a 10% penalty in the sum of $950,000.”
Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
“1 Compare Ky. Rev. Stat. §26A.300 (1985) (mandatory 10% penalty for second appeal); Miss.”
Watts v. Lab'y Corp. of Am., 139 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 11× “Watts, deceased, appeals from an order of the Warren Circuit Court denying the estate’s motion to impose a penalty on Laboratory Corporation of America pursuant to KRS 26A.300. We agree with the estate that the penalty is mandatory when a judgment has been superseded while an…”
Brown J. Sharp v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 689 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1983).
· cites it 2× “130 was repealed and Ky. Rev. Stat. § 26A.300(1) enacted. This step was apparently taken to “insure that there would be no penalty assessed for an appeal brought as a matter of right under section 115.”
Ford v. Ford, 623 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1981).
· cites it 2× “Our resolution of the issue of whether the supersedeas penalty provided by KRS 26A.300(2) applies to this case dispenses with the need to consider the other two.”
Wells v. S. Ry. Co., 633 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. 1982).
· cites it 2× “” KRS 26A.300 deals with the collection of judgments and damages when the collection has been delayed.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 26A.300(1) — 3 cases
Brown J. Sharp v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 689 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1983).
“130 was repealed and Ky. Rev. Stat. § 26A.300(1) enacted. This step was apparently taken to “insure that there would be no penalty assessed for an appeal brought as a matter of right under section 115.”
Ash v. Sec. Nat'l Ins. Co., 574 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
“This is an appeal from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying appellants’ motion for damages under KRS 26A.300. This case turns solely on the interpretation this Court will give to that statute.”
Watts v. Lab'y Corp. of Am., 139 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).
“Watts, deceased, appeals from an order of the Warren Circuit Court denying the estate’s motion to impose a penalty on Laboratory Corporation of America pursuant to KRS 26A.300. We agree with the estate that the penalty is mandatory when a judgment has been superseded while an…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 26A.300(2) — 3 cases
Coomer v. Gray, 750 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1988).
“The issue in this case is whether the ten percent damage for delay provision of KRS 26A.300 applies upon the second appeal from a judgment which determines ownership of sums of money held by a Master Commissioner in an interest bearing account pursuant to an order of the court.”
Ford v. Ford, 623 S.W.2d 903 (Ky. 1981).
“Our resolution of the issue of whether the supersedeas penalty provided by KRS 26A.300(2) applies to this case dispenses with the need to consider the other two.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 26A.300(3) — 3 cases
Ash v. Sec. Nat'l Ins. Co., 574 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
“This is an appeal from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying appellants’ motion for damages under KRS 26A.300. This case turns solely on the interpretation this Court will give to that statute.”
Watts v. Lab'y Corp. of Am., 139 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).
“Watts, deceased, appeals from an order of the Warren Circuit Court denying the estate’s motion to impose a penalty on Laboratory Corporation of America pursuant to KRS 26A.300. We agree with the estate that the penalty is mandatory when a judgment has been superseded while an…”
Wells v. S. Ry. Co., 633 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. 1982).
“” KRS 26A.300 deals with the collection of judgments and damages when the collection has been delayed.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.