Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 24 (2026)

Waiver of right of action for injuries

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 24. An employee shall be held to have waived his right of action at common law or under the law of any other jurisdiction in respect to an injury that is compensable under this chapter, to recover damages for personal injuries, if he shall not have given his employer, at the time of his contract of hire, written notice that he claimed such right, or, if the contract of hire was made before the employer became an insured person or self-insurer, if the employee shall not have given the said notice within thirty days of the time said employer became an insured person or self-insurer. An employee who has given notice to his employer that he claimed his right of action as aforesaid may waive such claim by a written notice, which shall take effect five days after it is delivered to the employer or his agent. The notices required by this section shall be given in such manner as the department may approve. If an employee has not given notice to his employer that he preserves his right of action at common law as provided by this section, the employee's spouse, children, parents and any other member of the employee's family or next of kin who is wholly or partly dependent upon the earnings of such employee at the time of injury or death, shall also be held to have waived any right created by statute, at common law, or under the law of any other jurisdiction against such employer, including, but not limited to claims for damages due to emotional distress, loss of consortium, parental guidance, companionship or the like, when such loss is a result of any injury to the employee that is compensable under this chapter.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 241 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1926–2025 · leading case: Est. of Moulton v. Puopolo, 5 N.E.3d 908 (Mass. 2014).

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Est. of Moulton v. Puopolo, 5 N.E.3d 908 (Mass. 2014). · cites it 6× “The director defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 7 chiefly on the grounds that, with respect to the wrongful death action, 8 they are immune from suit, as Moulton’s employer, under the exclusive remedy provision, G. L. c. 152, § 24, of the Workers’ Compensation Act (act)…”

St. Germaine v. Pendergast, 584 N.E.2d 611 (Mass. 1992). · cites it 7× “Germaines had incurred damages in at least the amount of $100,000 (the value of Lacey & Lacey’s liability insurance).”

Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 508 N.E.2d 72 (Mass. 1987). · cites it 4× “Polaroid does not contend that Foley's false imprisonment claim was barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act, G.L.c. 152, § 24, but rather that any emotional distress Foley suffered as a result of Polaroid's conduct constituted a personal injury compensable under the Act, and…”

Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 413 N.E.2d 711 (Mass. 1980). · cites it 4× “The defendant's motion to dismiss was properly granted if the plaintiffs' claims are barred under the exclusivity provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, G.L.c. 152, § 24, as amended through St. 1955, c.”

Fleming v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins., 445 Mass. 381 (Mass. 2005). · cites it 6× “152 to be remedied within the comprehensive statutory and regulatory framework of the Act, and that the exclusivity provision of G. L. c. 152, § 24, barred the plaintiffs’ cause of action.”

Adams v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 799 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 7× “Liberty’s exclusivity argument finds no support in the language of G. L. c. 152, § 24, as amended through St.”

Maxwell v. AIG Dom. Claims, Inc., 950 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011). · cites it 4× “The principal exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, G. L. c. 152, § 24, states that an employee “shall be held to have waived his right of action at common law .”

Corrigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1238 (Mass. 1990). · cites it 6× “Because the alleged injury occurred in 1980, this claim is unaffected by G.L.c. 152, § 24, as appearing in St. 1985, c.”

Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. 1991). · cites it 2× “[11] Ferriter held that neither a worker's failure to give notice, nor his acceptance of worker's compensation benefits, precluded his spouse and children from recovering on their independent common law claims for loss of consortium.”

Gomes v. Limieux (In Re Limieux), 306 B.R. 433 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004). · cites it 4× “Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 24 (2003). 4 Both motions were denied, and the Judgment became final.”

Saharceski v. Marcure, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (Mass. 1977). · cites it 3× “G. L. c. 152, § 24. 2 “Massachusetts has assumed exclusive juris *307 diction of rights to compensation where the contract of employment is made here and no notice in writing of claim of rights is given.”

Flesner v. Technical Commc'ns Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass. 1991). “9 The defendants assert on appeal that Flesner’s claims for damages for mental anguish in connection with the wrongful discharge count and the misrepresentation count are barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, G. L. c. 152, § 24 (1990 ed.). In…”

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— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 24(6) — 1 case

Smedley v. Everett Mgmt. Corp., 4 Mass. L. Rptr. 260 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995).

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