Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 104 (2026)

Use of force in defense of premises

✓ current as of May 2026
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1.  A person in possession or control of premises or a person who is licensed or privileged to be thereon is justified in using nondeadly force upon another person when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises.  
[PL 2007, c. 173, §20 (AMD).]
2.  A person in possession or control of premises or a person who is licensed or privileged to be thereon is justified in using deadly force upon another person when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes it necessary to prevent an attempt by the other person to commit arson.  
[PL 2007, c. 173, §20 (AMD).]
3.  A person in possession or control of a dwelling place or a person who is licensed or privileged to be therein is justified in using deadly force upon another person:  
A. Under the circumstances enumerated in section 108; or   [PL 1975, c. 740, §26 (NEW).]
B. When the person reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of a criminal trespass by such other person, who the person reasonably believes:  
(1) Has entered or is attempting to enter the dwelling place or has surreptitiously remained within the dwelling place without a license or privilege to do so; and  
(2) Is committing or is likely to commit some other crime within the dwelling place.   [PL 2007, c. 173, §20 (AMD).]
[PL 2007, c. 173, §20 (AMD).]
4.  A person may use deadly force under subsection 3, paragraph B only if the person first demands the person against whom such deadly force is to be used to terminate the criminal trespass and the trespasser fails to immediately comply with the demand, unless the person reasonably believes that it would be dangerous to the person or a 3rd person to make the demand.  
[PL 2007, c. 173, §20 (AMD).]
5.  As used in this section:  
A. Dwelling place has the same meaning provided in section 2, subsection 10; and   [PL 1975, c. 740, §26 (NEW).]
B. Premises includes, but is not limited to, lands, private ways and any buildings or structures thereon.   [PL 1975, c. 740, §26 (NEW).]
[PL 1975, c. 740, §26 (NEW).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW). PL 1975, c. 740, §26 (RPR). PL 2007, c. 173, §20 (AMD).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 28 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1981–2025 · leading case: State v. Dyer, 2001 ME 62 (Me. 2001).
State v. Dyer, 2001 ME 62 (Me. 2001). · cites it 16× “Dyer contends that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the use of force in defense of premises, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 104(1) (1983). We agree, vacate the judgment, and remand for a new trial.”
State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d 1380 (Me. 1985). · cites it 10× “Police who make such illegal warrantless entries into dwelling places are, furthermore, violating the express prohibitions of 17-A M.”
State of Maine v. Mark Cardilli Jr., 2021 ME 31 (Me. 2021). · cites it 7× “17-A M.R.S. § 104(1) (2021). Deadly force, however, can be used against only trespassers who are about to commit arson, 17-A M.”
State v. Neild, 903 A.2d 339 (Me. 2006). · cites it 4× “§ 208(1)(C), and his case was tried before a jury. At trial, the court instructed the jury on self-defense, but denied Neild’s request for a jury instruction on the defense of premises as provided in 17-A M.”
State v. Thurston, 2009 ME 41 (Me. 2009). · cites it 6× “2d 266, 268 (1959); see also the drafter's comment supporting the 1975 enactment of section 104, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 104 at p. 452 (2006). [¶ 22] On this point, the case before us is distinguishable from State v.”
State v. Cannell, 2007 ME 30 (Me. 2007). · cites it 3× “§§ 2(18), 108(1) (2006). The use of non-deadly force is also justified in defense of property when “necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of a criminal trespass.”
State v. Villacci, 187 A.3d 576 (Me. 2018). · cites it 2× “§ 108 (2017) ; (2) defense of premises, see 17-A M.R.S. § 104 (2017) ; (3) defense of property, see 17-A M.”
State of Maine v. Wesley M. Villacci, 2018 ME 80 (Me. 2018). · cites it 2× “§ 108 (2017); (2) defense of premises, see 17-A M.R.S. § 104 (2017); (3) defense of property, see 17-A M.”
State v. Gilbert, 473 A.2d 1273 (Me. 1984). · cites it 3× “See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 104(1) (right to use nondeadly force in defense of premises contingent upon reasonable belief that criminal trespass is or is about to occur).”
State v. Preston, 2011 ME 98 (Me. 2011). · cites it 2× “17-A M.R.S. § 104(1) (2010). 4 . The relevant statutory section provides: "A person is guilty of reckless conduct if he recklessly creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person.”
State v. Kirby, 2005 ME 92 (Me. 2005). · cites it 3× “Kirby argues that: (1) the deputies’ detention of him violated his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) the court erred when it found that Kirby’s use of nondeadly force to resist the deputies’ attempt to enter his home was not justified pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 104 (1983); and (3)…”
State v. Williams, 433 A.2d 765 (Me. 1981). · cites it 2× “This rationale comports with the Legislature’s inclusion in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 104, (use of force in defense of premises), of the requirement that a person may use deadly force in defense of his dwelling place “only if he first demands the person against whom such deadly force is…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 104(1) — 20 cases
State v. Dyer, 2001 ME 62 (Me. 2001). “Dyer contends that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the use of force in defense of premises, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 104(1) (1983). We agree, vacate the judgment, and remand for a new trial.”
State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d 1380 (Me. 1985). “Police who make such illegal warrantless entries into dwelling places are, furthermore, violating the express prohibitions of 17-A M.”
State v. Neild, 903 A.2d 339 (Me. 2006). “§ 208(1)(C), and his case was tried before a jury. At trial, the court instructed the jury on self-defense, but denied Neild’s request for a jury instruction on the defense of premises as provided in 17-A M.”
State v. Thurston, 2009 ME 41 (Me. 2009). “2d 266, 268 (1959); see also the drafter's comment supporting the 1975 enactment of section 104, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 104 at p. 452 (2006). [¶ 22] On this point, the case before us is distinguishable from State v.”
State v. Preston, 2011 ME 98 (Me. 2011). “17-A M.R.S. § 104(1) (2010). 4 . The relevant statutory section provides: "A person is guilty of reckless conduct if he recklessly creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to another person.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 104(2) — 1 case
State of Maine v. Mark Cardilli Jr., 2021 ME 31 (Me. 2021). “17-A M.R.S. § 104(1) (2021). Deadly force, however, can be used against only trespassers who are about to commit arson, 17-A M.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 104(3) — 3 cases
State of Maine v. Mark Cardilli Jr., 2021 ME 31 (Me. 2021). “17-A M.R.S. § 104(1) (2021). Deadly force, however, can be used against only trespassers who are about to commit arson, 17-A M.”
State v. Cannell, 2007 ME 30 (Me. 2007). “§§ 2(18), 108(1) (2006). The use of non-deadly force is also justified in defense of property when “necessary to prevent or terminate the commission of a criminal trespass.”
State v. Gilbert, 473 A.2d 1273 (Me. 1984). “See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 104(1) (right to use nondeadly force in defense of premises contingent upon reasonable belief that criminal trespass is or is about to occur).”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 104(3)(B) — 2 cases
State v. Rancourt, 435 A.2d 1095 (Me. 1981).
State v. Thorne, 490 A.2d 646 (Me. 1985).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 104(3)(B)(2) — 2 cases
State v. Clisham, 614 A.2d 1297 (Me. 1992).
State of Maine v. Mark Cardilli Jr., 2021 ME 31 (Me. 2021). “17-A M.R.S. § 104(1) (2021). Deadly force, however, can be used against only trespassers who are about to commit arson, 17-A M.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 104(5)(B) — 1 case
Franklin Prop. Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d 218 (Me. 1981).
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