Kentucky Revised Statutes
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 94.360 (2026)
Repealed, 1980
✓ current as of May 2026
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Catchline at repeal: Public ways and places -- Control -- Action to close. History: Repealed 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 233, sec. 3, effective July 15, 1980. -- Amended 1960 Ky. Acts ch. 217, sec. 1, effective June 16, 1960. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. secs. 3094, 3290-41, 3449, 3560, 3561, 3562.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 19
cases, 1945–1978 · leading case: Graves Cnty. Ex Rel. v. City of Mayfield, 204 S.W.2d 369 (Ky. Ct. App. 1947).
Graves Cnty. Ex Rel. v. City of Mayfield, 204 S.W.2d 369 (Ky. Ct. App. 1947). “This question is settled by the provisions of Section 94.360, Kentucky Revised Statutes.”
Miller v. City of Georgetown, Etc., 191 S.W.2d 403 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945). “, now part of KRS 94.360, said: “Certainly the power thus given by the statute, supra, in the absence of express or implied restrictions imposed by some other statute, which is not claimed, can-leave no doubt of the right of the city council to pass the ordinance, and such an…”
Prudential Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Louisville, 464 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971). “” KRS 94.360, in effect from 1906 to date, deals with all cities other than those of the first class, and it reads as follows: "All the owners of ground in the square or lots divided by that public way, or the portion proposed to be closed, shall be made defendants.”
City of Dayton v. Thompson, 372 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963). “KRS 94.360 provides that the legislative body of 2nd to 6th class cities, inclusive, “shall, by itself or through a department of public works or a superintendent of public works as provided by law, have and exercise exclusive control over the public ways * * * of the city.”
Adams v. Burke, 215 S.W.2d 531 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948). “” Under subsection (1), section 94.360, KRS, the legislative body of a fourth class city is granted “exclusive control over the public ways” of the city.”
Avey Drilling Mach. Co. v. Lukowsky, 261 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953). “The authority is expressly vested in the Board of Commissioners, although the ordinance does not become effective until the city “shall institute an action in the circuit court to have it closed” and thereby ensure compensation to property owners who may suffer direct and…”
Terrell v. Tracy, 229 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950). “KRS 94.360. They cite Stephens v. City of Russell, 306 Ky.”
Levy v. Curlin, 241 S.W.2d 997 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951). “050 the Department of Public Works of a first class city, as Louisville is, has exclusive control of the improvement, construction, reconstruction, and use of all public ways, but does not have authority to widen streets as do cities of the second, third and fourth classes under…”
City of Monticello v. Wayne Cnty. Fiscal Court, 562 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). “Monticello appeals contending that it, as a fourth class city, has the authority pursuant to KRS 94.360 to move the Doughboy monument to a place where it will not impede the flow of traffic.”
Pulaski Cnty. v. City of Somerset, 364 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963). “120(3) and KRS 94.360(1), giving the city council power of control over “public grounds belonging to” or “of” the city, are not significant here because the entire public square did not “belong” to the city.”
Shurtleff v. City of Pikeville, 217 S.W.2d 976 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949). “Only the City may ■close the alley, and it must proceed in accordance with the provisions of KRS 94.360. The court property dismissed appellants’ petition, and the judgment is affirmed.”
Terrell v. Tracy, 229 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950). “KRS 94.360. They cite Stephens v. City of Russell, 306 Ky.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 94.360(1) — 3 cases
Pulaski Cnty. v. City of Somerset, 364 S.W.2d 334 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963). “120(3) and KRS 94.360(1), giving the city council power of control over “public grounds belonging to” or “of” the city, are not significant here because the entire public square did not “belong” to the city.”
City of Monticello v. Wayne Cnty. Fiscal Court, 562 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). “Monticello appeals contending that it, as a fourth class city, has the authority pursuant to KRS 94.360 to move the Doughboy monument to a place where it will not impede the flow of traffic.”
Blackburn v. City of Pineville, 313 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958).
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 94.360(2) — 4 cases
Avey Drilling Mach. Co. v. Lukowsky, 261 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953). “The authority is expressly vested in the Board of Commissioners, although the ordinance does not become effective until the city “shall institute an action in the circuit court to have it closed” and thereby ensure compensation to property owners who may suffer direct and…”
Prudential Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Louisville, 464 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971). “” KRS 94.360, in effect from 1906 to date, deals with all cities other than those of the first class, and it reads as follows: "All the owners of ground in the square or lots divided by that public way, or the portion proposed to be closed, shall be made defendants.”
Hill v. Baker, 218 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949).
Louisville & Nashville R. v. City of Owensboro, 238 S.W.2d 148 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951).
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