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Ky. Rev. Stat.Chapter 513

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 513.040 (2026)

Arson in the third degree

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1984–2025 6citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 6 opinions since 1984, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (2 cases).

(1) A person is guilty of arson in the third degree if he wantonly causes destruction or damage to a building of his own or of another by intentionally starting a fire or causing an explosion.

(2) In any prosecution under this section, it is a defense that no person other than the defendant had a possessory or proprietary interest in the building, or, if other persons had such an interest, all of them consented to defendant's conduct.

(3) Arson in the third degree is a Class D felony. Effective: July 15, 1982 History: Amended 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 56, sec. 4, effective July 15, 1982. -- Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 116, effective January 1, 1975.

The 6 cases that cite Ky. Rev. Stat. § 513.040 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENKing v. Commonwealth, 513 S.W.3d 919 (Ky. 2017).
cites § 513.040 6×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 513.040
“This more difficult question arises because the third-degree arson statute, KRS 513.040, requires acting with two distinct mental states—one pertaining to the basic physical act of starting a fire and the other to the consequences of that act.”
Later courts cite it for
“the requirement of introducing 'some evidence justifying a reasonable inference of the existence of a defense,' . . . is not a terribly high bar.” · 2 citing courts
2
REDPerdue v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 148 (Ky. 1996).
cites § 513.040 2×cited by 80 cases
Overruled by Huddleston v. Commonwealth on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 513.040
“As to appellant's claim that a third degree arson instruction should have been given, this, too, is without merit.”
The case’s holding
Evidence concerning minimum parole eligibility guidelines may not be introduced during the penalty phase when the death penalty is sought.
Later courts cite it for
“facilitation reflects the mental state of one who is 'wholly indifferent' to the actual completion of the crime.” · 6 citing courts
3
GREENLawson v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. 2001).
cites § 513.040 1×cited by 89 cases
Where it cites § 513.040
“See KRS 513.040 ("A person is guilty of arson in the third degree if he wantonly causes destruction or damage to a building of his own or of another by intentionally starting a fire or causing an explosion.”
The case’s holding
When conducting voir dire regarding penalty ranges in non-capital cases, the questioner must define the range using the minimum and maximum sentences for each class of offense.
Later courts cite it for
“where a party or the trial court wishes to voir dire the jury panel regarding its ability to consider the full range of penalties for each indicted offense, the questioner should define the penalty range in terms of the possible minimum and maximum sentences for each class of offense.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENCollett v. Commonwealth, 686 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 513.040 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 513.040
“030 and KRS 513.040; theft by unlawful taking of property worth $100 or more, KRS 514.”
5
GREENUnited States v. Mitchell, 218 F. Supp. 3d 360 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
cites § 513.040 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 513.040
“05 (fourth degree); see also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 513.040 ; WYO. STAT.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is sufficient for purposes of 2255 review to show that the court might have applied the residual clause when it imposed the enhanced sentence.” · 1 citing court
6
NO FLAGJonathan Puckett v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 2024-SC-0448 (Ky. Dec. 18, 2025).
cites § 513.040 1×subsections: (1)cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 513.040
“030(1); KRS 513.040(1). Puckett claims he was entitled to an instruction on third-degree arson because the Commonwealth’s arson investigator could not rule out faulty wiring as the cause of the fire.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198420042025

One bar per year. Tallest: 1 case in 1984. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ky.4Ky. Ct. App.1M.D. Penn.1
By subsection
(1)2 cases
King v. Commonwealth, 513 S.W.3d 919 (Ky. 2017).“This more difficult question arises because the third-degree arson statute, KRS 513.040, requires acting with two distinct mental states—one pertaining to the basic physical act of starting a fire and the other to the consequences of that act.”
Jonathan Puckett v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 2024-SC-0448 (Ky. Dec. 18, 2025).“030(1); KRS 513.040(1). Puckett claims he was entitled to an instruction on third-degree arson because the Commonwealth’s arson investigator could not rule out faulty wiring as the cause of the fire.”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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