Me. Rev. Stat. » Title 39-A
Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39-A, § 104 (2026)

Applicability to certain actions and employers; exemptions

✓ current as of May 2026
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An employer that has secured the payment of compensation in conformity with sections 401 to 407 is exempt from civil actions, either at common law or under sections 901 to 908; Title 14 sections 8101 to 8118; and Title 18‑C, section 2‑807, involving personal injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of employment, or for death resulting from those injuries. An employer that uses a private employment agency for temporary help services is entitled to the same immunity from civil actions by employees of the temporary help service as is granted with respect to the employer's own employees as long as the temporary help service has secured the payment of compensation in conformity with sections 401 to 407. "Temporary help services" means a service where an agency assigns its own employees to a 3rd party to work under the direction and control of the 3rd party to support or supplement the 3rd party's workforce in work situations such as employee absences, temporary skill shortages, seasonal workload conditions and special assignments and projects. Except as provided in section 104‑A, these exemptions from liability apply to all employees, supervisors, officers and directors of the employer for any personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, or for death resulting from those injuries. These exemptions also apply to occupational diseases sustained by an employee or for death resulting from those diseases. These exemptions do not apply to an illegally employed minor as described in section 408, subsection 2.   [PL 2023, c. 126, §1 (AMD).]
A design professional acting within the course and scope of providing professional services during the construction, erection or installation of any project or a design professional's employee who is acting within the course and scope of assisting or representing the design professional in the performance of design professional services on or adjacent to the site of the project's construction, erection or installation is immune from liability for any personal injury or death occurring at or adjacent to such a site, if compensation is paid to the injured person or decedent's representative for the injury or death under this Act, and the design professional has no duty under a written contract to assume responsibility for construction site safety. The immunity provided by this section to any design professional does not apply to the negligent preparation of design plans and technical specifications. Except as provided by this section, any waiver, oral or written, express or implied, of the design professional's immunity granted by this section is void and unenforceable as a matter of law.   [PL 1991, c. 885, Pt. A, §8 (NEW); PL 1991, c. 885, Pt. A, §§9-11 (AFF).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1991, c. 885, §A8 (NEW). PL 1991, c. 885, §§A9-11 (AFF). PL 1995, c. 297, §1 (AMD). PL 2017, c. 402, Pt. C, §109 (AMD). PL 2017, c. 402, Pt. F, §1 (AFF). PL 2019, c. 417, Pt. B, §14 (AFF). PL 2023, c. 126, §1 (AMD).
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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 61 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: LePage v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2006 ME 130 (Me. 2006).
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LePage v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 2006 ME 130 (Me. 2006). · cites it 4× “" The court found that even assuming that LePage's letter to BIW and meeting with Gildart were protected activities under the MWPA, "[a]ll of the `adverse action' had occurred a year before either of those events," and therefore he failed to establish his prima facie case.”
Marcoux v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 2005 ME 107 (Me. 2005). · cites it 5× “§ 104 [¶ 6] The immunity and exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act provide that if an employer has secured the payment of workers’ compensation for its employees, it is immune from suit for personal injuries resulting from work-related injuries, and the…”
Cole v. Chandler, 2000 ME 104 (Me. 2000). · cites it 4× “2 The exclusivity provision is found in 39-A M.R.S.A. § 104, and provides in pertinent part as follows: An employer who has secured the payment of compensation .”
Hawkes v. Com. Union Ins., 2001 ME 8 (Me. 2001). · cites it 3× “Commercial Union argues that Karl Hawkes’ claims are barred by the immunity and exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 39-A M.R.S.A. §§ 104, 408 (Pamph.2000), or, alternatively, by settlement documents.”
Li v. C.N. Brown Co., 645 A.2d 606 (Me. 1994). · cites it 4× “It must be established that the injury or death of an employee (1) was incurred in the course of employment and (2) arose out of that employment.”
Cent. Maine Power Co. v. Devereux Marine, Inc., 2013 ME 37 (Me. 2013). · cites it 2× “” 39-A M.R.S. § 104 (2012). Therefore, Devereux was never a co-defendant with CMP, and no opportunity arose for a fact-finder to determine the percentage of fault as between co-defendants.”
Penn v. FMC Corp., 2006 ME 87 (Me. 2006). · cites it 4× “On appeal, Penn contends that a summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether FMC is entitled to statutory immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 39-A M.R.S. § 104 (2005). We affirm the judgment.”
Gordan v. Cummings, 2000 ME 68 (Me. 2000). · cites it 3× “Bill is correct in his assertions. [¶ 13] The trial court properly granted a judgment as a matter of law because Betty’s IIED claim was barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act.”
Doughty v. Work Opportunities Unlimited/Leddy Grp., 33 A.3d 410 (Me. 2011). · cites it 6× “The hearing officer further determined that 39-A M.R.S. § 104 (2010), which extends employers’ immunity from suit for work injuries to employers that hire temporary workers through insured employment agencies, also does not authorize an action against Poland Spring pursuant to…”
Frank v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D. Me. 2005). · cites it 2× “39-A M.R.S.A. § 104. Maine courts have held that this exemption applies not only to negligence, but,to intentional torts as well.”
Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26 (Me. 2008). “§ 8111(1)(E) (2007); (3) their statements were true; and (4) the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision, 39-A M.R.S. §§ 104, 408 (2007), bars recovery by Morgan.”
Michaels v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 171 Wash. 2d 587 (Wash. 2011). “§ 34-9 -ll(a); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39-A, § 104; Tenn. Code Ann.”
Show all 61 citing cases →
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39-A, § 104(2005) — 1 case
Penn v. FMC Corp., 2006 ME 87 (Me. 2006). “On appeal, Penn contends that a summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether FMC is entitled to statutory immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 39-A M.R.S. § 104 (2005). We affirm the judgment.”
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