Kentucky Revised Statutes

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182 (2026)

Allocation of fault in tort actions -- Award of damages -- Effect of release

✓ current as of May 2026

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(1) In all tort actions, including products liability actions, involving fault of more than one (1) party to the action, including third-party defendants and persons who have been released under subsection (4) of this section, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties, shall instruct the jury to answer interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings indicating: (a) The amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to recover if contributory fault is disregarded; and (b) The percentage of the total fault of all the parties to each claim that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, and person who has been released from liability under subsection (4) of this section. (2) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed. (3) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant in accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction under subsection (4) of this section, and shall determine and state in the judgment each party's equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance with the respective percentages of fault. (4) A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable, shall discharge that person from all liability for contribution, but it shall not be considered to discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons shall be reduced by the amount of the released persons' equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of this section. Effective: July 15, 1988 History: Created 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 224, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1988.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 142 cases (36 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467 (Ky. 2001).

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Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467 (Ky. 2001). · cites it 42× “Coyle also contends that the trial court should not have given comparative fault instructions regarding his conduct because he filed suit before the effective date of KRS 411.182. We address each argument in turn and hold that the evidence justified the comparative fault…”

Abney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 215 S.W.3d 699 (Ky. 2007). · cites it 26× “This appeal involves an issue of first impression in Kentucky: since the enactment of KRS 411.182, does a release negotiated with one joint tortfeasor discharging "all other persons, firms or corporations liable, or who might be claimed to be liable" effectively release another…”

Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 177 S.W.3d 797 (Ky. 2005). · cites it 44× “The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on apportionment, holding that KRS 411.182 does not permit apportionment of fault against a nominal party who is not subject to personal liability.”

Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp., 27 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2000). · cites it 28× “Korp II Ltd. Partnership, etc., is barred because the original complaint asserted only a cause of action under Kentucky's Civil Rights Act, which creates a right of action only against employers and not against non-employer perpetrators such as Salazar.”

Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2004). · cites it 12× “The trial court dismissed LFUCG for liability purposes on grounds that it was entitled to sovereign immunity, but allowed it to remain in the suit for purposes of apportionment under KRS 411.182. The trial court also dismissed the claims against the individual employees on…”

Morgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622 (Ky. 2009). · cites it 12× “Parrish, is more to the point: [F]ault may not be properly allocated to a party, a dismissed party or settling nonparty unless the court or the jury first find that the party was at fault; otherwise, the party has no fault to allocate.”

Stanford v. United States, 948 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D. Ky. 2013). · cites it 16× “Ky.Rev.Stat. § 411.182; see also Degener v.”

Grubb v. Smith, 523 S.W.3d 409 (Ky. 2017). · cites it 6× “of contributory negligence, in its many guises, toward a new regime in which a plaintiffs own negligence no longer bars his or her claim.”

Jenkins Ex Rel. Branum v. Best, 250 S.W.3d 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 7× “If we doubted our conclusion — on the theory that Hilen elevated the apportionment of fault between joint tort-feasors from a jury’s option to a full-fledged right of a tort defendant — we would have been rescued by the legislature’s enactment of KRS 411.182. That statute allows…”

Carter v. Bullitt Host, LLC, 471 S.W.3d 288 (Ky. 2015). · cites it 6× “1984), and since 1988 by statute, KRS 411.182, that all tort actions must provide for the apportionment of fault among all parties to an action, the Manis rule is no longer viable, and we hold ’ that all ■ open and obvious hazard *290 cases, including obvious natural outdoor…”

Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002). · cites it 6× “KRS 411.182; Baker v. Webb, Ky.App., 883 S.”

Abbott v. Chesley, 413 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. 2013). · cites it 7× “CGM argue that the imposition of joint and several liability is barred in this case by KRS 411.182, which requires that in tort actions, fault must be apportioned among the individual parties at fault, and that damages must be allocated severally among the tortfeasors.”

Show all 142 citing cases →

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182(1) — 28 cases

Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467 (Ky. 2001). “Coyle also contends that the trial court should not have given comparative fault instructions regarding his conduct because he filed suit before the effective date of KRS 411.182. We address each argument in turn and hold that the evidence justified the comparative fault…”

Mcdonald's Corp. v. Ogborn, 309 S.W.3d 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2004). “The trial court dismissed LFUCG for liability purposes on grounds that it was entitled to sovereign immunity, but allowed it to remain in the suit for purposes of apportionment under KRS 411.182. The trial court also dismissed the claims against the individual employees on…”

Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002). “KRS 411.182; Baker v. Webb, Ky.App., 883 S.”

Jenkins Ex Rel. Branum v. Best, 250 S.W.3d 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). “If we doubted our conclusion — on the theory that Hilen elevated the apportionment of fault between joint tort-feasors from a jury’s option to a full-fledged right of a tort defendant — we would have been rescued by the legislature’s enactment of KRS 411.182. That statute allows…”

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182(1)(a) — 2 cases

Kentucky River Med. Ctr. v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385 (Ky. 2010).

Morgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622 (Ky. 2009). “Parrish, is more to the point: [F]ault may not be properly allocated to a party, a dismissed party or settling nonparty unless the court or the jury first find that the party was at fault; otherwise, the party has no fault to allocate.”

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182(1)(b) — 3 cases

Stanford v. United States, 948 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D. Ky. 2013). “Ky.Rev.Stat. § 411.182; see also Degener v.”

Mem'l Sports Complex, LLC v. McCormick, 499 S.W.3d 700 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Ram Constr. Servs. of Michigan, Inc. (E.D. Ky. 2023).

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182(1X3) — 1 case

In Re Wallace's Bookstores, Inc., 317 B.R. 709 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2004).

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182(2) — 14 cases

Grubb v. Smith, 523 S.W.3d 409 (Ky. 2017). “of contributory negligence, in its many guises, toward a new regime in which a plaintiffs own negligence no longer bars his or her claim.”

CertainTeed Corp. v. Dexter, 330 S.W.3d 64 (Ky. 2010).

DeStock 14, Inc. v. Logsdon, 993 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. 1999).

Jackson v. Tullar, 285 S.W.3d 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182(3) — 3 cases

Kevin Tucker & Assocs., Inc. v. Scott & Ritter, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Fernanders v. Marks Constr. of South Carolina, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 509 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).

Fernanders v. Marks Const. of Sc, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 509 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182(4) — 22 cases

Abney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 215 S.W.3d 699 (Ky. 2007). “This appeal involves an issue of first impression in Kentucky: since the enactment of KRS 411.182, does a release negotiated with one joint tortfeasor discharging "all other persons, firms or corporations liable, or who might be claimed to be liable" effectively release another…”

AIK Selective Self Ins. Fund v. Bush, 74 S.W.3d 251 (Ky. 2002).

Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002). “KRS 411.182; Baker v. Webb, Ky.App., 883 S.”

Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp., 27 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2000). “Korp II Ltd. Partnership, etc., is barred because the original complaint asserted only a cause of action under Kentucky's Civil Rights Act, which creates a right of action only against employers and not against non-employer perpetrators such as Salazar.”

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182(l)(a) — 2 cases

Kentucky River Med. Ctr. v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385 (Ky. 2010).

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182(l)(b) — 2 cases

Carter v. Bullitt Host, LLC, 471 S.W.3d 288 (Ky. 2015). “1984), and since 1988 by statute, KRS 411.182, that all tort actions must provide for the apportionment of fault among all parties to an action, the Manis rule is no longer viable, and we hold ’ that all ■ open and obvious hazard *290 cases, including obvious natural outdoor…”

Low v. Power Tool Specialist, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 655 (E.D. Ky. 2011).

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