Notes of Decisions
Penobscot Area Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 3× “” 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962(1)(E) (1978). The Corporation contends that this statutory provision exempted its proposed group home from the Brewer ordinance because the Corporation was acting as an agent of the State in furtherance of clearly articulated state obligations and interests…”
Town of Shapleigh v. Shikles, 427 A.2d 460 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 3× “Thus, we hold in the instant case that the nuisance statute, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962(1)(F), in aid of enforcement of zoning law restrictions, was not intended by the Legislature to preclude by implication our equity courts from exercising in such circumstances their inherent power to…”
Benjamin v. Houle, 431 A.2d 48 (Me. 1981).
· cites it 3× “30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 (1978 & Supp.1980) provides in pertinent part: Zoning ordinances 1.”
Stewart v. Inhabitants of Town of Durham, 451 A.2d 308 (Me. 1982).
· cites it 3× “Whether or not the requirements of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 apply to the ordinance in question here, 7 we have no doubt that the Superior Court’s conclusion was warranted by the evidence before it.”
Baker v. Town of Woolwich, 517 A.2d 64 (Me. 1987).
· cites it 2× “The statute governing zoning ordinances at the time the 1974 ordinance was enacted, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 (1978), provided in pertinent part as follows: 1.”
Fisher v. Dame, 433 A.2d 366 (Me. 1981).
“” It goes beyond the narrow statutory definition of “zoning” in 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962(1)(H), which restricts “zoning” to “the division of a municipality into districts and the prescription and reasonable application of different regulations in each district.”
Cope v. Inhabitants of Town of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223 (Me. 1983).
“1982-1983) (granting municipality authority to establish board of appeals); 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 (1978 and Supp.1982-1983) (governing zoning ordinances).”
Clardy v. Town of Livermore, 403 A.2d 779 (Me. 1979).
· cites it 3× “pursuant to the home rule power” in the absence of a comprehensive plan, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 (Supp.1973), became itself limited by the operation of its own subsection (H), added in 1973 (P.”
LaBonta v. City of Waterville, 528 A.2d 1262 (Me. 1987).
“Validity of Zoning Amendment Plaintiffs contend that the Water-ville zoning change to accommodate the Shaw’s development is invalid because it fails to meet the requirements of the controlling statute, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962(1)(A) (1978), that a city’s zoning ordinance be “pursuant…”
Cunningham v. Kittery Plan. Bd., 400 A.2d 1070 (Me. 1979).
“Count V adds the allegation that the violation of the 1977 zoning ordinance creates a nuisance pursuant to 30 M.R.S.A. §§ 4962(1)(F) and 4964. Both Counts IV and V requested the Superior Court to find that the lots in the Davidson subdivision violate the minimum-lot-size…”
In Re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
“The comprehensive plan is now required by 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962. 14 . King Resources Co.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4962(1) — 3 cases
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4962(1)(A) — 3 cases
LaBonta v. City of Waterville, 528 A.2d 1262 (Me. 1987).
“Validity of Zoning Amendment Plaintiffs contend that the Water-ville zoning change to accommodate the Shaw’s development is invalid because it fails to meet the requirements of the controlling statute, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962(1)(A) (1978), that a city’s zoning ordinance be “pursuant…”
Baker v. Town of Woolwich, 517 A.2d 64 (Me. 1987).
“The statute governing zoning ordinances at the time the 1974 ordinance was enacted, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 (1978), provided in pertinent part as follows: 1.”
Stewart v. Inhabitants of Town of Durham, 451 A.2d 308 (Me. 1982).
“Whether or not the requirements of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 apply to the ordinance in question here, 7 we have no doubt that the Superior Court’s conclusion was warranted by the evidence before it.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4962(1)(E) — 1 case
Penobscot Area Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981).
“” 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962(1)(E) (1978). The Corporation contends that this statutory provision exempted its proposed group home from the Brewer ordinance because the Corporation was acting as an agent of the State in furtherance of clearly articulated state obligations and interests…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4962(1)(F) — 2 cases
Town of Shapleigh v. Shikles, 427 A.2d 460 (Me. 1981).
“Thus, we hold in the instant case that the nuisance statute, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962(1)(F), in aid of enforcement of zoning law restrictions, was not intended by the Legislature to preclude by implication our equity courts from exercising in such circumstances their inherent power to…”
Cunningham v. Kittery Plan. Bd., 400 A.2d 1070 (Me. 1979).
“Count V adds the allegation that the violation of the 1977 zoning ordinance creates a nuisance pursuant to 30 M.R.S.A. §§ 4962(1)(F) and 4964. Both Counts IV and V requested the Superior Court to find that the lots in the Davidson subdivision violate the minimum-lot-size…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4962(1)(H) — 5 cases
Benjamin v. Houle, 431 A.2d 48 (Me. 1981).
“30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 (1978 & Supp.1980) provides in pertinent part: Zoning ordinances 1.”
Fisher v. Dame, 433 A.2d 366 (Me. 1981).
“” It goes beyond the narrow statutory definition of “zoning” in 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962(1)(H), which restricts “zoning” to “the division of a municipality into districts and the prescription and reasonable application of different regulations in each district.”
Stewart v. Inhabitants of Town of Durham, 451 A.2d 308 (Me. 1982).
“Whether or not the requirements of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962 apply to the ordinance in question here, 7 we have no doubt that the Superior Court’s conclusion was warranted by the evidence before it.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 30, § 4962(1XF) — 1 case
Town of Shapleigh v. Shikles, 427 A.2d 460 (Me. 1981).
“Thus, we hold in the instant case that the nuisance statute, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962(1)(F), in aid of enforcement of zoning law restrictions, was not intended by the Legislature to preclude by implication our equity courts from exercising in such circumstances their inherent power to…”
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