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Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 4052 (2026)

Termination petition; petitioners; time filed; contents

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1983–2026 76citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 76 opinions since 1983, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (6 cases).

1.  Petitioner.  A termination petition may be brought by the custodial parent of the child, by the parent or guardian of another parent of the child if that parent is a minor, by a person who has filed a petition to adopt the child pursuant to Title 18‑C, Article 9 or by the department. If the petitioner is a parent of the child or a parent or guardian of another parent of the child if that parent is a minor, the court shall follow the requirements of Title 19‑A, section 1658. If the petitioner is also petitioning to adopt the child, the court shall follow the requirements of Title 18‑C, section 9‑204.  
[PL 2021, c. 340, §3 (AMD).]
2.  Time filed. 
[PL 1997, c. 715, Pt. B, §13 (RP).]
2-A.  Department as petitioner or as party.  The department shall file a termination petition or seek to be joined as a party to any pending petition:  
A. When a child has been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months. The department must file the petition before the end of the child's 15th month in foster care. In calculating when to file a termination petition:  
(1) The time the child has been in foster care begins when the child is considered to have entered foster care as specified in section 4038‑B, subsection 1, paragraph B;  
(2) When a child experiences multiple exits from and entries into foster care during the 22-month period, all periods in foster care must be accumulated; and  
(3) The time in foster care does not include trial home visits or times during which the child is a runaway.  
This paragraph does not apply if the department is required to undertake reunification efforts and the department has not provided to the family of the child such services as the court determines to be necessary for the safe return of the child to the child's home consistent with the time period in the case plan;   [PL 2005, c. 372, §7 (AMD).]
B. Within 60 days of a court order that includes a finding of an aggravating factor and an order to cease reunification; or   [PL 2003, c. 408, §7 (AMD).]
C. Within 60 days of a court finding that the child has been abandoned.   [PL 2003, c. 408, §7 (NEW).]
The department is not required to file a termination petition if the department has chosen to have the child cared for by a relative or the department has documented to the court a compelling reason for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child.  
[PL 2005, c. 372, §7 (AMD).]
3.  Contents of petition.  A termination petition must be sworn and must include at least the following:  
A. The name, date and place of birth and municipal residence, if known, of the child;   [PL 1979, c. 733, §18 (NEW).]
B. The name and address of the petitioner and the nature of the petitioner's relationship to the child;   [PL 2021, c. 340, §4 (AMD).]
C. The name and municipal residence, if known, of each of the child's parents;   [PL 1979, c. 733, §18 (NEW).]
D. The names and address of the guardian ad litem of the child in any related child protection proceeding, parental rights and responsibilities proceeding or adoption proceeding;   [PL 2021, c. 340, §4 (AMD).]
E. A summary statement of the facts that the petitioner believes constitute the basis for the request for termination;   [PL 2021, c. 340, §4 (AMD).]
F. An allegation that is sufficient for termination;   [PL 2021, c. 340, §4 (AMD).]
G. A statement of the effects of a termination order; and   [PL 1979, c. 733, §18 (NEW).]
H. A statement that the parents are entitled to legal counsel in the termination proceedings and that, if they want an attorney and are unable to afford one, they should contact the court as soon as possible to request appointed counsel.   [PL 1979, c. 733, §18 (NEW).]
[PL 2021, c. 340, §4 (AMD).]
4.  Hearing date.  On the filing of a petition, the court shall set a time and date for a hearing.  
[PL 1979, c. 733, §18 (NEW).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1979, c. 733, §18 (NEW). PL 1981, c. 369, §14 (AMD). PL 1983, c. 249, §1 (AMD). PL 1995, c. 694, §D47 (AMD). PL 1995, c. 694, §E2 (AFF). PL 1997, c. 475, §§7,8 (AMD). PL 1997, c. 475, §11 (AFF). PL 1997, c. 715, §§B12-14 (AMD). PL 2003, c. 408, §7 (AMD). PL 2005, c. 372, §7 (AMD). PL 2021, c. 340, §§3, 4 (AMD).
The 20 cases that cite Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 4052 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENIn re Evelyn A., 2017 ME 182, 169 A.3d 914.
cites § 4052 2×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“, 22 M.R.S. § 4052(2-A) (2016) (providing deadlines for the Department to file termination petitions).”
The case’s holding
A statutory presumption of parental unfitness does not shift the burden of proof because the state must prove unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“may reach an ultimate finding of unfitness only if the evidence in its entirety supports that finding by clear and convincing evidence.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENIn re D.P., 2013 ME 40, 65 A.3d 1216.
cites § 4052 4×subsections: (1) 3×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“” On March 13, the mother filed a petition to terminate her own parental rights without a jeopardy hearing, contending that 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2012) authorized her to do so, and that she had a constitutional right to unilaterally terminate her own parental rights.”
3
GREENIn re Michaela C., 2002 ME 159, 809 A.2d 1245.
cites § 4052 2×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“22 M.R.S.A. § 4052(2-A) (Supp.2001) (providing that Department need not file termination petition if it "has chosen to have the child cared for by a relative"); the paternal grandmother could be granted custody of Michaela, see section 4036(1)(F) (1992); In re David W.”
The case’s holding
A trial court's best interest determination is entitled to substantial deference because the court is uniquely positioned to evaluate witness testimony directly.
Later courts cite it for
“the district court's judgment on the issue of best interest is entitled to substantial deference because that court is able to directly evaluate the testimony of the witnesses.” · 6 citing courts
4
YELLOWIn re Jamara R., 2005 ME 45, 870 A.2d 112.
cites § 4052 2×cited by 18 cases
Overruled by In re B.C. on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 4052
“22 M.R.S.A. § 4052(2-A)(A) (2004). 8 This brief time period is designed to meet a child’s needs for a permanent family.”
Later courts cite it for
“whether the court's factual findings are supported by the record; . . . whether the court understood the law applicable to the exercise of its discretion; . . . and whether . . . the court's weighing of the applicable facts was within the bounds of reasonableness” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENIn re Cameron Z., 2016 ME 162, 150 A.3d 805.
cites § 4052 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2015). The mother consented to the termination of her parental rights; the father did not.”
Later courts cite it for
“be counted on to protect the child” · 2 citing courts
cites § 4052 1×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018). In August of 2018, the court held a hearing on the petition, where the mother, two departmental caseworkers, and the paternal grandmother testified.”
Later courts cite it for
“we review the court's factual findings related to the child's best interest for clear error, and its ultimate conclusion regarding the child's best interest for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the trial court's lens.” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENIn re Christopher S., 203 A.3d 808 (Me. 2019).
cites § 4052 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018). In August of 2018, the court held a hearing on the petition, where the mother, two departmental caseworkers, and the paternal grandmother testified.”
8
GREENIn re Tiyonie R., 203 A.3d 824 (Me. 2019).
cites § 4052 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018). After a testimonial hearing, the court ( Nelson, J.”
9
GREENIn re Child of Gustavus E., 2018 ME 43, 182 A.3d 153.
cites § 4052 3×subsections: (1) 3×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“See 22 M.R.S. § 4052(1) (2017). 2 In April 2017, the court held a hearing on all pending matters: the petition for child protection; the petition to terminate the father's parental rights; and the Department's motion to cease reunification with the father.”
10
GREENIn re Child of Domenick B., 2018 ME 158.
cites § 4052 1×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“Among other things, for a successful reunification, the jeopardy order required the father to participate in a substance abuse evaluation and individual therapy to address childhood trauma and anger issues, participate in random drug screening, and refrain from using any…”
11
GREENIn re Domenick B., 197 A.3d 1076 (Me. 2018).
cites § 4052 1×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“Among other things, for a successful reunification, the jeopardy order required the father to participate in a substance abuse evaluation and individual therapy to address childhood trauma and anger issues, participate in random drug screening, and refrain from using any…”
12
GREENIn re Sabrina M., 460 A.2d 1009 (Me. 1983).
cites § 4052 1×subsections: (2)cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“Parental rights can be terminated only in a proceeding brought pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4051-4057 or “as part of an adoption proceeding as provided in Title 19, chapter 9, when a child protective proceeding has not been initiated.”
The case’s holding
A preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies due process in child protection proceedings because the state interest in safety counterbalances the parental interest in family integrity.
Later courts cite it for
“in reviewing whether the trial court performed its judicial function, we must determine whether the findings adequately indicate the factual basis for the ultimate conclusion.” · 4 citing courts
13
GREENIn re B.P., 2015 ME 139, 126 A.3d 713.
cites § 4052 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“When the Legislature enacted the Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act, it established permanency as the central tenet of the act. Id. ¶ 23. Therefore, with only limited exceptions, the Department is required to petition for termination of parental rights when a…”
Later courts cite it for
“evidence is clear and convincing when the court could reasonably have been persuaded that the required factual findings were proved to be highly probable.” · 3 citing courts
14
GREENIn re Child. of Jessica D., 2019 ME 70, 208 A.3d 363.
cites § 4052 1×cited by 7 cases
Later courts cite it for
“we review the court's factual findings supporting its determination of parental unfitness and best interest of the child for clear error, and review its ultimate conclusion that termination is in the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the trial court's lens, and giving the court's judgment substantial deference.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENIn re Child. of Meagan C., 2019 ME 129.
cites § 4052 1×cited by 7 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
16
GREENIn re Child of Sherri Y., 2019 ME 162, 221 A.3d 120.
cites § 4052 1×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018). On March 6, 2019, the father consented to the termination of his parental rights.”
17
GREENIn re Child of Dawn B., 2019 ME 93, 210 A.3d 169.
cites § 4052 1×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018). After a testimonial hearing, the court entered a judgment terminating both parents' rights to the child.”
18
GREENIn re Child of Olivia F., 2019 ME 149, 217 A.3d 1106.
cites § 4052 1×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018). The court held a consolidated hearing on that petition and on the issue of placement on January 25 and February 25, 2019.”
Later courts cite it for
“we review the court's findings of fact for clear error and the court's ultimate determination that termination of the parental rights is in the child's best interest for an abuse of discretion.” · 4 citing courts
19
GREENIn re Child. of Jason C., 2020 ME 86, 236 A.3d 438.
cites § 4052 1×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“1 See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2020). The trial court 1 The mother appeared before the trial court on December 6, 2019, and consented to the termination of her parental rights as to both children.”
20
GREENIn re Higera N., 2010 ME 77, 2 A.3d 265.
cites § 4052 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 4052
“See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2009). In March 2009, six months after the TPR petition was filed, and less than two weeks before the TPR hearing, the father moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the PKPA deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Later courts cite it for
“we review the trial court's determination of parental unfitness to see if a review of the entire record demonstrates that the trial court rationally could have found clear and convincing evidence in that record to support the necessary factual findings as to the bases for termination.” · 5 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320042026

One bar per year. Tallest: 28 cases in 2019. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Me.74Del.1D. Me.1
By subsection
(1)6 cases
In re D.P., 2013 ME 40, 65 A.3d 1216.“” On March 13, the mother filed a petition to terminate her own parental rights without a jeopardy hearing, contending that 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2012) authorized her to do so, and that she had a constitutional right to unilaterally terminate her own parental rights.”
In re Child of Gustavus E., 2018 ME 43, 182 A.3d 153.“See 22 M.R.S. § 4052(1) (2017). 2 In April 2017, the court held a hearing on all pending matters: the petition for child protection; the petition to terminate the father's parental rights; and the Department's motion to cease reunification with the father.”
In re Austin T., 2006 ME 28, 898 A.2d 946.
In re Child of Scott A., 2019 ME 123, 213 A.3d 117.
Gluse v. Dennison, 462 A.2d 32 (Me. 1983).
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(2)3 cases
In re Sabrina M., 460 A.2d 1009 (Me. 1983).“Parental rights can be terminated only in a proceeding brought pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4051-4057 or “as part of an adoption proceeding as provided in Title 19, chapter 9, when a child protective proceeding has not been initiated.”
In re Denise M., 670 A.2d 390 (Me. 1996).
In re Jeremiah Y., 2002 ME 135, 804 A.2d 357.
(3)(H)1 case
In re Carolyn S. S., 498 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1984).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.