Notes of Decisions
Cited in
18
cases, 1976–1995 · leading case:
State v. Berube, 669 A.2d 170 (Me. 1995).
State v. Berube, 669 A.2d 170 (Me. 1995).
· cites it 6× “[4] The comment to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 5 confirms that this was section 5's limited objective.”
State v. Giglio, 441 A.2d 303 (Me. 1982).
· cites it 3× “17-A M.R.S.A. § 5(2) (Supp. 1980). 11 See our discussion in Part 4 of this opinion.”
State v. Burnham, 406 A.2d 889 (Me. 1979).
· cites it 3× “We find the alleged error preserved with respect to failure to instruct the jury as to the requirement of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 5(1) (that each element of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt) and its relation to 17-A M.”
State v. Reed, 459 A.2d 178 (Me. 1983).
· cites it 4× “17-A M.R.S.A. § 5(2) (1980). [2] We have stated: "[t]o reduce the sex offenses from Class A to Class B, it was enough that the jury could have entertained a reasonable doubt whether the State had succeeded in disproving the existence of the `voluntary social companion' defense.”
State v. Mishne, 427 A.2d 450 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 2× “The criminal code originally provided that “the existence of a reasonable doubt as to any culpable state of mind .”
State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537 (Me. 1980).
“In view of the absence of any evidence other than the defendant’s assertion that the victim had or used a knife, the jury could have rationally concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not subjectively believe either, that it was necessary to use deadly force…”
Poitras v. R. E. Glidden Body Shop, Inc., 430 A.2d 1113 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 2× “Thus, the inquiry we are now undertaking will have importance, to mention a primary example, in criminal prosecutions wherever a “defense” under the Criminal Code is involved (as distinguished from an “affirmative defense”), as to which under 17-A M.”
State v. O'BRIEN, 434 A.2d 9 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 2× “2d 537, 542 (1980); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 5(2)(B) (Supp.1980). 6 The State asserts, on the other hand, that the jury charge, considered in its entirety, 7 clearly informed the jurors that they could not convict the Defendant of either murder or manslaughter unless they concluded that…”
State v. Libby, 435 A.2d 1075 (Me. 1981).
“” See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 5&-A (Supp.1980). The jury’s verdict of guilt must therefore be seen as a finding of fact that Parsons was not too drunk to have had the requisite criminal intent to damage or destroy the property at the Bugbee Camps.”
State v. St. Francis, 563 A.2d 249 (Vt. 1989).
“However, that holding was predicated solely upon a Maine statute, then 17-A M.R.S.A. § 5, since recodified as 17-A M.”
State v. Vosmus, 431 A.2d 621 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 3× “17-A M.R.S.A. § 5 states in part: 1. No person may be convicted of a crime unless each element of the crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 5(1) — 5 cases
State v. Burnham, 406 A.2d 889 (Me. 1979).
“We find the alleged error preserved with respect to failure to instruct the jury as to the requirement of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 5(1) (that each element of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt) and its relation to 17-A M.”
State v. Vosmus, 431 A.2d 621 (Me. 1981).
“17-A M.R.S.A. § 5 states in part: 1. No person may be convicted of a crime unless each element of the crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 5(2) — 4 cases
State v. Giglio, 441 A.2d 303 (Me. 1982).
“17-A M.R.S.A. § 5(2) (Supp. 1980). 11 See our discussion in Part 4 of this opinion.”
State v. Reed, 459 A.2d 178 (Me. 1983).
“17-A M.R.S.A. § 5(2) (1980). [2] We have stated: "[t]o reduce the sex offenses from Class A to Class B, it was enough that the jury could have entertained a reasonable doubt whether the State had succeeded in disproving the existence of the `voluntary social companion' defense.”
State v. Berube, 669 A.2d 170 (Me. 1995).
“[4] The comment to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 5 confirms that this was section 5's limited objective.”
State v. Vosmus, 431 A.2d 621 (Me. 1981).
“17-A M.R.S.A. § 5 states in part: 1. No person may be convicted of a crime unless each element of the crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 5(2)(B) — 6 cases
State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537 (Me. 1980).
“In view of the absence of any evidence other than the defendant’s assertion that the victim had or used a knife, the jury could have rationally concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not subjectively believe either, that it was necessary to use deadly force…”
Poitras v. R. E. Glidden Body Shop, Inc., 430 A.2d 1113 (Me. 1981).
“Thus, the inquiry we are now undertaking will have importance, to mention a primary example, in criminal prosecutions wherever a “defense” under the Criminal Code is involved (as distinguished from an “affirmative defense”), as to which under 17-A M.”
State v. Burnham, 406 A.2d 889 (Me. 1979).
“We find the alleged error preserved with respect to failure to instruct the jury as to the requirement of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 5(1) (that each element of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt) and its relation to 17-A M.”
State v. O'BRIEN, 434 A.2d 9 (Me. 1981).
“2d 537, 542 (1980); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 5(2)(B) (Supp.1980). 6 The State asserts, on the other hand, that the jury charge, considered in its entirety, 7 clearly informed the jurors that they could not convict the Defendant of either murder or manslaughter unless they concluded that…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 5(3) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 5(4) — 1 case
State v. Mishne, 427 A.2d 450 (Me. 1981).
“The criminal code originally provided that “the existence of a reasonable doubt as to any culpable state of mind .”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.