Notes of Decisions
State v. Janisczak, 579 A.2d 736 (Me. 1990).
· cites it 18× “The Superior Court instructed the jury that the only criminal act it needed to *739 consider was disorderly conduct under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(1)(A) (1983 & Supp. 1989), [5] which prohibits intentionally or recklessly causing annoyance to others in a public place by intentionally…”
State v. John W., 418 A.2d 1097 (Me. 1980).
· cites it 6× “was adjudged to have committed the juvenile crime of Disorderly Conduct, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(2), arising out of his verbal abuse of a police officer.”
City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646 (Me. 1985).
· cites it 4× “We held there that speech could not be punished as disorderly conduct under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(2) unless its consequences were of a nature that the State has a compelling interest in preventing.”
State v. Watson, 2006 ME 80 (Me. 2006).
· cites it 2× “§ 210(1)(A) (2005), and disorderly conduct (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 501(2) (2005). Both defendants were unrepresented at the time of their convictions.”
Mahar v. StoneWood Transp., 2003 ME 63 (Me. 2003).
“[¶ 5] As a result of his conduct, Linfield was convicted of disorderly conduct (Class E), in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501 (1983 & Supp.2002); criminal threatening (Class D), in violation of 17-A M.”
State v. Morey, 427 A.2d 479 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 2× “He does raise three contentions concerning his conviction for disorderly conduct under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(2) to which we must respond.”
State v. Griatzky, 587 A.2d 234 (Me. 1991).
· cites it 4× “§ 502 (1983), and disorderly conduct, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501 (1983), resulting from a jury trial in the Superior Court (Sagadahoc County, Bradford, J).”
State v. Montgomery, 644 P.2d 747 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 2× “Fact finders need not look to the subjective response of the actual addressee, but they must consider the situation of that addressee.”
State v. Austin, 381 A.2d 652 (Me. 1978).
“He predicates that claim of illegality (1) upon the alleged unconstitutionality of the disorderly conduct statute, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501, and (2) upon an argument that his acquittal on the disorderly conduct charge necessitates the conclusion that Chief Bernard had no authority to…”
State v. Tuplin, 901 A.2d 792 (Me. 2006).
“§ 207(1)(A), and one count of disorderly conduct (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 501(1)(C) (2005). He pleaded not guilty on both counts and was tried by a jury on February 15, 2005.”
State v. Cropley, 544 A.2d 302 (Me. 1988).
“” State v. John W., 418 A.2d at 1101 . Similarly, we conclude that the conduct proscribed by the harassment statute fits within the area of unprotected speech.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 501(1) — 1 case
State v. Griatzky, 587 A.2d 234 (Me. 1991).
“§ 502 (1983), and disorderly conduct, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501 (1983), resulting from a jury trial in the Superior Court (Sagadahoc County, Bradford, J).”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 501(1)(A) — 1 case
State v. Janisczak, 579 A.2d 736 (Me. 1990).
“The Superior Court instructed the jury that the only criminal act it needed to *739 consider was disorderly conduct under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(1)(A) (1983 & Supp. 1989), [5] which prohibits intentionally or recklessly causing annoyance to others in a public place by intentionally…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 501(1)(B) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 501(1)(C) — 2 cases
State v. Tuplin, 901 A.2d 792 (Me. 2006).
“§ 207(1)(A), and one count of disorderly conduct (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 501(1)(C) (2005). He pleaded not guilty on both counts and was tried by a jury on February 15, 2005.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 501(2) — 13 cases
State v. John W., 418 A.2d 1097 (Me. 1980).
“was adjudged to have committed the juvenile crime of Disorderly Conduct, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(2), arising out of his verbal abuse of a police officer.”
State v. Janisczak, 579 A.2d 736 (Me. 1990).
“The Superior Court instructed the jury that the only criminal act it needed to *739 consider was disorderly conduct under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(1)(A) (1983 & Supp. 1989), [5] which prohibits intentionally or recklessly causing annoyance to others in a public place by intentionally…”
City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646 (Me. 1985).
“We held there that speech could not be punished as disorderly conduct under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(2) unless its consequences were of a nature that the State has a compelling interest in preventing.”
State v. Watson, 2006 ME 80 (Me. 2006).
“§ 210(1)(A) (2005), and disorderly conduct (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 501(2) (2005). Both defendants were unrepresented at the time of their convictions.”
State v. Morey, 427 A.2d 479 (Me. 1981).
“He does raise three contentions concerning his conviction for disorderly conduct under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(2) to which we must respond.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 501(3) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 501(5)(A)(3) — 1 case
State v. Griatzky, 587 A.2d 234 (Me. 1991).
“§ 502 (1983), and disorderly conduct, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501 (1983), resulting from a jury trial in the Superior Court (Sagadahoc County, Bradford, J).”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 501(A)(1) — 1 case
State v. Janisczak, 579 A.2d 736 (Me. 1990).
“The Superior Court instructed the jury that the only criminal act it needed to *739 consider was disorderly conduct under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(1)(A) (1983 & Supp. 1989), [5] which prohibits intentionally or recklessly causing annoyance to others in a public place by intentionally…”
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.