Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1021 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026

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As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise indicates, the following terms have the following meanings. [PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]

1. Dependent. "Dependent," with respect to an elderly person, means wholly or partially dependent upon one or more other persons for care or support, either emotional or physical, because the elderly person:

A. Suffers from a significant limitation in mobility, vision, hearing, emotional or mental functioning or the ability to read or write; or [PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]

B. Is suffering or recovering from a major illness or is facing or recovering from major surgery. [PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]

[PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]

2. Elderly person. "Elderly person" means a person who is 60 years of age or older.

[PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]

3. Independent counsel. "Independent counsel" means an attorney retained by the elderly dependent person to represent only that person's interests in the transfer.

[PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]

4. Less than full consideration. "Less than full consideration," with respect to a transfer of property, means the transferee pays less than fair market value for the property or the transfer is supported by past consideration.

[PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]

5. Major transfer of personal property or money. "Major transfer of personal property or money" means a transfer of money or items of personal property which represent 10% or more of the elderly dependent person's estate.

[PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]

6. Transfer. "Transfer" includes, but is not limited to, a transfer under the Uniform Real Property Transfer on Death Act, but does not include testamentary transfers, which are outside the scope of this chapter. For purposes of this chapter, a transfer under the Uniform Real Property Transfer on Death Act occurs when the deed is executed or recorded.

[PL 2017, c. 402, Pt. E, §1 (AMD); PL 2019, c. 417, Pt. B, §14 (AFF).]

SECTION HISTORY

PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW). PL 1989, c. 238, §§1,4 (AMD). PL 2017, c. 402, Pt. E, §1 (AMD). PL 2017, c. 402, Pt. F, §1 (AFF). PL 2019, c. 417, Pt. B, §14 (AFF).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 16 cases, 1994–2020 · leading case: Patricia A. McCollor v. Frederick J. McCollor Jr., 2014 ME 39 (Me. 2014).

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Patricia A. McCollor v. Frederick J. McCollor Jr., 2014 ME 39 (Me. 2014). · cites it 4× “” 33 M.R.S. § 1021(1)(A). We review the court’s factual finding that Patricia was dependent on John for clear error and will uphold it unless there is no competent evidence in the record supporting such a finding.”

Lois Young v. Joseph Lagasse, 2016 ME 96 (Me. 2016). “The only element of the presumption that the parties dispute is whether Juskewitch acted as “independent counsel” for Young. 9 “Independent counsel” is defined as “an' attorney retained by the elderly dependent person to represent only that person’s interests in the transfer.”

Est. of Sylvester v. Benjamin, 2001 ME 48 (Me. 2001). “Title 33 M.R.S.A. § 1021(2) defines an elderly person as over sixty years old, and Sylvester was eighty-six at the time of the transfer.”

First Union Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 882 A.2d 796 (Me. 2005). “33 M.R.S.A. § 1021(2) (1999). Reilly was older than sixty, she was dependent, she received less than full consideration for subordinating her rights to those of Crossland, the transaction was made in the context of a confidential relationship, Reilly was not represented by…”

Est. of Campbell, 651 A.2d 382 (Me. 1994). “Specifically, the court found that Mary was a “dependent” and “elderly person” as defined in 33 M.R.S.A. §§ 1021(1)(A) and (2). Moreover, it determined that John’s relationship with Mary was a confidential and fiduciary relationship as defined in 33 M.”

Douglass v. Graffam (Me. Super. Ct 2017). · cites it 2× “The amended complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) a statutory claim of undue influence under the Improvident Transfer of Title statute, 33 M.R.S. § 1021 et seq., (2) a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, (3) a claim of unjust enrichment, and (4) a non-statutory claim of…”

Belanger v. Yorke (Me. Super. Ct 2019). · cites it 2× “Undue Influence The Improvident Transfers of Title Act, 33 M.R.S. § 1021 et seq., provides a rebuttable presumption of undue influence in any transfer of real estate for less than full consideration by an elderly person who is dependent on others to a person with whom the…”

Hunt v. Hunt (D. Me. 2020). “Counts I and II state claims against Attorney Trudeau under Maine’s Improvident Transfer of Title Act, 33 M.R.S. §§ 1021 et seq. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75-89.”

Miller v. Loughran (Me. Super. Ct 2020). “33 M.R.S. §§ 1021(1). In addition to establishing that there is an absence of disputed facts as to each element required for the statutory presumption to arise, a plaintiff must also establish that there 8 ( are no disputed facts concerning the claims raised by the defendant to…”

Davis v. Grover (Me. Super. Ct 2002). “Improvident Transfers of Title Statute The “Improvident Transfers of Title” Statute, 33 M.R.S.A. §§ 1021 to 1025, provides that: [iJn any transfer of real estate .”

First Union Nat'l Bank v. Curtis (Me. Super. Ct 2004). “claim in this action that her relinquishment of the original life estate she held in the property is void under the Improvident Transfers of Title Act, 33 M.R.S.A. § 1021 et seq., ITTA). If it is not void, then her rights are subordinate to First Union’s rights to relief on the…”

Breen v. Lucas (Me. Super. Ct 2005). “In count ILI of the complaint, Timothy asserts a claim, solely in his representative capacity, based on the provisions of 33 M.R.S.A. § 1021 et seq., which serve as a vehicle for elderly dependent persons to avoid improvident transfers of title.”

Show all 16 citing cases →

— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1021(1) — 2 cases

Miller v. Loughran (Me. Super. Ct 2020). “33 M.R.S. §§ 1021(1). In addition to establishing that there is an absence of disputed facts as to each element required for the statutory presumption to arise, a plaintiff must also establish that there 8 ( are no disputed facts concerning the claims raised by the defendant to…”

Comber v. McAllister (Me. Super. Ct 2000).

— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1021(1)(A) — 2 cases

Patricia A. McCollor v. Frederick J. McCollor Jr., 2014 ME 39 (Me. 2014). “” 33 M.R.S. § 1021(1)(A). We review the court’s factual finding that Patricia was dependent on John for clear error and will uphold it unless there is no competent evidence in the record supporting such a finding.”

Est. of Campbell, 651 A.2d 382 (Me. 1994). “Specifically, the court found that Mary was a “dependent” and “elderly person” as defined in 33 M.R.S.A. §§ 1021(1)(A) and (2). Moreover, it determined that John’s relationship with Mary was a confidential and fiduciary relationship as defined in 33 M.”

— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1021(2) — 4 cases

Est. of Sylvester v. Benjamin, 2001 ME 48 (Me. 2001). “Title 33 M.R.S.A. § 1021(2) defines an elderly person as over sixty years old, and Sylvester was eighty-six at the time of the transfer.”

Patricia A. McCollor v. Frederick J. McCollor Jr., 2014 ME 39 (Me. 2014). “” 33 M.R.S. § 1021(1)(A). We review the court’s factual finding that Patricia was dependent on John for clear error and will uphold it unless there is no competent evidence in the record supporting such a finding.”

First Union Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 882 A.2d 796 (Me. 2005). “33 M.R.S.A. § 1021(2) (1999). Reilly was older than sixty, she was dependent, she received less than full consideration for subordinating her rights to those of Crossland, the transaction was made in the context of a confidential relationship, Reilly was not represented by…”

Douglass v. Graffam (Me. Super. Ct 2017). “The amended complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) a statutory claim of undue influence under the Improvident Transfer of Title statute, 33 M.R.S. § 1021 et seq., (2) a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, (3) a claim of unjust enrichment, and (4) a non-statutory claim of…”

— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1021(3) — 2 cases

Lois Young v. Joseph Lagasse, 2016 ME 96 (Me. 2016). “The only element of the presumption that the parties dispute is whether Juskewitch acted as “independent counsel” for Young. 9 “Independent counsel” is defined as “an' attorney retained by the elderly dependent person to represent only that person’s interests in the transfer.”

Patricia A. McCollor v. Frederick J. McCollor Jr., 2014 ME 39 (Me. 2014). “” 33 M.R.S. § 1021(1)(A). We review the court’s factual finding that Patricia was dependent on John for clear error and will uphold it unless there is no competent evidence in the record supporting such a finding.”

— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1021(5) — 2 cases

Patricia A. McCollor v. Frederick J. McCollor Jr., 2014 ME 39 (Me. 2014). “” 33 M.R.S. § 1021(1)(A). We review the court’s factual finding that Patricia was dependent on John for clear error and will uphold it unless there is no competent evidence in the record supporting such a finding.”

Weatherbee v. McPike (Me. Super. Ct 2012).

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