Dirring, 183 N.E.2d 300 (Mass. 1962). · Go Syfert
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Dirring, 183 N.E.2d 300 (Mass. 1962). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
19 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Pierce (mass, 2026-02-09)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pierce
Mass. · 2026 · confidence medium
See Kauffman, petitioner, 413 Mass. 1010, 1011 (1992) ("petitions for writs of habeas corpus may not be used to raise issues that should have been raised on appeal" [emphasis added]); Dirring, petitioner, 344 Mass. 522, 523 (1962) (concluding that writ of habeas corpus was unavailable to petitioner who could have but failed to raise suppression issue by "appropriate appellate procedure"); Crystal, 330 Mass. at 590-591 (concluding that writ of habeas corpus was available even though petitioner "could have appealed from the contempt decree" because of "exception" to general rule that habeas is n…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stevens v. Commonwealth
Mass. Super. Ct. · 2011 · confidence medium
It is settled, however, that “habeas corpus cannot be employed as a substitute for ordinary appellate procedure, and so in general is not available where there is a remedy by writ of error or appeal.” Crystal, petitioner, 344 Mass. 583, 590 (1953); see Lamb, petitioner, 368 Mass. 491, 496 (1975) (where errors asserted in habeas corpus petition by a person adjudged a sexually dangerous person either were or could have been argued in the Appeals Court when that court first reviewed proceedings, those matters could not be reopened in a petition for habeas corpus); Crowell v. Commonwealth 352 …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Claflin
Mass. App. Ct. · 1973 · confidence medium
Dirring, petr. 344 Mass. 522, 523-524 (1962).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Jacobs
Mass. · 1963 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. also Dirring, petitioner, 344 Mass. 522, 523-524 (where there were no exceptions at any stage based upon the principles of the Mapp opinion); United States v. Koenig, 290 F. 2d 166, 170-174 (5th Cir.), affd. sub nom.
discussed Cited "see" Crowley
Mass. App. Ct. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dirring, petitioner, 344 Mass. 522, 523-524 (1962) (no habeas corpus relief where petitioner did not bring an alleged error below before the court through appropriate appellate procedure).
discussed Cited "see" Kauffman
Mass. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Dirring, petitioner, 344 Mass. 522, 523-524 (1962) (no habeas corpus relief granted where petitioner did not bring an alleged error below before the court through appropriate appellate procedure). “[A] petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus must show that he or she is entitled to be released from restraint by the particular respondent or respondents named in the petition.” Hennessy v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst., Framingham, 386 Mass. 848, 852 (1982). 4 The petitioners are not requesting that they be released immediately.
John T. Dirring, Petitioner
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Jun 11, 1962.
183 N.E.2d 300
Walter Powers, Jr. for the petitioner., James W. Bailey, Assistant Attorney General, for the respondent.
Wilkins, Spalding, Williams, Cutter, Spiegel.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published
Wilkins, C.J.

The petitioner is in custody of the respondent superintendent of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole in execution under criminal process. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 248, § 1. In 1958 he was convicted in the Superior Court of felonies described in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 266, § 49 (possession of burglarious implements), and in G. L. c. 269, § 10, as amended through St. 1957, c. 688, § 23 (unlawfully carrying firearms). Also in 1958 he was committed to the custody of the respondent to serve, and is now serving, two concurrent sentences. At the hearing upon this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed on July 11, 1961, he sought release in reliance upon Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (decided on June 19, 1961), contending that[*523] there had been “violation of his Constitutional right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. ’ ’ The Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss. From a denial of the petition, the petitioner appealed, purportedly under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, § 96.

The judge found that the petitioner testified as to the search of his automobile by police officers on September 6, 1958, and the finding of “an assortment of tools and a loaded pistol” in the trunk “substantially conformably to the allegations of the petition.” He also found: “He did not know whether objection to the admissibility of the evidence of the search and seizure was made at the trial of the indictments. He was there represented by competent counsel. The petitioner did not satisfy me that he seasonably safeguarded his Constitutional rights against the alleged unlawful search and seizure.”

The Attorney General argues that the findings of the judge are not before us on appeal under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, § 96. He cites Watts v. Watts, 312 Mass. 442; Matter of Loeb, 315 Mass. 191, 193-194; and Harrington v. Anderson, 316 Mass. 187,191-192. We do not consider this or any other procedural question, because we rest our judgment upon a ground which goes to the heart of the petitioner’s case and is decisive.

Retrospective effect of the Mapp rule is enshrouded in doubt. We do not puzzle as to something which must be, for us, inscrutable. Compare People v. Muller, 11 N. Y. 2d 154. At the moment there is no occasion to do so, because in the present ease no issue as to illegally seized evidence was brought here by an appropriate appellate procedure (see Guerin v. Commonwealth, 337 Mass. 264, 266-270) following the trial of the indictments. Indeed, it does not appear that any motion to suppress or objection was made either before (see Segurola v. United States, 275 U. S. 106, 111-112) or at that trial. Compare People v. Friola, 11 N. Y. 2d 157. There is no issue as to jurisdiction, and the question of law is raised for the first time in this petition. See Commonwealth v. Skalberg, 333 Mass. 255, 256.

The petitioner derives no aid from Commonwealth v.[*524] Spofford, 343 Mass. 703, where in the Superior Court the admissibility of illegally seized evidence was properly challenged in what might be described as optimistic anticipation of the Mapp decision. After the Mapp decision, we heard the Spofford appeal, which came before us, as we said at page 707, “in regular course for decision on the law as it presently stands.”

Order affirmed.