Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 505 (2026)

Obstructing public ways

✓ current as of May 2026

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1. A person is guilty of obstructing public ways if he unreasonably obstructs the free passage of foot or vehicular traffic on any public way, and refuses to cease or remove the obstruction upon a lawful order to do so given him by a law enforcement officer.

[PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW).]

2. As used in this section, "public way" means a way, including a sidewalk, owned and maintained by the State, a county or a municipality over which the general public has a right to pass by foot or by vehicle, a way upon which the public has access as invitees or licensees or a way under the control of park commissioners or a body having like powers.

[PL 2017, c. 432, Pt. C, §2 (AMD).]

3. Obstructing public ways is a Class E crime.

[PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW).]

SECTION HISTORY

PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW). PL 2015, c. 358, §2 (AMD). PL 2017, c. 432, Pt. C, §2 (AMD).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 9 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1985–2023 · leading case: State v. Burgess, 2001 ME 117 (Me. 2001).

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State v. Burgess, 2001 ME 117 (Me. 2001). “Burgess additionally contends that, even if the motion to suppress was correctly denied, the court erred in denying his motion for acquittal because the parking lot driveway in which Burgess was operating his vehicle was not a “public way,” as defined by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 505(2)…”

State v. Betts, 491 A.2d 1169 (Me. 1985). “Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that Sunset Avenue is a “way upon which the public has a right of access as invitees or licensees,” and, hence is a public way. Our statutes define “public way” as “way dedicated to public use, way upon which the public has a right of…”

Koplow v. City of Biddeford, 494 A.2d 175 (Me. 1985). “He was cited for obstructing traffic in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 505 (1983) and for four violations of the Biddeford Ordinance: unleashed dogs, untagged dogs, dogs unlicensed in the City of Biddeford, and possession of more than three dogs allowed to a single owner within…”

State of Maine v. Lisha Rose Stanley, 2014 ME 14 (Me. 2014). · cites it 7× “Stanley argues that the court committed obvious error when it failed to clarify the definition of “public way” as defined by 17-A M.R.S. § 505(2) (2013) and contends that the statute’s language is confusing, outdated, and unconstitutionally vague.”

State v. Lagasse, 2011 ME 30 (Me. 2011). · cites it 6× “Lagasse asserts that the court erred in determining that a Wal-Mart parking lot constitutes a “way” for purposes of 17-A M.R.S. § 505(2) (2010). Because we conclude that the parking lot in this case is a “way,” we affirm the judgment of conviction.”

State v. Corson, 634 A.2d 1270 (Me. 1993). “17-A M.R.S.A. § 505(2) (1988). “Way” is not defined in the statute, but the dictionary defines “way” as a “passage, path, road, or street.”

State v. Currier, 662 A.2d 204 (Me. 1995). · cites it 3× “§ 2298) and the law barring operation of a motor vehicle on a public way while one’s license or registration has been suspended or revoked (29 M.R.S.A. § 2184), it is a fair inference that the Legislature intended to incorporate in 29 M.”

Dastinot v. Auburn Police Dep't,et Al (D. Me. 2023). “When Defendant Ham was dispatched, no violation had yet occurred. Even if Plaintiff refused to move along after Defendant Lemos ordered him to do so, the offense would be considered a misdemeanor and relatively minor for purposes of the excessive force analysis.”

Kline v. One Beacon Ins. Grp. (Me. Super. Ct 2003). “However, a violation of § 505 requires an individual to “unreasonably obstruct” roadway and refuse to remove the obstruction upon order by a police officer.. Id.(emphasis added).”

— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 505(2) — 6 cases

State v. Burgess, 2001 ME 117 (Me. 2001). “Burgess additionally contends that, even if the motion to suppress was correctly denied, the court erred in denying his motion for acquittal because the parking lot driveway in which Burgess was operating his vehicle was not a “public way,” as defined by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 505(2)…”

State v. Betts, 491 A.2d 1169 (Me. 1985). “Judicial notice may be taken of the fact that Sunset Avenue is a “way upon which the public has a right of access as invitees or licensees,” and, hence is a public way. Our statutes define “public way” as “way dedicated to public use, way upon which the public has a right of…”

State of Maine v. Lisha Rose Stanley, 2014 ME 14 (Me. 2014). “Stanley argues that the court committed obvious error when it failed to clarify the definition of “public way” as defined by 17-A M.R.S. § 505(2) (2013) and contends that the statute’s language is confusing, outdated, and unconstitutionally vague.”

State v. Lagasse, 2011 ME 30 (Me. 2011). “Lagasse asserts that the court erred in determining that a Wal-Mart parking lot constitutes a “way” for purposes of 17-A M.R.S. § 505(2) (2010). Because we conclude that the parking lot in this case is a “way,” we affirm the judgment of conviction.”

State v. Corson, 634 A.2d 1270 (Me. 1993). “17-A M.R.S.A. § 505(2) (1988). “Way” is not defined in the statute, but the dictionary defines “way” as a “passage, path, road, or street.”

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