administrative law judge.
(1) An award or order of the administrative law judge as provided in KRS 342.275, if
petition for reconsideration is not filed as provided for in KRS 342.281, shall be
conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact, but either party may in
accordance with administrative regulations promulgated by the commissioner
appeal to the Workers' Compensation Board for the review of the order or award.
(2) No new or additional evidence may be introduced before the board except as to the
fraud or misconduct of some person engaged in the administration of this chapter
and affecting the order, ruling, or award, but the board shall otherwise hear the
appeal upon the record as certified by the administrative law judge and shall dispose
of the appeal in summary manner. The board shall not substitute its judgment for
that of the administrative law judge as to the weight of evidence on questions of
fact, its review being limited to determining whether or not:
(a) The administrative law judge acted without or in excess of his powers;
(b) The order, decision, or award was procured by fraud;
(c) The order, decision, or award is not in conformity to the provisions of this
chapter;
(d) The order, decision, or award is clearly erroneous on the basis of the reliable,
probative, and material evidence contained in the whole record; or
(e) The order, decision, or award is arbitrary or capricious or characterized by
abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
(3) Within sixty (60) days following the date on which the last appellate brief was filed,
the board shall enter its decision affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order,
decision, or award, or in its discretion remanding the claim to the administrative law
judge for further proceedings in conformity with the direction of the board. The
board may, before decision and upon a sufficient showing of fact, remand the claim
to the administrative law judge.
Effective: July 15, 2010
History: Amended 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 24, sec. 1814, effective July 15, 2010. --
Amended 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 355, sec. 9, effective July 15, 1996. -- Amended 1994
Ky. Acts ch. 181, Part 15, sec. 82, effective April 4, 1994. -- Amended 1987 (1st
Extra. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 1, sec. 34, effective January 4, 1988. -- Amended 1976 Ky.
Acts ch. 111, sec. 1, -- Amended 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 78, sec. 32, effective January 1,
1973 -- Amended 1964 Ky. Acts ch. 192, sec. 22. -- Amended 1962 Ky. Acts ch. 18,
sec. 1. -- Amended 1960 Ky. Acts ch. 147, sec. 15. -- Amended 1948 Ky. Acts ch.
152, sec. 1. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942,
from Ky. Stat. sec. 4935.
Notes of Decisions
Bowerman v. Black Equip. Co., 297 S.W.3d 858 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 12× “KRS 342.285 designates the ALJ as finder of fact, and has been construed to mean that the factfinder has the sole discretion to determine the quality, character, weight, credibility, and substance of the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
Hutchins v. Gen. Elec. Co., 190 S.W.3d 333 (Ky. 2006).
· cites it 24× “KRS 342.285 was amended effective January 4, 1988, and remains substantially the same today.”
Abel Verdon Constr. v. Rivera, 348 S.W.3d 749 (Ky. 2011).
· cites it 14× “KRS 342.285 designates the ALJ as the finder of fact in workers' compensation cases.”
Snawder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
· cites it 9× “3 Although no court has specifically ruled on the issue of the effect of a failure to file a petition for reconsideration upon the permissible scope of judicial review, a number of decisions of the courts have interpreted the terms “conclusive and binding” found in subsection…”
Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d 56 (Ky. 2012).
· cites it 8× “275(2) and KRS 342.285 contemplate an opinion that summarizes the conflicting evidence concerning disputed facts; weighs that evidence to make findings of fact; and determines the *62 legal significance of those findings.”
Kroger v. Ligon, 338 S.W.3d 269 (Ky. 2011).
· cites it 5× “1 KRS 342.285 designates the ALJ as the finder of fact in workers’ compensation cases.”
Am. Greetings Corp. v. Bunch, 331 S.W.3d 600 (Ky. 2010).
· cites it 7× “Although KRS 342.285(1) designates the ALJ as the fact-finder in workers’ compensation claims, KRS 342.”
Whittaker v. Reeder, 30 S.W.3d 138 (Ky. 2000).
· cites it 7× “However, it determined that the ALJ must base the award at reopening upon a correct weekly benefit for claimant’s entire compensable disability and credit the defendants for the overlapping benefits awarded in the initial award.”
Brasch-Barry Gen. Contractors v. Jones, 175 S.W.3d 81 (Ky. 2005).
· cites it 6× “Without filing a petition for rehearing, Appellant appealed directly to the Board pursuant to KRS 342.285. The Board ruled that in order to comply with KRS 342.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(1) — 47 cases
Hutchins v. Gen. Elec. Co., 190 S.W.3d 333 (Ky. 2006).
“KRS 342.285 was amended effective January 4, 1988, and remains substantially the same today.”
Snawder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
“3 Although no court has specifically ruled on the issue of the effect of a failure to file a petition for reconsideration upon the permissible scope of judicial review, a number of decisions of the courts have interpreted the terms “conclusive and binding” found in subsection…”
Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d 56 (Ky. 2012).
“275(2) and KRS 342.285 contemplate an opinion that summarizes the conflicting evidence concerning disputed facts; weighs that evidence to make findings of fact; and determines the *62 legal significance of those findings.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(2) — 66 cases
Bowerman v. Black Equip. Co., 297 S.W.3d 858 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).
“KRS 342.285 designates the ALJ as finder of fact, and has been construed to mean that the factfinder has the sole discretion to determine the quality, character, weight, credibility, and substance of the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d 56 (Ky. 2012).
“275(2) and KRS 342.285 contemplate an opinion that summarizes the conflicting evidence concerning disputed facts; weighs that evidence to make findings of fact; and determines the *62 legal significance of those findings.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(2)(a) — 13 cases
Kroger v. Ligon, 338 S.W.3d 269 (Ky. 2011).
“1 KRS 342.285 designates the ALJ as the finder of fact in workers’ compensation cases.”
Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d 56 (Ky. 2012).
“275(2) and KRS 342.285 contemplate an opinion that summarizes the conflicting evidence concerning disputed facts; weighs that evidence to make findings of fact; and determines the *62 legal significance of those findings.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(2)(b) — 6 cases
Kroger v. Ligon, 338 S.W.3d 269 (Ky. 2011).
“1 KRS 342.285 designates the ALJ as the finder of fact in workers’ compensation cases.”
Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d 56 (Ky. 2012).
“275(2) and KRS 342.285 contemplate an opinion that summarizes the conflicting evidence concerning disputed facts; weighs that evidence to make findings of fact; and determines the *62 legal significance of those findings.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(2)(c) — 16 cases
Whittaker v. Reeder, 30 S.W.3d 138 (Ky. 2000).
“However, it determined that the ALJ must base the award at reopening upon a correct weekly benefit for claimant’s entire compensable disability and credit the defendants for the overlapping benefits awarded in the initial award.”
Kroger v. Ligon, 338 S.W.3d 269 (Ky. 2011).
“1 KRS 342.285 designates the ALJ as the finder of fact in workers’ compensation cases.”
Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d 56 (Ky. 2012).
“275(2) and KRS 342.285 contemplate an opinion that summarizes the conflicting evidence concerning disputed facts; weighs that evidence to make findings of fact; and determines the *62 legal significance of those findings.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(2)(d) — 8 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(3) — 54 cases
Hutchins v. Gen. Elec. Co., 190 S.W.3d 333 (Ky. 2006).
“KRS 342.285 was amended effective January 4, 1988, and remains substantially the same today.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(3)(c) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(3)(d) — 7 cases
Snawder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
“3 Although no court has specifically ruled on the issue of the effect of a failure to file a petition for reconsideration upon the permissible scope of judicial review, a number of decisions of the courts have interpreted the terms “conclusive and binding” found in subsection…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(3)(e) — 4 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(4) — 4 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(a) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(c) — 2 cases
Am. Greetings Corp. v. Bunch, 331 S.W.3d 600 (Ky. 2010).
“Although KRS 342.285(1) designates the ALJ as the fact-finder in workers’ compensation claims, KRS 342.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.285(d) — 1 case
Am. Greetings Corp. v. Bunch, 331 S.W.3d 600 (Ky. 2010).
“Although KRS 342.285(1) designates the ALJ as the fact-finder in workers’ compensation claims, KRS 342.”
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