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Ky. Rev. Stat.Chapter 342

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.395 (2026)

Employee deemed to have accepted provisions of chapter -- Employee's

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1946–2023 44citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 44 opinions since 1946, 3 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (7 cases).

written notice of rejection -- Withdrawal of election.

(1) Where an employer is subject to this chapter, then every employee of that employer, as a part of his or her contract of hiring or who may be employed at the time of the acceptance of the provisions of this chapter by the employer, shall be deemed to have accepted all the provisions of this chapter and shall be bound thereby unless he or she shall have filed, prior to the injury or incurrence of occupational disease, written notice to the contrary with the employer; and the acceptance shall include all of the provisions of this chapter with respect to traumatic personal injury, silicosis, and any other occupational disease. However, before an employee's written notice of rejection shall be considered effective, the employer shall file the employee's notice of rejection with the Department of Workers' Claims. The commissioner of that department shall not give effect to any rejection of this chapter not voluntarily made by the employee. If an employee withdraws his or her rejection, the employer shall notify the commissioner.

(2) An employer shall not require an employee to execute a rejection of this chapter as either a condition to obtain employment or a condition to maintain employment. An employer shall not terminate an employee for refusal to execute a rejection of this chapter.

(3) Until notice to the contrary as specified in subsection (1) of this section is given to the employer, the measure of liability of the employer shall be determined according to the compensation provisions of this chapter. Any employee, may, without prejudice to any existing right or claim, withdraw his election to reject this chapter by filing with the employer a written notice of withdrawal, stating the date when the withdrawal is to become effective. Following the filing of that notice, the status of the party withdrawing shall become the same as if the former election to reject this chapter had not been made, except that withdrawal shall not be effective as to any injury sustained or disease incurred less than one (1) week after the notice is filed. Effective: July 15, 2010 History: Amended 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 24, sec. 1829, effective July 15, 2010. -- Amended 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 355, sec. 15, effective July 15, 1996. -- Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 181, Part 15, sec. 87, effective April 4, 1994. -- Amended 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 160, sec. 8. -- Amended 1956 Ky. Acts ch. 77, sec. 14, effective August 1, 1956. -- Amended 1952 Ky. Acts ch. 82, sec. 1. -- Amended 1948 Ky. Acts ch. 64, sec. 15. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. sec. 4957.

The 20 cases that cite Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.395 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBlackstone Mining Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d 193 (Ky. 2011).
cites § 342.395 18×subsections: (1) 6× (2) 2×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“At various times during the periods of coverage, twenty-three of Blackstone's employees executed Department of Workers' Claims forms [1] rejecting workers' compensation coverage as permitted under KRS 342.395. In lieu of workers' compensation coverage, Blackstone provided the…”
The case’s holding
Summary judgment is appropriate when a nonmoving party relies on mere speculation and supposition rather than affirmative evidence to dispute a presumption of validity.
Later courts cite it for
“designed to be narrow and exacting so as to preserve one's right to trial by jury, summary judgment is nevertheless appropriate in cases where the nonmoving party relies on little more than 'speculation and supposition' to support his claims.” · 5 citing courts
cites § 342.395 2×cited by 181 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“§ 4154 (West 2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 342.395 (West 2005); Mass.”
The case’s holding
Provisions allowing preferences must be tightly construed because discrete exceptions to the general equality principle must be clearly authorized by Congress.
Later courts cite it for
“preferential treatment of a class of creditors is in order only when clearly authorized by congress.” · 14 citing courts
3
GREENShamrock Coal Co. v. Maricle, 5 S.W.3d 130 (Ky. 1999).
cites § 342.395 4×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“, elected not to be covered under the Workers' Compensation Act, KRS 342.395. The former employees sued Shamrock in the Leslie Circuit Court seeking damages for their respective occupational diseases.”
Later courts cite it for
“there was no common law cause of action for non-disabling category one pneumoconiosis in existence at the time of the adoption of the present constitution; therefore, the jural rights doctrine is inapplicable.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENFann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975).
cites § 342.395 4×cited by 85 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“2d 11 (1971), and in relation to KRS 342.395, which provides that an employee, as a part of his contract of hiring, shall be deemed to have accepted all the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and be bound thereby unless he shall have filed written notice to the…”
The case’s holding
The legislature has the prerogative to declare public policy and the wisdom of its policy choices is not subject to judicial review.
Later courts cite it for
“it is elementary that the legislative branch of government has the prerogative of declaring public policy and that the mere wisdom of its choice in that respect is not subject to the judgment of a court.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENBrown v. Indiana Ins. Co., 184 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2005).
cites § 342.395 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“, the employee rejected coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act, KRS 342.395(1); the employee forfeited compensation benefits by failing to give timely notice of the accident, KRS 342.”
The case’s holding
A commercial auto policy's workers' compensation and employee exclusions bar coverage for tort suits by employees of an employer that failed to secure workers' compensation insurance.
6
GREENTravelers Indem. Co. v. Reker, 100 S.W.3d 756 (Ky. 2003).
cites § 342.395 2×subsections: (3) 2×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“In addition, KRS 342.395(3) provides that until and unless an employee files a written notice of rejection of the Act, i.”
The case’s holding
Under KRS 342.690(1), the exclusive-remedy provision bars an injured employee's civil tort claims against a workers' compensation insurer; KRS 342.267 and KRS 446.070 create no exception permitting such suits.
Later courts cite it for
“deals with the subject matter in a general way and the other in a specific way, the more specific provision prevails.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENRoethke v. Sanger, 68 S.W.3d 352 (Ky. 2001).
cites § 342.395 2×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“KRS 342.395.) They also sued Chris Sanger, claiming that he negligently supervised the installation of the roof, and "Sanger Crane Service," claiming that it, as Chris Sanger's employer, was vicariously liable for Sanger's negligence.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is necessary to the relationship that there be a sharing of the profits and losses; though in the absence of an express agreement, the sharing of losses may sometimes be implied from an express agreement to share profits.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENGateway Constr. Co. v. Wallbaum, 356 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962).
cites § 342.395 3×cited by 110 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“KRS 342.395 provides that the election of the employer to operate under the Act carries with it "as a part of his contract of hiring" a corresponding acceptance by the employee.”
The case’s holding
A principal contractor is not liable for workers' compensation to a subcontractor's employee unless the employee first initiates a proceeding against the immediate employer.
Later courts cite it for
“it is neither the duty nor the prerogative of the judiciary to breathe into the statute that which the legislature has not put there.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENDick v. Int'l Harvester Co., 310 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958).
cites § 342.395 5×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“82, now *516 KRS 342.395, 1953 edition. See Wells v. Jefferson County, Ky.”
10
GREENFirestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983).
cites § 342.395 1×cited by 193 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“Nevertheless, it does plainly exhibit a policy that employees should be free to accept or reject coverage without coercion by their employers, KRS 342.395, and that they should not be deceived into foregoing lawful claims for benefits or into accepting less than is due them.”
The case’s holding
An employee may maintain a tort action for wrongful discharge when the termination violates a fundamental public policy protecting the right to assert lawful claims for benefits.
Later courts cite it for
“for good cause, for no cause, or for a cause that some might view as morally indefensible.” · 39 citing courts
11
GREENGen. Elec. Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579 (Ky. 2007).
cites § 342.395 1×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“The right to accept or reject the Act, now embodied in KRS 342.395, was added and the Act was later upheld: It is quite correct to say that this section operates as a restraint on the General Assembly and prohibits it from attempting to limit the amount of recovery in the cases…”
The case’s holding
A premises owner is a statutory employer immune from tort liability if the work performed is a regular or recurrent part of the owner's trade or business.
Later courts cite it for
“customary, usual, or normal to the particular business (including work assumed by contract or required by law) or work that the business repeats with some degree of regularity, and it is of a kind that the business or similar businesses would normally perform or be expected to perform with employees.” · 8 citing courts
12
GREENBoykins v. Hous. Auth. of Louisville, 842 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1992).
cites § 342.395 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“NOTES [1] The policy of KRS 342.395 is that employees should be free to accept or reject coverage without coercion by their employers.”
13
GREENAdkins v. R & S Body Co., 58 S.W.3d 428 (Ky. 2001).
cites § 342.395 1×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“KRS 342.395. Furthermore, a worker’s affirmative rejection of the Act must be knowing and voluntary because it amounts to a waiver of the worker’s rights under Chapter 342.”
Later courts cite it for
“is to compensate workers who are injured in the course of their employment for necessary medical treatment and for a loss of wage-earning capacity, without regard to fault,” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENKarst Robbins Mach. Shop, Inc. v. Caudill, 779 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1989).
cites § 342.395 3×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“The issue in these cases is whether the claimant, William Caudill, had voluntarily rejected the provisions of the act pursuant to KRS 342.395. That Caudill, under no coercion, did sign the Form 4 notice of rejection was not disputed; but the evidence conflicted as to whether…”
Later courts cite it for
“tjhat caudill, under no coercion, did sign the form 4 notice of rejection was not disputed; but the evidence conflicted as to whether this employee, possessed of 'extremely limited literary skills,' executed the document with an informed understanding of its import sufficient to render his rejection truly voluntary.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENWatts v. Newberg, 920 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1996).
cites § 342.395 3×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“KRS 342.395. Due to financial difficulties, in December of 1987, the employer gave claimant and fellow employees of Benco Mining, Inc.”
Later courts cite it for
“for a rejection to be voluntary, a worker must have a substantial understanding of the nature of the action and its consequences.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENMcLain v. Dana Corp., 16 S.W.3d 320 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 342.395 1×subsections: (1)cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“McLain also specifically challenges the constitutionality of KRS 342.395(1), the “opt-out” provision of the Act, which provides, in part, as follows: Where an employer is subject to this chapter, then every employee of that employer, as a part of his contract of hiring .”
Later courts cite it for
“a person who has knowledge of an injury is put on 'notice to investigate' and discover, within the statutory time constraints, the identity of the tortfeasor.” · 7 citing courts
17
GREENRoberts ex rel. Roberts v. George W. Hill & Co., 23 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2000).
cites § 342.395 3×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“KRS 342.395 and KRS 342.690. The suit also challenges the constitutionality of the statutes when applied to workers whose award under the Workers’ Compensation scheme would be quite small, although their injury is severe.”
Later courts cite it for
“the legislature specifically rejected the alternative of tort liability and embraced worker's compensation coverage for minors, even if illegally employed.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENWells v. Jefferson Cnty., 255 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
cites § 342.395 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“■ By Chapter 82 of the Acts of 1952, the legislature amended KRS 342.395, relating to acceptance of the Compensation Act by employes.”
Later courts cite it for
“the question now before us is whether a waiver of the constitutional rights may be effected by means of the failure of the employe to elect affirmatively to retain those rights.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENTri-Gem Coal Co. v. Whitaker, 661 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 342.395 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“Appellant company approaches from various points of view its dilemma caused by the award, however, the primary issue on appeal is whether or not Whitaker voluntarily rejected coverage within the meaning of KRS 342.395, which provides for rejection of the provisions of the Act.”
Later courts cite it for
“he filed a claim with the workers' compensation board which found that he had not volun tarily rejected workers' compensation coverage and awarded benefits to him based on a 50 occupational disability.” · 1 citing court
20
GREENMcNeese Constr. Co. v. Harris, 273 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
cites § 342.395 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 342.395
“It is important to note this case arose before the amendment of KRS 342.395 in " 1952. Ch. 82, Acts of 1952.”

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Citing cases by year
194619842023

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 4 cases in 2000–2001. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ky.19Ky. Ct. App.12Ky. Ct. App.9E.D. Ky.2SCOTUS2
By subsection
(1)7 cases
Blackstone Mining Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 351 S.W.3d 193 (Ky. 2011).“At various times during the periods of coverage, twenty-three of Blackstone's employees executed Department of Workers' Claims forms [1] rejecting workers' compensation coverage as permitted under KRS 342.395. In lieu of workers' compensation coverage, Blackstone provided the…”
Brown v. Indiana Ins. Co., 184 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2005).“, the employee rejected coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act, KRS 342.395(1); the employee forfeited compensation benefits by failing to give timely notice of the accident, KRS 342.”
McLain v. Dana Corp., 16 S.W.3d 320 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).“McLain also specifically challenges the constitutionality of KRS 342.395(1), the “opt-out” provision of the Act, which provides, in part, as follows: Where an employer is subject to this chapter, then every employee of that employer, as a part of his contract of hiring .”
Meade v. Arnold, 643 F. Supp. 2d 913 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
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(2)3 cases
Dick v. Int'l Harvester Co., 310 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958).“82, now *516 KRS 342.395, 1953 edition. See Wells v. Jefferson County, Ky.”
Blackstone Mining Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 2009 SC 000015 (Ky. Dec. 16, 2010).
(3)2 cases
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Reker, 100 S.W.3d 756 (Ky. 2003).“In addition, KRS 342.395(3) provides that until and unless an employee files a written notice of rejection of the Act, i.”
Letcher Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Roger Hall, 671 S.W.3d 374 (Ky. 2023).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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