Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 402 (2026)

Criminal trespass

✓ current as of May 2026
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1.  A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, knowing that that person is not licensed or privileged to do so, that person:  
A. Enters any dwelling place. Violation of this paragraph is a Class D crime;   [PL 2001, c. 383, §56 (AMD); PL 2001, c. 383, §156 (AFF).]
B. Enters any structure that is locked or barred. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime;   [PL 2001, c. 383, §56 (AMD); PL 2001, c. 383, §156 (AFF).]
C. Enters any place from which that person may lawfully be excluded and that is posted in accordance with subsection 4 or in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders or that is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime;   [PL 2001, c. 383, §56 (AMD); PL 2001, c. 383, §156 (AFF).]
D. Remains in any place in defiance of a lawful order to leave that was personally communicated to that person by the owner or another authorized person. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime;   [PL 2001, c. 383, §56 (AMD); PL 2001, c. 383, §156 (AFF).]
E. Enters any place in defiance of a lawful order not to enter that was personally communicated to that person by the owner or another authorized person. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime; or   [PL 2001, c. 383, §56 (AMD); PL 2001, c. 383, §156 (AFF).]
F. Enters or remains in a cemetery or burial ground at any time between 1/2 hour after sunset and 1/2 hour before sunrise the following day, unless that person enters or remains during hours in which visitors are permitted to enter or remain by municipal ordinance or, in the case of a privately owned and operated cemetery, by posting. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime.   [PL 2001, c. 383, §56 (AMD); PL 2001, c. 383, §156 (AFF).]
[PL 2001, c. 383, §56 (AMD); PL 2001, c. 383, §156 (AFF).]
2. 
[PL 2001, c. 383, §57 (RP); PL 2001, c. 383, §156 (AFF).]
3. 
[PL 1979, c. 701, §23 (RP).]
4.  For the purposes of subsection 1, paragraph C, property is posted if it is marked with signs or paint in compliance with this subsection. Proof that any posted sign or paint marking is actually seen by an intruder gives rise to a permissible inference under the Maine Rules of Evidence, Rule 303 that such posted sign or paint marking is posted in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders.  
A. Signs must indicate that access is prohibited, that access is prohibited without permission of the landowner or the landowner's agent, or that access for a particular purpose is prohibited.   [PL 1995, c. 529, §2 (NEW).]
B. [PL 2011, c. 432, §4 (AMD); MRSA T. 17-A §402, sub-4, ¶B (RP).]
B-1. Paint markings made pursuant to this paragraph mean that access is prohibited without permission of the landowner or the landowner's agent. Paint markings made pursuant to this paragraph must consist of a conspicuous vertical line at least one inch in width and at least 8 inches in length and must be placed so that the bottoms of the marks are not less than 3 feet from the ground or more than 5 feet from the ground at locations that are readily visible to any person approaching the property and no more than 100 feet apart. Paint markings may be placed on trees, posts or stones as described in this paragraph. The Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry, Bureau of Forestry shall adopt rules to determine the color and type of paint that may be used to post property pursuant to this paragraph. Rules adopted pursuant to this paragraph are routine technical rules pursuant to Title 5, chapter 375, subchapter 2‑A.   [PL 2011, c. 432, §5 (NEW); PL 2011, c. 657, Pt. W, §§5, 7 (REV); PL 2013, c. 405, Pt. A, §23 (REV).]
C. Signs or paint must mark the property at intervals no greater than 100 feet and at all vehicular access entries from a public road.   [PL 1995, c. 529, §2 (NEW).]
D. Signs or paint markings are required only on the portion of the property where access is prohibited or limited. Signs or paint posted in accordance with this section have no effect on boundaries of property and do not constitute claims of possession or adverse use in accordance with state law.   [PL 1995, c. 529, §2 (NEW).]
D-1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a landowner who posts that landowner's land by paint markings and who intends to prohibit access without permission of the landowner or the landowner's agent or intends to prohibit access for a particular purpose may do this by posting in a prominent place one or more qualifying signs that by words or symbols set forth the nature of the prohibition. The landowner need not post the qualifying signs at 100-foot intervals.   [PL 1999, c. 115, §1 (NEW).]
E. A person commits criminal mischief and is subject to prosecution under section 806 if that person, without permission of the owner or owner's agent:  
(1) Knowingly posts the property of another with a sign or paint mark indicating that access is prohibited, that access is prohibited without permission or that access for a particular purpose is prohibited; or  
(2) Removes, mutilates, defaces or destroys a sign or paint mark placed for purposes of this section.   [PL 1995, c. 529, §2 (NEW).]
Nothing in this subsection limits any manner of posting reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders.  
[PL 2011, c. 432, §§4, 5 (AMD); PL 2011, c. 657, Pt. W, §§5, 7 (REV); PL 2013, c. 405, Pt. A, §23 (REV).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW). PL 1977, c. 128 (AMD). PL 1977, c. 510, §53 (AMD). PL 1979, c. 701, §23 (RPR). PL 1981, c. 317, §11 (AMD). PL 1989, c. 793 (AMD). PL 1995, c. 529, §§1, 2 (AMD). PL 1999, c. 115, §1 (AMD). PL 2001, c. 383, §§56-58 (AMD). PL 2001, c. 383, §156 (AFF). PL 2011, c. 432, §§4, 5 (AMD). PL 2011, c. 657, Pt. W, §§5, 7 (REV). PL 2013, c. 405, Pt. A, §23 (REV).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 57 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1978–2025 · leading case: State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685 (Me. 1987).
State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685 (Me. 1987). · cites it 10× “The Defendants, Lawrence Dansinger, Karen Harlan, Marguerite Roosen, David Demere, Peter Millard, Mary Lois Anderson and Francine Falcone, appeal judgments of the Superior Court in Penobscot County, finding them guilty of criminal trespass, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402 (1983). The…”
State v. Dyer, 2001 ME 62 (Me. 2001). · cites it 8× “" 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(D) (Supp.2000). [¶ 8] Having been invited to enter a private residence, Dixon could become a trespasser by failing to leave after being given a lawful order to leave by the owner or other authorized person, and the "mere demand of the owner constitutes a…”
State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d 1380 (Me. 1985). · cites it 6× “especting a domestic disturbance amounting at the most to a breach of the public peace due to loud vocal exchanges between a father and his school-age son, Officer Gagnon, who was dispatched to investigate the complaint, practically stormed the Boilard home, even though all was…”
Holland v. Sebunya, 2000 ME 160 (Me. 2000). · cites it 4× “" 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1) (Supp.1999). Holland's dispute centers upon whether Sebunya's order to leave was "lawful.”
Lyons v. Baptist Sch. of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137 (Me. 2002). · cites it 2× “The court could have construed this testimony to mean simply that the witnesses would have complied with signs to avoid the possibility of a criminal trespass prosecution, see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(C) (Supp.2001), and not that they believed the Baptist School had the right to…”
State v. Tauvar, 461 A.2d 1065 (Me. 1983). · cites it 3× “■ Tauvar was originally tried in the District Court, Bar Harbor, and convicted of criminal trespass, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402. On appeal to the Superior Court, Hancock County, he was afforded a de novo trial by jury pursuant to former M.”
Loi Van Ngo v. State, 2008 ME 71 (Me. 2008). · cites it 2× “, 17-A M.R.S. § 402 (2007) (defining criminal trespass in relevant part as remaining "in any place in defiance of a lawful order to leave").”
Ingraham v. Univ. of Maine at Orono, 441 A.2d 691 (Me. 1982). “We note a procedural irregularity in the plaintiff’s conviction on December 9, 1981 of criminal trespassing, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402, a Class E crime. Ingraham was sentenced to six months in jail; sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for a year and a half.”
State v. Mahan, 1998 ME 143 (Me. 1998). · cites it 3× “1997) 1 and criminal trespass (Class E) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402 (1983 & Supp.1997), 2 entered in the Superior Court (Lincoln County, Calkins, J.”
State of Maine v. Matthew Reed, 2013 ME 5 (Me. 2013). “§ 806(1)(A), (2); and criminal trespass (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 402(1)(C) (2012). *1133 A daylong jury trial was held on March 23, 2012.”
State v. Svay, 2003 ME 93 (Me. 2003). “He was found guilty of the criminal trespass (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(A) (Supp. 2002), but not the burglary charge.”
State v. Luce, 394 A.2d 770 (Me. 1978). · cites it 2× “17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1): 1. A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so: A.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 402(1) — 6 cases
Holland v. Sebunya, 2000 ME 160 (Me. 2000). “" 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1) (Supp.1999). Holland's dispute centers upon whether Sebunya's order to leave was "lawful.”
State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685 (Me. 1987). “The Defendants, Lawrence Dansinger, Karen Harlan, Marguerite Roosen, David Demere, Peter Millard, Mary Lois Anderson and Francine Falcone, appeal judgments of the Superior Court in Penobscot County, finding them guilty of criminal trespass, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402 (1983). The…”
State v. Luce, 394 A.2d 770 (Me. 1978). “17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1): 1. A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so: A.”
Friedman v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 48 A.3d 794 (Me. 2012).
State v. Jonathan C. Richards, 2021 VT 40 (Vt. 2021).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 402(1)(A) — 6 cases
State v. Svay, 2003 ME 93 (Me. 2003). “He was found guilty of the criminal trespass (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(A) (Supp. 2002), but not the burglary charge.”
State v. Leonard, 2002 ME 125 (Me. 2002).
State v. Thurston, 2009 ME 41 (Me. 2009).
State v. Gilbert, 473 A.2d 1273 (Me. 1984).
Smith v. Jackson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D. Me. 2006).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 402(1)(B) — 4 cases
State v. Gordon, 437 A.2d 855 (Me. 1981).
State v. Robinson, 403 A.2d 1201 (Me. 1979).
State of Maine v. P.S., 2020 ME 9 (Me. 2020).
State v. Waycott, 471 A.2d 1045 (Me. 1984).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 402(1)(C) — 5 cases
Lyons v. Baptist Sch. of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137 (Me. 2002). “The court could have construed this testimony to mean simply that the witnesses would have complied with signs to avoid the possibility of a criminal trespass prosecution, see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(C) (Supp.2001), and not that they believed the Baptist School had the right to…”
State of Maine v. Matthew Reed, 2013 ME 5 (Me. 2013). “§ 806(1)(A), (2); and criminal trespass (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 402(1)(C) (2012). *1133 A daylong jury trial was held on March 23, 2012.”
McDermott v. Town of Windham, 204 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. Me. 2002).
United States v. Thomas, 190 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D. Me. 2002).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 402(1)(D) — 10 cases
State v. Dyer, 2001 ME 62 (Me. 2001). “" 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(D) (Supp.2000). [¶ 8] Having been invited to enter a private residence, Dixon could become a trespasser by failing to leave after being given a lawful order to leave by the owner or other authorized person, and the "mere demand of the owner constitutes a…”
Holland v. Sebunya, 2000 ME 160 (Me. 2000). “" 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1) (Supp.1999). Holland's dispute centers upon whether Sebunya's order to leave was "lawful.”
State v. Tauvar, 461 A.2d 1065 (Me. 1983). “■ Tauvar was originally tried in the District Court, Bar Harbor, and convicted of criminal trespass, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402. On appeal to the Superior Court, Hancock County, he was afforded a de novo trial by jury pursuant to former M.”
State v. Neild, 903 A.2d 339 (Me. 2006).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 402(1)(E) — 5 cases
State of Maine v. Samuel Sanchez, 2014 ME 50 (Me. 2014).
State v. Anthony, 798 A.2d 1099 (Me. 2002).
Doyle v. Rummsey (D. Me. 2023).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 402(1)(e) — 1 case
Kinderhaus North LLC v. Nicolas (Me. Super. Ct 2020).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 402(2) — 2 cases
State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685 (Me. 1987). “The Defendants, Lawrence Dansinger, Karen Harlan, Marguerite Roosen, David Demere, Peter Millard, Mary Lois Anderson and Francine Falcone, appeal judgments of the Superior Court in Penobscot County, finding them guilty of criminal trespass, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402 (1983). The…”
State v. Luce, 394 A.2d 770 (Me. 1978). “17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1): 1. A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so: A.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 402(4) — 1 case
State of Maine v. John D. Schlosser, 2025 ME 76 (Me. 2025).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 402(l)(E) — 1 case
State of Maine v. Browning (Me. Super. Ct 2021).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.