of liability if employee intended to kill or injure self or another -- Illegal
substances -- Employer's intention to produce injury or death -- Builder's
proof of coverage required for issuance of building permit -- Notice required to
be posted by employers.
(1) Every employer subject to this chapter shall be liable for compensation for injury,
occupational disease, or death without regard to fault as a cause of the injury,
occupational disease, or death.
(2) A contractor who subcontracts all or any part of a contract and his or her carrier
shall be liable for the payment of compensation to the employees of the
subcontractor unless the subcontractor primarily liable for the payment of such
compensation has secured the payment of compensation as provided for in this
chapter. Any contractor or his or her carrier who shall become liable for such
compensation may recover the amount of such compensation paid and necessary
expenses from the subcontractor primarily liable therefor. A person who contracts
with another:
(a) To have work performed consisting of the removal, excavation, or drilling of
soil, rock, or mineral, or the cutting or removal of timber from land; or
(b) To have work performed of a kind which is a regular or recurrent part of the
work of the trade, business, occupation, or profession of such person
shall for the purposes of this section be deemed a contractor, and such other person
a subcontractor. This subsection shall not apply to the owner or lessee of land
principally used for agriculture.
(3) Liability for compensation shall not apply to injury, occupational disease, or death
to the employee if the employee willfully intended to injure or kill himself, herself,
or another.
(4) If an employee voluntarily introduced an illegal, nonprescribed substance or
substances or a prescribed substance or substances in amounts in excess of
prescribed amounts into his or her body detected in the blood, as measured by a
scientifically reliable test, that could cause a disturbance of mental or physical
capacities, it shall be presumed that the illegal, nonprescribed substance or
substances or the prescribed substance or substances in amounts in excess of
prescribed amounts caused the injury, occupational disease, or death of the
employee and liability for compensation shall not apply to the injury, occupational
disease, or death to the employee.
(5) If injury or death results to an employee through the deliberate intention of his or
her employer to produce such injury or death, the employee or the employee's
dependent as herein defined shall receive the amount provided in this chapter in a
lump sum to be used, if desired, to prosecute the employer. The dependents may
bring suit against the employer for any amount they desire. If injury or death results
to an employee through the deliberate intention of his or her employer to produce
such injury or death, the employee or the employee's dependents may take under
this chapter, or in lieu thereof, have a cause of action at law against the employer as
if this chapter had not been passed, for such damage so sustained by the employee,
his dependents or personal representatives as is recoverable at law. If a suit is
brought under this subsection, all right to compensation under this chapter shall
thereby be waived as to all persons. If a claim is made for the payment of
compensation or any other benefit provided by this chapter, all rights to sue the
employer for damages on account of such injury or death shall be waived as to all
persons.
(6) Prior to issuing any building permit pursuant to KRS 198B.060(10), every local
building official shall require proof of workers' compensation coverage from the
builder before a permit is issued. A person who is exempt under the exception
contained in KRS 342.650(2), and any contractor otherwise exempt from this
chapter, shall so certify to the local building official, in writing and on a form
prescribed by the commissioner, in lieu of providing proof of workers'
compensation coverage.
(7) Every employer subject to this chapter, at its principal office and such other
locations where employees customarily report for payroll and personnel matters,
shall post a notice stating the name of its workers' compensation insurance carrier
and policy number, setting forth the means to access medical care for injuries, the
employee's obligation to give notice of accidents, and such other matters concerning
the employee's rights under this chapter as may be required by the commissioner so
as to afford every employee the opportunity to become informed about the
employer's workers' compensation program. The format and contents of the notice
shall be established by the commissioner through administrative regulation, and
copies shall be provided to the employer by its insurance carrier.
Effective: July 14, 2018
History: Amended 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 40, sec. 11, effective July 14, 2018. -- Amended
2010 Ky. Acts ch. 24, sec. 1835, effective July 15, 2010. -- Amended 1996 (1st
Extra. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 1, sec. 27, effective December 12, 1996. -- Created 1972
Ky. Acts ch. 78, sec. 1, effective January 1, 1973.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
123
cases (
28 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case:
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579 (Ky. 2007).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579 (Ky. 2007).
· cites it 23× “Under the facts presented, this panel also held that “exclusive remedy” immunity as embodied in KRS 342.610 and 342.690 is constitutional and does not transgress the “jural rights” doctrine.”
Franke v. Ford Motor Co., 398 F. Supp. 2d 833 (W.D. Ky. 2005).
· cites it 26× “Ford has moved for summary judgment on the ground that it is a “contractor” of Burns under the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”), KRS § 342.610, and is therefore immune from liability to Plaintiff under the Act’s exclusive remedy provision.”
Steve Black v. Dixie Consum. Prods., 835 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2016).
· cites it 10× “Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.610. The Kentucky Supreme Court has described the Act as “a product of compromises by workers and employers” whereby “[w]orkers agree to forego common law remedies in exchange for statutory benefits awarded without regard to fault” and “[e]mployers agree to…”
Doctors' Assocs., Inc. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 364 S.W.3d 88 (Ky. 2011).
· cites it 21× “The ALJ noted also that KRS 342.610 makes no reference to a franchisor-franchisee relationship and concluded that the statute imposed no liability on DAI for this claim.”
Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
· cites it 20× “Ford has moved for summary judgment on the ground that Ford qualified as Budd’s “contractor” under the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Kentucky Act”), KRS 342.610, and therefore, the Act’s exclusive remedy provision bars this action.”
Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d 688 (Ky. 2002).
· cites it 10× “" KRS 342.610(4) creates an exception to the "exclusive remedy" rule if the employee is injured through the deliberate intention of the employer.”
Beaver v. Oakley, 279 S.W.3d 527 (Ky. 2009).
· cites it 10× “” Although not expressly discussed in Branham, the statutes at issue (KRS 342.610 and KRS 342.690) were substantially the same at the time of the Branham opinion thirty years ago in that a contractor was described as one who contracts with another to perform work of a regular…”
Tinna Dilts v. United Grp. Servs., LLC, 500 F. App'x 440 (6th Cir. 2012).
· cites it 6× “Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 342.610 (2)(b) defines “contractor” as a person who contracts with another: to have work performed of a kind which is a regular or recurrent part of the work, trade, business, occupation, or profession of such person .”
Labor Ready, Inc. v. Johnston, 289 S.W.3d 200 (Ky. 2009).
· cites it 8× “Noting that KRS 342.610 and KRS 342.690 provided Mid-America with up-the-ladder immunity from a civil suit by a Labor Ready employee, the trial court held that Hudson and Johnston must be viewed as being co-employees.”
Moore v. Env't Constr. Corp., 147 S.W.3d 13 (Ky. 2004).
· cites it 8× “" Upon review, the Court of Appeals, "[h]aving thoroughly analyzed the evidence presented in this matter against the standard set for recovery by KRS 342.610(4) and [relevant case law] believe[d] the trial court properly entered JNOV.”
Pennington v. Jenkins-Essex Constr., Inc., 238 S.W.3d 660 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 11× “For purposes of this section, the term “employer” shall include a “contractor” covered by subsection (2) of KRS 342.610, whether or not the subcontractor has in fact, secured the payment of compensation.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.610(1) — 21 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.610(2) — 65 cases
Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
“Ford has moved for summary judgment on the ground that Ford qualified as Budd’s “contractor” under the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Kentucky Act”), KRS 342.610, and therefore, the Act’s exclusive remedy provision bars this action.”
Franke v. Ford Motor Co., 398 F. Supp. 2d 833 (W.D. Ky. 2005).
“Ford has moved for summary judgment on the ground that it is a “contractor” of Burns under the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”), KRS § 342.610, and is therefore immune from liability to Plaintiff under the Act’s exclusive remedy provision.”
Labor Ready, Inc. v. Johnston, 289 S.W.3d 200 (Ky. 2009).
“Noting that KRS 342.610 and KRS 342.690 provided Mid-America with up-the-ladder immunity from a civil suit by a Labor Ready employee, the trial court held that Hudson and Johnston must be viewed as being co-employees.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.610(2)(a) — 3 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.610(2)(b) — 36 cases
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579 (Ky. 2007).
“Under the facts presented, this panel also held that “exclusive remedy” immunity as embodied in KRS 342.610 and 342.690 is constitutional and does not transgress the “jural rights” doctrine.”
Steve Black v. Dixie Consum. Prods., 835 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2016).
“Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.610. The Kentucky Supreme Court has described the Act as “a product of compromises by workers and employers” whereby “[w]orkers agree to forego common law remedies in exchange for statutory benefits awarded without regard to fault” and “[e]mployers agree to…”
Franke v. Ford Motor Co., 398 F. Supp. 2d 833 (W.D. Ky. 2005).
“Ford has moved for summary judgment on the ground that it is a “contractor” of Burns under the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”), KRS § 342.610, and is therefore immune from liability to Plaintiff under the Act’s exclusive remedy provision.”
Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
“Ford has moved for summary judgment on the ground that Ford qualified as Budd’s “contractor” under the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Kentucky Act”), KRS 342.610, and therefore, the Act’s exclusive remedy provision bars this action.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.610(3) — 13 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.610(4) — 12 cases
Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d 688 (Ky. 2002).
“" KRS 342.610(4) creates an exception to the "exclusive remedy" rule if the employee is injured through the deliberate intention of the employer.”
Moore v. Env't Constr. Corp., 147 S.W.3d 13 (Ky. 2004).
“" Upon review, the Court of Appeals, "[h]aving thoroughly analyzed the evidence presented in this matter against the standard set for recovery by KRS 342.610(4) and [relevant case law] believe[d] the trial court properly entered JNOV.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.610(5) — 2 cases
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