Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34-A, § 9603 (2026)

Request for final disposition--Article III

✓ current as of May 2026
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1.  Trial pending.  Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, the prisoner must be brought to trial within 180 days after the prisoner has caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of the prisoner's imprisonment and the prisoner's request for final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint, except that, for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner must be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the total of deductions received and retained, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.  
[PL 2019, c. 113, Pt. C, §104 (AMD).]
2.  Request for final disposition.  The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in subsection 1 shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, Commissioner of Corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.  
[PL 1983, c. 459, §6 (NEW).]
3.  Notification.  The warden, Commissioner of Corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer is based.  
[PL 1983, c. 459, §6 (NEW).]
4.  Application.  Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to subsection 1 shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, Commissioner of Corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this subsection shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.  
[PL 1983, c. 459, §6 (NEW).]
5.  Waiver of extradition.  Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to subsection 1 shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein by reason of subsection 1 and a waiver of extradition to the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with this agreement. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.  
[PL 1983, c. 459, §6 (NEW).]
6.  Escape.  Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the request for final disposition referred to in subsection 1 shall void the request.  
[PL 1983, c. 459, §6 (NEW).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1983, c. 459, §6 (NEW). PL 2019, c. 113, Pt. C, §104 (AMD).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1988–2022 · leading case: State v. Rose, 604 A.2d 24 (Me. 1992).
State v. Rose, 604 A.2d 24 (Me. 1992). · cites it 8× “See 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603(1). When a prisoner so initiates a final disposition, the ICD mandates that he be brought to trial "within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court .”
State v. Caulk, 543 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1988). · cites it 2× “34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603(1), (4). Accordingly, the trial court properly held that the 180-day time limitation of Article III of the Compact governed the time within which Caulk must be brought to trial and denied Caulk’s motion to dismiss the indictment.”
State v. Fair, 672 A.2d 590 (Me. 1996). · cites it 5× “2 Fair contends that in September 1992, he made a proper request pursuant to 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603 3 for disposition of his Maine charges, and that the State’s failure to bring him to trial within 180 days 4 required the court to dismiss the Maine charges against him pursuant to…”
State v. Beauchene, 541 A.2d 914 (Me. 1988). “34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603. Article IV imposes time limits within which the state must act only after it has requested custody.”
State v. Cookson, 657 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1995). · cites it 2× “On April 30, 1993, Cookson notified the District Attorney that he was invoking his right to a *1156 speedy resolution of the charges and Cook-son complied with the formal requirements for a final disposition pursuant to 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603(1) (1988). 4 Cookson was delivered…”
State v. Herrick, 686 A.2d 602 (Me. 1996). · cites it 2× “1996) (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603). The ICD detainer requirement is not triggered by a detainer filed before a prisoner begins to serve his sentence.”
State of Maine v. Christopher Shepard, 2022 ME 11 (Me. 2022). · cites it 6× “The trial court concluded that the postponement of judicial 6 proceedings due to the COVID-19 pandemic constituted good cause for a continuance under 34-A M.R.S. § 9603, stating that “where the State was unable to bring the defendant to trial because the courts had delayed all…”
Bacon v. Magnusson, 727 F. Supp. 694 (D. Me. 1990). · cites it 3× “Although the time limit set out in the ICD will not begin to run until a "detainer" has been sent, 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603, the Superior Court chose not to decide whether or not a warrant is a "detainer,” relying instead on the fact that Petitioner had not entered a term of…”
State of Maine v. Shepard (Me. Super. Ct 2020). · cites it 3× “Background On June 9, 2017, the defendant was indicted on three counts of Gross Sexual Assault, Class A, and one count of Sexual Misconduct with a Child, Class C.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34-A, § 9603(1) — 5 cases
State v. Rose, 604 A.2d 24 (Me. 1992). “See 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603(1). When a prisoner so initiates a final disposition, the ICD mandates that he be brought to trial "within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court .”
State v. Cookson, 657 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1995). “On April 30, 1993, Cookson notified the District Attorney that he was invoking his right to a *1156 speedy resolution of the charges and Cook-son complied with the formal requirements for a final disposition pursuant to 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603(1) (1988). 4 Cookson was delivered…”
State v. Caulk, 543 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1988). “34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603(1), (4). Accordingly, the trial court properly held that the 180-day time limitation of Article III of the Compact governed the time within which Caulk must be brought to trial and denied Caulk’s motion to dismiss the indictment.”
State of Maine v. Christopher Shepard, 2022 ME 11 (Me. 2022). “The trial court concluded that the postponement of judicial 6 proceedings due to the COVID-19 pandemic constituted good cause for a continuance under 34-A M.R.S. § 9603, stating that “where the State was unable to bring the defendant to trial because the courts had delayed all…”
State v. Herrick, 686 A.2d 602 (Me. 1996). “1996) (citing 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603). The ICD detainer requirement is not triggered by a detainer filed before a prisoner begins to serve his sentence.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34-A, § 9603(2) — 3 cases
State v. Rose, 604 A.2d 24 (Me. 1992). “See 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603(1). When a prisoner so initiates a final disposition, the ICD mandates that he be brought to trial "within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court .”
State v. Fair, 672 A.2d 590 (Me. 1996). “2 Fair contends that in September 1992, he made a proper request pursuant to 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603 3 for disposition of his Maine charges, and that the State’s failure to bring him to trial within 180 days 4 required the court to dismiss the Maine charges against him pursuant to…”
Bacon v. Magnusson, 727 F. Supp. 694 (D. Me. 1990). “Although the time limit set out in the ICD will not begin to run until a "detainer" has been sent, 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603, the Superior Court chose not to decide whether or not a warrant is a "detainer,” relying instead on the fact that Petitioner had not entered a term of…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34-A, § 9603(5) — 1 case
State v. Rose, 604 A.2d 24 (Me. 1992). “See 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603(1). When a prisoner so initiates a final disposition, the ICD mandates that he be brought to trial "within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court .”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 34-A, § 9603(l) — 1 case
State v. Caulk, 543 A.2d 1366 (Me. 1988). “34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603(1), (4). Accordingly, the trial court properly held that the 180-day time limitation of Article III of the Compact governed the time within which Caulk must be brought to trial and denied Caulk’s motion to dismiss the indictment.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.