(1) If, by contract, a term or tenancy for a year or more is to expire on a certain day, the
tenant shall abandon the premises on that day, unless by express contract he secures
the right to remain longer. If without such contract the tenant shall hold over, he
shall not thereby acquire any right to hold or remain on the premises for ninety (90)
days after said day, and possession may be recovered without demand or notice if
proceedings are instituted within that time. But, if proceedings are not instituted
within ninety (90) days after the day of expiration, then none shall be allowed until
the expiration of one (1) year from the day the term or tenancy expired. At the end
of that year the tenant shall abandon the premises without demand or notice, or
stand in the same relation to his landlord that he did at the expiration of the term or
tenancy aforesaid; and so from year to year, until he abandons the premises, is
turned out of possession, or makes a new contract.
(2) If by contract a tenancy for less than a year is to expire on a certain day, the tenant
shall abandon the premises on that day unless by express contract he secures the
right to remain longer. If without such contract the tenant shall hold over he shall
not thereby acquire any right to hold or remain on the premises for thirty (30) days
after said day, and the possession may be recovered without demand or notice if
proceedings are instituted within that time. But, if proceedings are not instituted
within thirty (30) days after the day of expiration, then none shall be allowed until
the expiration of sixty (60) days from the day the tenancy expired. At the end of that
sixty (60) days the tenant shall abandon the premises without demand or notice, or
stand in the same relation to his landlord that he did at the expiration of the tenancy
aforesaid; and so on from time to time until he abandons the premises, is turned out
of possession, or makes a new contract.
Effective: October 1, 1942
History: Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky.
Stat. secs. 2295, 2296.
Notes of Decisions
Smithfield Farms, LLC v. Riverside Developers, LLC, 566 S.W.3d 566 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 12× “Citing common industry standards, customs, and practices, Smithfield asserted that the parties' 2014 lease expired on November 1, 2014, and that from November 1, 2014 to March 26, 2015, a period in excess of ninety days, it was a holdover tenant under KRS 383.160(1).…”
Stowe v. Realco Ltd. Liab. Co., 551 S.W.3d 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 14× “After a period of discovery and motion practice, Stowe moved for summary judgment on his counterclaim and sought a ruling the lease term had been extended to March 31, 2011, by operation of KRS 383.160. 2 The trial court denied the motion, explicitly holding the statutory…”
Masterson v. DeHart Paint & Varnish Co., 843 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. 1992).
· cites it 11× “Further, we disagree that simply because the lease had provisions on how a two-year option could be exercised, that KRS 383.160 would not apply. Nowhere does the statute state that it does not apply to holdover tenants who choose not to exercise options for extensions.”
Clift v. RDP Co., 200 F. Supp. 3d 660 (W.D. Ky. 2016).
· cites it 2× “The Clifts claim that RDP Company and its sublessees are nothing more than holdover tenants under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 383.160. See R. 84-1 at 17-19 (Memorandum in Support of Clifts’ Motion for Summary Judgment); R.”
Caudill v. Acton, 175 S.W.3d 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “49 17 to the issue rather than KRS 383.160, which had been applied by the district court.”
Lexington Flying Serv., Inc. v. Anderson's Ex'r, 239 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951).
“sustaining the demurrer o'n the grounds: (1) That the holding over each year after the initial one year term, for a period of ninety days, and the payment and acceptance of rent, gave appellant only the right to remain in possession of the premises another nine months, or until…”
Harper v. Johnson, 294 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).
· cites it 2× “The plaintiffs sought to avoid that by the facts (1) that according to the terms of the contract they had sowed alfalfa, which is a perennial crop that can be harvested from three to four' yé'ars from one planting, and' they are entitled to recover the entire harvest, and (2)…”
Cass v. Home Tobacco Warehouse Co., 223 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949).
“holding under the original lease. However, Golden explains that he was going to move before the first of January 1947 and appellants advised him not to object to the raise.”
Anderson v. City of Lexington, 192 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. Ct. App. 1946).
“KRS 383.160. As the chancellor indicated in his opinion rendered in this case, no one was hurt, misled or prejudiced by the City’s failure to remove the hangar immediately upon the expiration of the old lease.”
Gaidry's Trs. v. Cooke, 191 S.W.2d 390 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945).
“ninety days after January 1, they were entitled to occupy the premises upon the payment of the agreed rent until January 1 of the following year, under the provisions of KRS 383.160. A jury was impaneled to try certain issues of fact propounded to them upon interrogatories.”
Snider v. City of Lyndon (W.D. Ky. 2024).
· cites it 2× “He asserts that he is a holdover tenant under KRS 383.160, but that law also requires the existence of “contract” or rental agreement.”
Bill J. Connley (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2020).
“At the end of that year the tenant shall abandon the premises without demand or notice, or stand in the same relation to his landlord that he did at the expiration of the term or tenancy aforesaid; and so from year to year, until he abandons the premises, is turned out of…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 383.160(1) — 7 cases
Smithfield Farms, LLC v. Riverside Developers, LLC, 566 S.W.3d 566 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).
“Citing common industry standards, customs, and practices, Smithfield asserted that the parties' 2014 lease expired on November 1, 2014, and that from November 1, 2014 to March 26, 2015, a period in excess of ninety days, it was a holdover tenant under KRS 383.160(1).…”
Stowe v. Realco Ltd. Liab. Co., 551 S.W.3d 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).
“After a period of discovery and motion practice, Stowe moved for summary judgment on his counterclaim and sought a ruling the lease term had been extended to March 31, 2011, by operation of KRS 383.160. 2 The trial court denied the motion, explicitly holding the statutory…”
Masterson v. DeHart Paint & Varnish Co., 843 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. 1992).
“Further, we disagree that simply because the lease had provisions on how a two-year option could be exercised, that KRS 383.160 would not apply. Nowhere does the statute state that it does not apply to holdover tenants who choose not to exercise options for extensions.”
Caudill v. Acton, 175 S.W.3d 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).
“49 17 to the issue rather than KRS 383.160, which had been applied by the district court.”
Harper v. Johnson, 294 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).
“The plaintiffs sought to avoid that by the facts (1) that according to the terms of the contract they had sowed alfalfa, which is a perennial crop that can be harvested from three to four' yé'ars from one planting, and' they are entitled to recover the entire harvest, and (2)…”
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