Kentucky Revised Statutes

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.030 (2026)

Choice of evils

✓ current as of May 2026

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(1) Unless inconsistent with the ensuing sections of this code defining justifiable use of physical force or with some other provisions of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable when the defendant believes it to be necessary to avoid an imminent public or private injury greater than the injury which is sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense charged, except that no justification can exist under this section for an intentional homicide. (2) When the defendant believes that conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is necessary for the purpose described in subsection (1), but is wanton or reckless in having such belief, or when the defendant is wanton or reckless in bringing about a situation requiring the conduct described in subsection (1), the justification afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which wantonness or recklessness, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability. Effective: January 1, 1975 History: Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 28, effective January 1, 1975.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 24 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1979–2024 · leading case: Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1991).

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Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1991). · cites it 12× “In KRS 503.030, the Penal Code recognizes a legal justification for criminal conduct in circumstances "in which individuals are confronted with a choice of engaging in conduct defined as criminal or suffering the consequences of greater injury.”

Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. 1999). · cites it 2× “KRS 503.030(1). Since the jury necessarily disbelieved Appellant's claim that Cotton threatened his life if he did not rob McCreary, the failure to instruct the jury on choice of evils was equally as harmless as the failure to instruct on duress.”

Senay v. Commonwealth, 650 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1983). · cites it 3× “Thus, the trial court’s refusal to instruct on the defense was not error, and we affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals upholding the conviction.”

Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803 (Ky. 2014). “070, choice of evils, KRS 503.030, or prevention of a crime, KRS 503.”

Lapradd v. Commonwealth, 334 S.W.3d 88 (Ky. 2011). · cites it 3× “The issue in this criminal appeal is the burden of proof and how the jury is to be instructed when a choice of evils defense is raised pursuant to KRS 503.030. Because the jury instructions improperly failed to place the burden of proof on the Commonwealth to show that the…”

Thompson v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1983). · cites it 2× “It argues that a self-protection instruction does not apply to wanton or reckless homicide in light of KRS 503.030 and 503.020. Specifically, it urges this Court to reconsider its decision in Kohlheim v.”

Duvall v. Commonwealth, 593 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). · cites it 2× “Three issues are raised on appeal: 1) Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury on the law of “choice of evils” pursuant to KRS 503.030; 2) Did the Commonwealth succeed in proving all the elements required of it under KRS 527.”

Commonwealth v. Ferrell, 17 S.W.3d 520 (Ky. 2000). “KRS 503.030: (1) Unless inconsistent with the ensuing sections of this code defining justifiable use of physical force or with some other provisions of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable when the defendant believes it to be necessary to avoid…”

Damron v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. 1985). · cites it 2× “First, he asked for and was denied a “choice of evils” instruction, KRS 503.030. Damron testified that he escaped from jail because it was a “matter of life or death.”

Mullikan v. Com., 341 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2011). · cites it 2× “KRS 503.030. And as previously discussed, there was no evidence of threats of imminent injury when Mullikan accosted Fields on the street or when Mullikan entered Fields's home and began brandishing a sword and making verbal threats.”

Beasley v. Commonwealth, 618 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). “KRS 503.030 states that: ... conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable when the defendant believes it to be necessary to avoid an imminent public or private injury greater than the injury which is sought to be prevented by the statute defining the…”

Bates v. Commonwealth, 145 S.W.3d 845 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). “The duress defense differs from the choice of evils defense contained in KRS 503.030: (1) Unless inconsistent with the ensuing sections of this code defining justifiable use of physical force or with some other provisions of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an…”

Show all 24 citing cases →

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.030(1) — 8 cases

Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1991). “In KRS 503.030, the Penal Code recognizes a legal justification for criminal conduct in circumstances "in which individuals are confronted with a choice of engaging in conduct defined as criminal or suffering the consequences of greater injury.”

Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. 1999). “KRS 503.030(1). Since the jury necessarily disbelieved Appellant's claim that Cotton threatened his life if he did not rob McCreary, the failure to instruct the jury on choice of evils was equally as harmless as the failure to instruct on duress.”

Lapradd v. Commonwealth, 334 S.W.3d 88 (Ky. 2011). “The issue in this criminal appeal is the burden of proof and how the jury is to be instructed when a choice of evils defense is raised pursuant to KRS 503.030. Because the jury instructions improperly failed to place the burden of proof on the Commonwealth to show that the…”

Mullikan v. Com., 341 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2011). “KRS 503.030. And as previously discussed, there was no evidence of threats of imminent injury when Mullikan accosted Fields on the street or when Mullikan entered Fields's home and began brandishing a sword and making verbal threats.”

Peak v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 80 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).

— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.030(2) — 1 case

Anthony Webb v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. Ct. App. 2024).

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