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Ky. Rev. Stat.Chapter 411

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182 (2026)

Allocation of fault in tort actions -- Award of damages -- Effect of release

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1989–2026 142citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 142 opinions since 1989, 36 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (28 cases).

(1) In all tort actions, including products liability actions, involving fault of more than one (1) party to the action, including third-party defendants and persons who have been released under subsection (4) of this section, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties, shall instruct the jury to answer interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings indicating:

(a) The amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to recover if contributory fault is disregarded; and

(b) The percentage of the total fault of all the parties to each claim that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, and person who has been released from liability under subsection (4) of this section.

(2) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.

(3) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant in accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction under subsection (4) of this section, and shall determine and state in the judgment each party's equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance with the respective percentages of fault.

(4) A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable, shall discharge that person from all liability for contribution, but it shall not be considered to discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons shall be reduced by the amount of the released persons' equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of this section. Effective: July 15, 1988 History: Created 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 224, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1988.

The 20 cases that cite Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.182 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENOwens Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467 (Ky. 2001).
cites § 411.182 42×subsections: (1) 4× (4) 4×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“Coyle also contends that the trial court should not have given comparative fault instructions regarding his conduct because he filed suit before the effective date of KRS 411.182. We address each argument in turn and hold that the evidence justified the comparative fault…”
The case’s holding
Under Kentucky's comparative fault statute, fault may be apportioned to a settling nonparty, including one that settled a workers' compensation claim, only if the fact finder first finds that party at fault.
Later courts cite it for
“fault may not be properly allocated to a party, a dismissed party or a settling nonparty unless the court or the jury first finds that the party was at fault; otherwise, the party has no fault to allocate.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENAbney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 215 S.W.3d 699 (Ky. 2007).
cites § 411.182 26×subsections: (4) 20×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“This appeal involves an issue of first impression in Kentucky: since the enactment of KRS 411.182, does a release negotiated with one joint tortfeasor discharging "all other persons, firms or corporations liable, or who might be claimed to be liable" effectively release another…”
The case’s holding
A release discharging all persons liable or who might be claimed to be liable satisfies the statutory requirement to discharge other joint tortfeasors.
Later courts cite it for
“when no ambiguity exists in the contract, the court looks only as far as the four corners of the document to determine that intent.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENKentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 177 S.W.3d 797 (Ky. 2005).
cites § 411.182 44×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on apportionment, holding that KRS 411.182 does not permit apportionment of fault against a nominal party who is not subject to personal liability.”
4
GREENDegener v. Hall Contracting Corp., 27 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2000).
cites § 411.182 28×subsections: (4) 2×cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“Korp II Ltd. Partnership, etc., is barred because the original complaint asserted only a cause of action under Kentucky's Civil Rights Act, which creates a right of action only against employers and not against non-employer perpetrators such as Salazar.”
The case’s holding
The common law right to indemnity survives comparative negligence statutes and applies when one party is exposed to liability due to the primary and efficient fault of another.
Later courts cite it for
“is available to one exposed to liability because of the wrongful act of another” · 10 citing courts
5
GREENLexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2004).
cites § 411.182 12×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“The trial court dismissed LFUCG for liability purposes on grounds that it was entitled to sovereign immunity, but allowed it to remain in the suit for purposes of apportionment under KRS 411.182. The trial court also dismissed the claims against the individual employees on…”
The case’s holding
Urban county governments are entitled to sovereign immunity and fault cannot be apportioned against them under the comparative fault statute.
Later courts cite it for
“immunity from suit includes protection against the 'costs of trial' and the 'burdens of broad-reaching discovery' that 'are peculiarly disruptive of effective government.” · 8 citing courts
6
GREENMorgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622 (Ky. 2009).
cites § 411.182 12×subsections: (1) 2× (2) 2× (1)(a)cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“Parrish, is more to the point: [F]ault may not be properly allocated to a party, a dismissed party or settling nonparty unless the court or the jury first find that the party was at fault; otherwise, the party has no fault to allocate.”
The case’s holding
Failure to follow an internal safety policy does not create liability unless the non-observance of the rule increases the risk of harm to third parties.
Later courts cite it for
“it is also presumed that the jury will follow instructions issued to it by the trial court.” · 6 citing courts
7
GREENStanford v. United States, 948 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D. Ky. 2013).
cites § 411.182 16×subsections: (1) 2× (1)(b) 2×cited by 16 cases
Later courts cite it for
“secondary tortfeasor simply failed to perform some legal duty, such as inspection or remedying a hazard.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENGrubb v. Smith, 523 S.W.3d 409 (Ky. 2017).
cites § 411.182 6×subsections: (1) (2)cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“of contributory negligence, in its many guises, toward a new regime in which a plaintiffs own negligence no longer bars his or her claim.”
The case’s holding
An obvious risk-posing condition on a property is not unreasonable as a matter of law except in rare instances where justified by public policy.
Later courts cite it for
“determined effort to effect that restoration and to limit holdings, at trial or on appeal, that an obvious risk-posing condition on the property is 'not unreasonable as a matter of law,' to those rare instances where they are justified.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENJenkins ex rel. Branum v. Best, 250 S.W.3d 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 411.182 7×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“If we doubted our conclusion — on the theory that Hilen elevated the apportionment of fault between joint tort-feasors from a jury’s option to a full-fledged right of a tort defendant — we would have been rescued by the legislature’s enactment of KRS 411.182. That statute allows…”
The case’s holding
A medical group owes a duty of care to a patient through the undertaking doctrine when it fails to perform contracted services that create a foreseeable risk.
Later courts cite it for
“our courts have never found liability in tort unless we have first found circumstances giving rise to a relationship of some kind in which one particular party owed a duty to another particular party.” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENCarter v. Bullitt Host, LLC, 471 S.W.3d 288 (Ky. 2015).
cites § 411.182 6×subsections: (1)(b)cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“1984), and since 1988 by statute, KRS 411.182, that all tort actions must provide for the apportionment of fault among all parties to an action, the Manis rule is no longer viable, and we hold ’ that all ■ open and obvious hazard *290 cases, including obvious natural outdoor…”
The case’s holding
The open-and-obvious doctrine does not bar recovery under a comparative fault system and instead serves as a factor for the trier of fact in apportioning fault.
Later courts cite it for
“t_hat a landowner is not excused from his own reasonable obligations just because a plaintiff has failed to a degree, however slight, in looking out for his own safety.” · 3 citing courts
11
YELLOWSand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002).
cites § 411.182 6×subsections: (1) 2× (4) 2×cited by 50 cases
Vacated: 2 citing opinions add another limit ("vacated (caution)").
Where it cites § 411.182
“KRS 411.182; Baker v. Webb, Ky.App., 883 S.”
The case’s holding
A trial court's admission of expert testimony under KRE 702 is reviewed deferentially and reversed only for clear abuse of discretion.
Later courts cite it for
“give great deference to the trial court's ruling and reverse only in circumstances of clear abuse.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENAbbott v. Chesley, 413 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. 2013).
cites § 411.182 7×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“CGM argue that the imposition of joint and several liability is barred in this case by KRS 411.182, which requires that in tort actions, fault must be apportioned among the individual parties at fault, and that damages must be allocated severally among the tortfeasors.”
The case’s holding
A lawyer who allows co-counsel to retain settlement funds exceeding their entitlement breaches fiduciary duty to clients, and such breach may be established as a matter of law on undisputed facts.
Later courts cite it for
“appellate review of a denial of a summary judgment motion is proper if (1) the facts are not in dispute, (2) the only basis of the ruling is a matter of law, (3) there is a denial of the motion, and (4) there is an entry of a final judgment with an appeal therefrom.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENDeStock 14, Inc. v. Logsdon, 993 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. 1999).
cites § 411.182 9×subsections: (1) 3× (2)cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“2d 563 (1938); or whether the dram shop’s negligence is deemed concurrent with that of the drunken driver so that their respective liabilities are subject to apportionment, KRS 411.182, Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.”
The case’s holding
The dram shop statute establishes primary liability for the intoxicated driver and secondary liability for the establishment, allowing the establishment to seek indemnity from the driver.
Later courts cite it for
“any apparent conflict between sections of the same statute should be harmonized if possible so as to give effect to both; and, in so doing, the statute should be construed so that no part of it is meaningless or ineffectual.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENJefferson Cty. Com. Atty's Off. v. Kaplan, 65 S.W.3d 916 (Ky. 2002).
cites § 411.182 18×subsections: (1) 3× (2) (4)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“Further, he argues that there are genuine issues of material fact as to Rider's negligence and whether he is entitled to immunity.”
Later courts cite it for
“this leaves rider's testimony as the only possible remaining source of his liability.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENHargis v. Baize, 168 S.W.3d 36 (Ky. 2005).
cites § 411.182 4×cited by 90 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“" Following completion of discovery, Appellants moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of Baize's negligence, claiming that the violation of the KOSHA regulations was negligence per se and created a private cause of action for wrongful death; thus, the jury should be…”
The case’s holding
A violation of a penal statute creates a private right of action for any person within the class of persons the statute intended to protect.
Later courts cite it for
“creates a private right of action in a person damaged by another person's violation of any statute that is penal in nature and provides no civil remedy, if the person damaged is within the class of persons the statute intended to be protected.” · 11 citing courts
16
GREENSommerkamp v. Linton, 114 S.W.3d 811 (Ky. 2003).
cites § 411.182 5×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“Inherent in the Kentucky law of apportionment, KRS 411.182, is that the interests of code-fendants may be considered antagonistic.”
Later courts cite it for
“whether the defendants are represented by separate counsel; whether the alleged acts of negligence occurred at different times; whether the defendants have individual theories of defense; and whether fault will be subject to apportionment.” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENAIK Selective Self Ins. Fund v. Bush, 74 S.W.3d 251 (Ky. 2002).
cites § 411.182 8×subsections: (4) 6×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“2d 91 (1993), the Court of Appeals held that the same result obtains under our subsequently enacted comparative negligence statute, KRS 411.182. We agree. Thus, AIK can recover no more than 25% of its total subrogation claim and, pursuant to Hillman v.”
The case’s holding
Under the workers' compensation subrogation statute, an insurer recovers its proportionate share of benefits, minus the employee's entire legal expense; the made-whole rule does not apply.
Later courts cite it for
“requires that the employee's entire legal expense, not just a pro rata share, be deducted from the employer's or insurer's portion of any recovery.” · 1 citing court
18
cites § 411.182 3×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“KRS 411.182, Kentucky’s comparative fault statute provides, in relevant part: (1)In all tort actions, including products liability actions, involving fault of more than one (1) party to the action, including third-party defendants and persons who have been released under…”
The case’s holding
Aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty requires proving the existence and breach of a fiduciary relationship, substantial assistance or encouragement, and knowledge of the breach.
Later courts cite it for
“a claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires that a plaintiff allege that '(1) the defendant owes a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; and (3) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach.” · 6 citing courts
19
GREENLarkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758 (Ky. 2004).
cites § 411.182 4×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“Only three years after that decision, effective July 15, 1988, the Legislature enacted a revised KRS 411.182, which statutorily overruled Reda Pump Co .”
The case’s holding
A manufacturer satisfies its duty to warn a patient by providing adequate warnings to the prescribing physician, who is in a superior position to advise the patient.
Later courts cite it for
“providing an adequate warning to the prescribing physician relieves the manufacturer of its duty to warn the patient regardless of how or if the physician warns the patient.” · 5 citing courts
cites § 411.182 17×subsections: (1) 2× (2) (4)cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 411.182
“Further, he argues that there are genuine issues of material fact as to Rider’s negligence and whether he is entitled to immunity.”
Later courts cite it for
“prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity.” · 1 citing court

Show all 142 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198920072026

One bar per year. Tallest: 8 cases in 2017. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ky.42Ky. Ct. App.34W.D. Ky.26E.D. Ky.226th Cir.4S.C. Ct. App.3Bankr. E.D. Ky.2Miss.2

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 15 courts in all.

By subsection
(1)28 cases
Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467 (Ky. 2001).“Coyle also contends that the trial court should not have given comparative fault instructions regarding his conduct because he filed suit before the effective date of KRS 411.182. We address each argument in turn and hold that the evidence justified the comparative fault…”
Mcdonald's Corp. v. Ogborn, 309 S.W.3d 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).
Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2004).“The trial court dismissed LFUCG for liability purposes on grounds that it was entitled to sovereign immunity, but allowed it to remain in the suit for purposes of apportionment under KRS 411.182. The trial court also dismissed the claims against the individual employees on…”
Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002).“KRS 411.182; Baker v. Webb, Ky.App., 883 S.”
Jenkins ex rel. Branum v. Best, 250 S.W.3d 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).“If we doubted our conclusion — on the theory that Hilen elevated the apportionment of fault between joint tort-feasors from a jury’s option to a full-fledged right of a tort defendant — we would have been rescued by the legislature’s enactment of KRS 411.182. That statute allows…”
Showing the top 5 of 28. More in the list view →
(1)(a)2 cases
Kentucky River Med. Ctr. v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385 (Ky. 2010).
Morgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622 (Ky. 2009).“Parrish, is more to the point: [F]ault may not be properly allocated to a party, a dismissed party or settling nonparty unless the court or the jury first find that the party was at fault; otherwise, the party has no fault to allocate.”
(1)(b)5 cases
Stanford v. United States, 948 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D. Ky. 2013).
Carter v. Bullitt Host, LLC, 471 S.W.3d 288 (Ky. 2015).“1984), and since 1988 by statute, KRS 411.182, that all tort actions must provide for the apportionment of fault among all parties to an action, the Manis rule is no longer viable, and we hold ’ that all ■ open and obvious hazard *290 cases, including obvious natural outdoor…”
Mem'l Sports Complex, LLC v. McCormick, 499 S.W.3d 700 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).
Low v. Power Tool Specialist, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 655 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Ram Constr. Servs. of Michigan, Inc., No. 5:21-cv-00233 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 19, 2023).
(2)14 cases
Morgan v. Scott, 291 S.W.3d 622 (Ky. 2009).
Grubb v. Smith, 523 S.W.3d 409 (Ky. 2017).“of contributory negligence, in its many guises, toward a new regime in which a plaintiffs own negligence no longer bars his or her claim.”
CertainTeed Corp. v. Dexter, 330 S.W.3d 64 (Ky. 2010).
DeStock 14, Inc. v. Logsdon, 993 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. 1999).“2d 563 (1938); or whether the dram shop’s negligence is deemed concurrent with that of the drunken driver so that their respective liabilities are subject to apportionment, KRS 411.182, Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.”
Jackson v. Tullar, 285 S.W.3d 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
Showing the top 5 of 14. More in the list view →
(3)3 cases
Kevin Tucker & Assocs., Inc. v. Scott & Ritter, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
Fernanders v. Marks Constr. of South Carolina, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 509 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).
Fernanders v. Marks Const. of SC, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 509 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998).
(4)22 cases
Abney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 215 S.W.3d 699 (Ky. 2007).“This appeal involves an issue of first impression in Kentucky: since the enactment of KRS 411.182, does a release negotiated with one joint tortfeasor discharging "all other persons, firms or corporations liable, or who might be claimed to be liable" effectively release another…”
AIK Selective Self Ins. Fund v. Bush, 74 S.W.3d 251 (Ky. 2002).“2d 91 (1993), the Court of Appeals held that the same result obtains under our subsequently enacted comparative negligence statute, KRS 411.182. We agree. Thus, AIK can recover no more than 25% of its total subrogation claim and, pursuant to Hillman v.”
Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467 (Ky. 2001).
Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002).
Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp., 27 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2000).“Korp II Ltd. Partnership, etc., is barred because the original complaint asserted only a cause of action under Kentucky's Civil Rights Act, which creates a right of action only against employers and not against non-employer perpetrators such as Salazar.”
Showing the top 5 of 22. More in the list view →

Show all 142 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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