Section 3. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person's
(a) transacting any business in this commonwealth;
(b) contracting to supply services or things in this commonwealth;
(c) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this commonwealth;
(d) causing tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside this commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this commonwealth;
(e) having an interest in, using or possessing real property in this commonwealth;
(f) contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this commonwealth at the time of contracting;
(g) maintaining a domicile in this commonwealth while a party to a personal or marital relationship out of which arises a claim for divorce, alimony, property settlement, parentage of a child, child support or child custody; or the commission of any act giving rise to such a claim; or
(h) having been subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction of a court of the commonwealth which has resulted in an order of alimony, custody, child support or property settlement, notwithstanding the subsequent departure of one of the original parties from the commonwealth, if the action involves modification of such order or orders and the moving party resides in the commonwealth, or if the action involves enforcement of such order notwithstanding the domicile of the moving party.
Good Hope Indus., Inc. v. Ryder Scott Co., 389 N.E.2d 76 (Mass. 1979). · cites it 10דThe plaintiffs appealed, arguing that subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of G. L. c. 223A, § 3, 2 each confers long arm jurisdiction over the defendant.”
Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 1994). · cites it 9דFirst, she claimed that her action was one “arising from the [defendant’s transaction of] business in this [Commonwealth,” so that jurisdiction was proper under G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a) (1992 ed.), the Massachusetts long-arm statute.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 94 N.E.3d 786 (Mass. 2018). · cites it 7דExxon's primary argument is that, as a nonresident corporation, it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Massachusetts.”
Droukas v. Divers Training Academy, Inc., 376 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1978). · cites it 6דThe plaintiff challenges the order of a judge of the Superior Court allowing the motion, arguing that G. L. c. 223A, §§ 3 (a) and (b) (the long arm statute), conferred personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”
Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2016). · cites it 2ד2 It follows that Baskin-Robbins must show that the district court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over Alpenrose would satisfy the requirements of both the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution and the Massachusetts long-arm statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3.…”
Targetsmart Holdings, LLC v. Ghp Advisors, LLC, 366 F. Supp. 3d 195 (D.D.C. 2019). · cites it 4דThe Massachusetts long-arm statute allows a court of the Commonwealth to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person's: (a) transacting any business in this commonwealth ... (c)…”
Roberts v. Legendary Marine Sales, 447 Mass. 860 (Mass. 2006). · cites it 7דWe conclude that personal jurisdiction was not conferred over the defendant under our long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and affirm the judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint.”
Miller v. Miller, 861 N.E.2d 393 (Mass. 2007). · cites it 6דWe transferred this case from the Appeals Court to *321 consider a reported question from a judge in the Probate and Family Court whether her interlocutory ruling that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant husband pursuant to G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (g), was proper.…”
Morrill v. Tong, 453 N.E.2d 1221 (Mass. 1983). · cites it 7דHere, the judge based the exercise of jurisdiction on G. L. c. 223A, § 3 (a) and (c). 11 *130 In Ross v.”
Nova Biomedical Corp. v. Willi Moller, D/b/a/ Gebruder Moller Glasblaserei, 629 F.2d 190 (1st Cir. 1980). · cites it 5דOn November 28,1979, the district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that Nova had failed to establish personal jurisdiction over Moller pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 223A, § 3, the Massachusetts long arm statute.”
United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 1999). · cites it 4ד, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3 (providing “long-arm” jurisdiction).”
Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2016). “2 It follows that Baskin-Robbins must show that the district court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over Alpenrose would satisfy the requirements of both the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution and the Massachusetts long-arm statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3.…”
Targetsmart Holdings, LLC v. Ghp Advisors, LLC, 366 F. Supp. 3d 195 (D.D.C. 2019). “The Massachusetts long-arm statute allows a court of the Commonwealth to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person's: (a) transacting any business in this commonwealth ... (c)…”
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