Mass. Gen. Laws » Part II Title I Chapter 184
Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 184, § 30 (2026)

Enforceability of restrictions; presumptions and prerequisites; temporary injunction

✓ current as of July 2026
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Section 30. No restriction shall in any proceeding be enforced or declared to be enforceable, whether or not the time for recording a notice or extension under section twenty-seven or twenty-eight has occurred, or such a notice or extension has been recorded, unless it is determined that the restriction is at the time of the proceeding of actual and substantial benefit to a person claiming rights of enforcement. There shall be a presumption that no restriction shall be of such actual and substantial benefit except in cases of gifts or devises for public, charitable or religious purposes, if any part of the subject land lies within a city or town having a population greater than one hundred thousand persons unless (1) such restriction at the time it was imposed is not more burdensome as to requirements for lot size, density, building height, set back, or other yard dimensions than such requirements established by restriction or restrictions applicable to the land of the persons for whose benefit rights of enforcement are claimed; or (2) such restriction is part of a common scheme applicable to four or more parcels contiguous except for any intervening streets or ways to land of the grantor or other premises purported to be benefited thereby; or (3) unless such restriction is in favor of contiguous land of the grantor. No restriction determined to be of such benefit shall be enforced or declared to be enforceable, except in appropriate cases by award of money damages, if (1) changes in the character of the properties affected or their neighborhood, in available construction materials or techniques, in access, services or facilities, in applicable public controls of land use or construction, or in any other conditions or circumstances, reduce materially the need for the restriction or the likelihood of the restriction accomplishing its original purposes or render it obsolete or inequitable to enforce except by award of money damages, or (2) conduct of persons from time to time entitled to enforce the restriction has rendered it inequitable to enforce except by award of money damages, or (3) in case of a common scheme the land of the person claiming rights of enforcement is for any reason no longer subject to the restriction or the parcel against which rights of enforcement are claimed is not in a group of parcels still subject to the restriction and appropriate for accomplishment of its purposes, or (4) continuation of the restriction on the parcel against which enforcement is claimed or on parcels remaining in a common scheme with it or subject to like restrictions would impede reasonable use of land for purposes for which it is most suitable, and would tend to impair the growth of the neighborhood or municipality in a manner inconsistent with the public interest or to contribute to deterioration of properties or to result in decadent or substandard areas or blighted open areas, or (5) enforcement, except by award of money damages, is for any other reason inequitable or not in the public interest.

Nothing herein shall prevent a court from issuing a temporary injunction or restraining order pending determination of enforceability of a restriction.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17 cases, 1972–2018 · leading case: Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903 (Mass. 1974).
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Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903 (Mass. 1974). · cites it 34× “More specifically, they seek such relief under the terms of G.L.c. 184, § 30. After proper notice was given to owners of nearby lots pursuant to c.”
Well-Built Homes, Inc. v. Shuster, 834 N.E.2d 1213 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 4× “In this connection, it will be incumbent upon Well-Built to establish, under G. L. c. 184, § 30, 25 that it derives an “actual and substantial benefit” from the restriction, which cannot consist solely of the “hold-up *637 price” for its release.”
Atwood v. Walter, 714 N.E.2d 365 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999). · cites it 6× “Enforcement of the restriction pursuant to G. L. c. 184, § 30. The defendants also argue that the restriction should not be enforced because the evidence does not support the conclusion that the restriction provides an actual and substantial benefit to the plaintiff.”
Cogliano v. Lyman, 348 N.E.2d 765 (Mass. 1976). · cites it 6× “240, §§ 10A-10C, by the petitioners, owners of land burdened by a restrictive covenant, *509 to be relieved of the restriction in accordance with the provisions of G. L. c. 184, § 30. Named as respondents were the owners of certain abutting land, one of whom was the grantor who…”
Kline v. Shearwater Ass'n, 830 N.E.2d 235 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 4× “15 Validity of the Shearwater covenants. We begin with Kline’s argument that the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard in determining that the Shearwater covenants were valid.”
Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Urstadt Biddle Props., Inc., 740 N.E.2d 1286 (Mass. 2001). “” Stop & Shop does not contend that the judge erred in concluding that the restriction, pursuant to G. L. c. 184, § 30, is “of actual and substantial benefit” to Urstadt.”
Exit 1 Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Mobil Oil Corp., 692 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). · cites it 4× “We conclude, as did the Superior Court judge, that the land restriction continues to be of substantial benefit, within the meaning of G. L. c. 184, § 30, to the occupant of the Howard Johnson parcel and is enforceable.”
Connaughton v. Payne, 779 N.E.2d 683 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 6× “The plaintiff brought this action in Land Court seeking a declaration that G. L. c. 184, § 30, bars the enforcement of a 1965 deed restriction that limits the development of 17.”
Garland v. Rosenshein, 420 Mass. 319 (Mass. 1995). · cites it 2× “A judge in the Land Court declared the restriction invalid because it was of no “actual and substantial benefit” to the defendant within the meaning of G. L. c. 184, § 30 (1992 ed.), *320 or in the alternative, because the restriction constituted an unreasonable restraint on…”
Harrod v. Rigelhaupt, 298 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973). · cites it 3× “Being of opinion that the record did not contain certain documents material to the existence or not of a common scheme and that the statement of agreed facts did not include sufficient facts to make the determinations required by the first paragraph of G. L. c. 184, § 30 (as…”
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Konner, 367 N.E.2d 1174 (Mass. 1977). “[Footnote reference to G. L. c. 184, § 30, omitted.] However, there is no statutory mechanism available at this time for such a solution.”
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fall River Hous. Auth., 306 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 1974). “It is finally necessary to consider the restriction in light of the provisions of G. L. c. 184, § 30, 3 in order to determine *501 if the restriction should be enforced and, if so, whether it should be enforced by other than money damages'.”
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