Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, § 1 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 1. When used in this chapter, the following words shall have the following meanings except as otherwise specifically provided:

(a) ''Person'', any individual, corporation, association, partnership, reciprocal exchange, inter-insurer, Lloyds insurer, fraternal benefit society, operators of any medical service plan and hospital service plan as defined in chapters 176B, 176C, 176E and 176F, carriers and health maintenance organizations as defined in chapter 176G, insurers and sponsors of a legal services plan as defined in chapter 176H, any other legal entity or self insurer which is engaged in the business of insurance, including agents, brokers, and adjusters, the Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund and any joint underwriting association established pursuant to law. For purposes of this chapter, operators of any such medical and hospital service plans and carriers and such health maintenance organizations shall be engaged in the business of insurance.

(b) ''Commissioner'', the commissioner of insurance.

(c) ''Insurance policy'' or ''insurance contract'', any contract or insurance, indemnity, medical or hospital service, dental or optometric, suretyship, or annuity issued, proposed for issuance or intended for issuance by any person.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 14 cases, 1979–2013 · leading case: Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 925 N.E.2d 9 (Mass. 2010).

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Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 925 N.E.2d 9 (Mass. 2010). · cites it 7× “In 1996, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 176D, § 1 (a), adding the Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund (insolvency fund), as well as joint underwriting associations, to the definition of “person” as that term is defined in G.”

R.W. Granger & Sons, Inc. v. J & S Insulation, Inc., 435 Mass. 66 (Mass. 2001). “See G. L. c. 176D, § 1 (c). While it says that it does not challenge the judge’s findings, USF&G does request “critical assessment” of those findings.”

Nelson v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 387 N.E.2d 589 (Mass. 1979). “Although Blue Shield is generally exempt from the insurance laws (§ 14), it is explicitly subjected to G.”

Anawan Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Div. of Ins., 459 Mass. 592 (Mass. 2011). “176D, § 7, directs that if, after hearing, the commissioner determines that a “person” (defined in G. L. c. 176D, § 1 [a], to include an individual or an entity engaged in the business of insurance) has *601 engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, that person “shall be…”

Lemos v. Electrolux North Am., Inc., 937 N.E.2d 984 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). “Not only has that case been weakened by the 1996 amendment to G. L. c. 176D, § 1(a), St. 1996, c. 313, see Wheatley v.”

McMahon v. Digit. Equip. Corp., 944 F. Supp. 70 (D. Mass. 1996). “An action under Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 93A and ch. 176D is precluded here because Mass.”

Liquor Liab. Jt. Underwriting Ass'n v. Great Am. Ins., 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 268 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2003). · cites it 4× “” G.L.c. 176D, §1 (1992 ed.). Statutorily established joint underwriting associations were not specifically included in the 1992 version of G.”

Hyppolite ex rel. Hyppolite v. City of Boston, 1 Mass. L. Rptr. 31 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1993). “93A, §1, nor engaged in the “business of insurance” under G.L.c. 176D, §1. The plaintiff contends that the character of the defendant is the same as that of an insurer and as such it is engaged in trade or commerce under 93A and the business of insurance under 176D.”

Morrison v. Toys \R\" Us, 806 N.E.2d 388 (2004). “§ 3 (9) (d), (f), and (g), when it refused initially to pay her claim without conducting a reasonable investigation; when it failed to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of her claim when its liability was clear; and when it compelled her to institute litigation…”

Viglas v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 31 Mass. L. Rptr. 527 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2013). · cites it 2× “BJ’s has moved for judgment on the pleadings as to the claim under Chapters 176D and 93A, arguing that it can have no Chapter 176D liability because it is not engaged in the business of insurance as defined in M.G.L.c. 176D, §1. BJ’s is correct, and I will allow its motion.”

Kanavos v. Bayer Corp., 13 Mass. L. Rptr. 374 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2001). “Importantly, though, G.L.c. 93A, §9(1), includes explicit language making a violation of G.”

Hanley v. Walker, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. 516 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2009). “G.L.c. 176D, §1 provides: When used in this chapter, the following words shall have the following meanings except as otherwise specifically provided: (a) “Person,” any individual, corporation, association, partnership, reciprocal exchange, inter-insurer, Lloyds insurer,…”

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— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, § 1(a) — 3 cases

Lemos v. Electrolux North Am., Inc., 937 N.E.2d 984 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). “Not only has that case been weakened by the 1996 amendment to G. L. c. 176D, § 1(a), St. 1996, c. 313, see Wheatley v.”

McMahon v. Digit. Equip. Corp., 944 F. Supp. 70 (D. Mass. 1996). “An action under Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 93A and ch. 176D is precluded here because Mass.”

Liquor Liab. Jt. Underwriting Ass'n v. Great Am. Ins., 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 268 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2003). “” G.L.c. 176D, §1 (1992 ed.). Statutorily established joint underwriting associations were not specifically included in the 1992 version of G.”

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