Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39-A, § 306 (2026)

Time for filing petitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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1.  Statute of limitations.  Except as provided in this section, a petition brought under this Act is barred unless filed within 2 years after the date of injury or the date the employee's employer files a required first report of injury if required in section 303, whichever is later.  
[PL 2011, c. 647, §18 (AMD).]
2.  Payment of benefits.  If an employer or insurer pays benefits under this Act, with or without prejudice, within the period provided in subsection 1, the period during which an employee or other interested party must file a petition is 6 years from the date of the most recent payment.  
A. The provision of medical care for an injury or illness by or under the supervision of a health care provider employed by, or under contract with, the employer is a payment of benefits with respect to that injury or illness if:  
(1) Care was provided for that injury or illness on 6 or more occasions in the 12-month period after the initial treatment; and  
(2) The employer or the health care provider knew or should have known that the injury or illness was work-related.  
For the purposes of this paragraph, "health care provider" has the same meaning as provided in rules of the board.   [PL 2001, c. 435, §1 (NEW); PL 2001, c. 435, §2 (AFF).]
[PL 2001, c. 435, §1 (AMD); PL 2001, c. 435, §2 (AFF).]
3.  Establishment of injury.  If the occurrence of a work-related injury is established by board decree, mediation report or agreement of the parties without the payment of benefits as provided in subsection 2, the period during which an employee or other interested party may file a petition is 6 years from the date of that decree, report or agreement.  
[PL 1999, c. 354, §6 (NEW); PL 1999, c. 354, §10 (AFF).]
4.  Physical or mental incapacity.  If an employee is unable to file a petition because of physical or mental incapacity, the period of that incapacity is not included in the limitation period provided in subsection 1.  
[PL 1999, c. 354, §6 (NEW); PL 1999, c. 354, §10 (AFF).]
5.  Mistake of fact.  If an employee fails to file a petition within the limitation period provided in subsection 1 because of mistake of fact as to the cause or nature of the injury, the employee may file a petition within a reasonable time, subject to the 6-year limitation provided in subsection 2.  
[PL 1999, c. 354, §6 (NEW); PL 1999, c. 354, §10 (AFF).]
6.  Death of employee.  If an employee dies as a result of a work-related injury, a petition is barred unless filed within one year after the death or 2 years from the date of injury, whichever is later, but in any event not later than 6 years from the date of last payment.  
[PL 1999, c. 354, §6 (NEW); PL 1999, c. 354, §10 (AFF).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1991, c. 885, §A8 (NEW). PL 1991, c. 885, §§A9-11 (AFF). PL 1999, c. 354, §6 (RPR). PL 1999, c. 354, §10 (AFF). PL 2001, c. 435, §1 (AMD). PL 2001, c. 435, §2 (AFF). PL 2011, c. 647, §18 (AMD).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1995–2025 · leading case: Graves v. Brockway-Smith Co., 55 A.3d 456 (Me. 2012).
Graves v. Brockway-Smith Co., 55 A.3d 456 (Me. 2012). · cites it 15× “Title 39-A M.R.S. § 306 (2011) and its Statutory Context [¶ 11] Title 39-A M.”
Jensen v. S.D. Warren Co., 2009 ME 35 (Me. 2009). · cites it 4× “§ 301 (2008) and timely filed his petition pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 306 (2008); (2) foreclosing inquiry into attorney-client communications disclosed by Jensen regarding his recognition that he suffered a work-related gradual injury; (3) awarding ongoing “total” incapacity…”
White v. McTeague, Higbee, Case, Cohen, Whitney & Toker, P.A., 809 A.2d 622 (Me. 2002). · cites it 2× “In 1991, the Legislature repealed section 95 and replaced it with 39-A M.R.S.A. § 306(2) (2001 & Supp.2001).”
Ray v. Carland Constr., Inc., 1997 ME 206 (Me. 1997). · cites it 2× “§ 325, and could conceivably be subject to a shorter statute of limitations, 39-A M.R.S.A. § 306. Moreover, in addition to discouraging employees from returning to work, today's decision could also discourage employees with pre-1993 injuries from reporting injuries after 1993.”
Dahms v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, 782 A.2d 774 (Me. 2001). · cites it 4× “885, §§ A-7, A-8 (codified at 39-A M.R.S.A. § 306 (2001)). The hearing officer concluded that the employer’s transfer of the employee to a light-duty work assignment on the recommendation of the hospital’s occupational health nurse constituted a “payment” for purposes of tolling…”
Leighton v. S.D. Warren Co., 883 A.2d 906 (Me. 2005). “§§ 318, 322(3) (2001), 4 we decline to do so.”
Joyce v. S.D. Warren Co., 759 A.2d 712 (Me. 2000). · cites it 3× “2 The hearing officer concluded that providing in-house medical treatment tolled the two-year statute of limitations and therefore the employee’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations.”
Rutter v. Allstate Auto. Ins., 655 A.2d 1258 (Me. 1995). “Section 95 has been repealed and replaced by 39-A M.R.S.A. § 306. Maine Workers' Compensation Act of 1992, P.”
Robert Charest v. Hydraulic Hose & Assemblies, LLC, 2021 ME 17 (Me. 2021). · cites it 3× “39-A M.R.S. § 306 (2020).7 Because Charest received some workers’ compensation payments in 2001, he is subject to the statute of limitations set forth in section 306(2).”
Libby v. Boise Cascade Corp., 1998 ME 89 (Me. 1998). · cites it 2× “Boise also contends that its voluntary payments without prejudice satisfied the two-year statute of limitations, 39-A M.R.S.A. § 306 (Supp.1997), and therefore, a protective decree is not necessary to toll the statute of limitations.”
Moreau v. S.D. Warren Co., 2000 ME 62 (Me. 2000). · cites it 2× “For the purposes of this section, payments of benefits made by an employer or insurer pursuant to section 51-B shall be considered payments under a decision unless a timely notice of controversy has been filed.”
Lister v. Roland's Serv., Inc., 690 A.2d 491 (Me. 1997). “Section 95 has been repealed and replaced by 39-A M.R.S.A. § 306 (Supp.1995). Maine Workers’ Compensation Act of 1992, P.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39-A, § 306(1) — 3 cases
Graves v. Brockway-Smith Co., 55 A.3d 456 (Me. 2012). “Title 39-A M.R.S. § 306 (2011) and its Statutory Context [¶ 11] Title 39-A M.”
Wilson v. Bath Iron Works, 942 A.2d 1237 (Me. 2008).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39-A, § 306(2) — 5 cases
Graves v. Brockway-Smith Co., 55 A.3d 456 (Me. 2012). “Title 39-A M.R.S. § 306 (2011) and its Statutory Context [¶ 11] Title 39-A M.”
White v. McTeague, Higbee, Case, Cohen, Whitney & Toker, P.A., 809 A.2d 622 (Me. 2002). “In 1991, the Legislature repealed section 95 and replaced it with 39-A M.R.S.A. § 306(2) (2001 & Supp.2001).”
Robert Charest v. Hydraulic Hose & Assemblies, LLC, 2021 ME 17 (Me. 2021). “39-A M.R.S. § 306 (2020).7 Because Charest received some workers’ compensation payments in 2001, he is subject to the statute of limitations set forth in section 306(2).”
Roe v. Yarmouth Lumber, Inc., 785 A.2d 334 (Me. 2001).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39-A, § 306(2)(A) — 1 case
Dahms v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, 782 A.2d 774 (Me. 2001). “885, §§ A-7, A-8 (codified at 39-A M.R.S.A. § 306 (2001)). The hearing officer concluded that the employer’s transfer of the employee to a light-duty work assignment on the recommendation of the hospital’s occupational health nurse constituted a “payment” for purposes of tolling…”
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