Louisiana Revised Statutes & Codes

La. Rev. Stat. § 14:10 (2026)

Criminal intent may be specific or general:

✓ current as of May 2026

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§10. Criminal intent

Criminal intent may be specific or general:

(1) Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.

(2) General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 1,516 cases (125 in the last 5 years), 1954–2026 · leading case: State v. Holmes, 388 So. 2d 722 (La. 1980).

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State v. Holmes, 388 So. 2d 722 (La. 1980). · cites it 5× “As discussed previously, the defendant is correct that there must be proof of specific intent on the part of Ralph Holmes in order to convict him of first degree murder.”

City of Baton Rouge v. Ross, 654 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1995). · cites it 6× “LSA-R.S. 14:10. "Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.”

State v. Bridgewater, 823 So. 2d 877 (La. 2002). · cites it 2× “R.S. 14:10(1)'s reference to specific intent in terms of an offender's "failure to act," the state argues that the latter apparent failure to act sufficed to establish defendant's specific intent.”

State v. Dyson, 222 So. 3d 220 (La. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “R.S. 14:10(1). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact.”

State v. Amos, 192 So. 3d 822 (La. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 3× “R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Weary, 2003-3067, p.”

State v. Par., 405 So. 2d 1080 (La. 1981). · cites it 3× “R.S. 14:10, 27. Accordingly, in order to commit attempted aggravated rape, an offender must actively desire to commit rape by (1) overcoming the victim's utmost resistance by force; (2) preventing the victim from resisting by threats of great and immediate bodily harm,…”

State v. Neal, 796 So. 2d 649 (La. 2001). “To convict the defendant of first degree murder, the prosecution was required to prove: 1) that the defendant specifically intended to kill the victims during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an aggravated burglary; (2) that the defendant was engaged in the…”

State v. Williams, 893 So. 2d 7 (La. 2004). “" LSA-R.S. 14:10(2). In this case, the State established that defendant caused the accident, left the scene of the accident, and failed to render reasonable aid.”

State of Louisiana v. Eric Dale Mickelson, 149 So. 3d 178 (La. 2014). · cites it 2× “” In particular, he alleges that there was pervasive evidence of his intoxication at the time of the offense, evidence sufficient to support his contention that he was so intoxicated he could not form the requisite specific intent to commit the crime, and that the state failed…”

Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609 (La. 1989). · cites it 2× “R.S. 14:10. [4] Furthermore, the inquiry into whether injuries are "intended or expected" by an insured under the terms of an insurance contract differs from the inquiry into whether an act is "intentional" under the worker's compensation statute's intentional acts exception to…”

State v. Lawson, 1 So. 3d 516 (La. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “" LSA-R.S. 14:10(1). The determination of specific criminal intent is a question of fact.”

State v. Leger, 936 So. 2d 108 (La. 2006). “[167] The state bore the burden to prove these elements, and to prove the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator.”

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— La. Rev. Stat. § 14:10(1) — 1072 cases

State v. Bridgewater, 823 So. 2d 877 (La. 2002). “R.S. 14:10(1)'s reference to specific intent in terms of an offender's "failure to act," the state argues that the latter apparent failure to act sufficed to establish defendant's specific intent.”

State of Louisiana v. Eric Dale Mickelson, 149 So. 3d 178 (La. 2014). “” In particular, he alleges that there was pervasive evidence of his intoxication at the time of the offense, evidence sufficient to support his contention that he was so intoxicated he could not form the requisite specific intent to commit the crime, and that the state failed…”

State v. Holmes, 388 So. 2d 722 (La. 1980). “As discussed previously, the defendant is correct that there must be proof of specific intent on the part of Ralph Holmes in order to convict him of first degree murder.”

State v. Lawson, 1 So. 3d 516 (La. Ct. App. 2008). “" LSA-R.S. 14:10(1). The determination of specific criminal intent is a question of fact.”

— La. Rev. Stat. § 14:10(2) — 176 cases

State v. Oliphant, 113 So. 3d 165 (La. 2013).

City of Baton Rouge v. Ross, 654 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1995). “LSA-R.S. 14:10. "Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.”

State v. Dyson, 222 So. 3d 220 (La. Ct. App. 2017). “R.S. 14:10(1). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact.”

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