Mass. Gen. Laws » Part III Title II Chapter 229
Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2 (2026)

Wrongful death; damages

✓ current as of July 2026
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Section 2. A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person, or (2) by willful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a person under such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted, or (3) operates a common carrier of passengers and by his negligence causes the death of a passenger, or (4) operates a common carrier of passengers and by his willful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a passenger under such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted, or (5) is responsible for a breach of warranty arising under Article 2 of chapter one hundred and six which results in injury to a person that causes death, shall be liable in damages in the amount of: (1) the fair monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered, as provided in section one, including but not limited to compensation for the loss of the reasonably expected net income, services, protection, care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel, and advice of the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages recovered; (2) the reasonable funeral and burial expenses of the decedent; (3) punitive damages in an amount of not less than five thousand dollars in such case as the decedent's death was caused by the malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct of the defendant or by the gross negligence of the defendant; except that (1) the liability of an employer to a person in his employment shall not be governed by this section, (2) a person operating a railroad shall not be liable for negligence in causing the death of a person while walking or being upon such railroad contrary to law or to the reasonable rules and regulations of the carrier and (3) a person operating a street railway or electric railroad shall not be liable for negligence for causing the death of a person while walking or being upon that part of the street railway or electric railroad not within the limits of a highway. A person shall be liable for the negligence or the willful, wanton or reckless act of his agents or servants while engaged in his business to the same extent and subject to the same limits as he would be liable under this section for his own act. Damages under this section shall be recovered in an action of tort by the executor or administrator of the deceased. An action to recover damages under this section shall be commenced within three years from the date of death, or within three years from the date when the deceased's executor or administrator knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the factual basis for a cause of action, or within such time thereafter as is provided by section four, four B, nine or ten of chapter two hundred and sixty.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 282 cases (30 in the last 5 years), 1960–2026 · leading case: Pobieglo v. Monsanto Co., 521 N.E.2d 728 (Mass. 1988).
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Pobieglo v. Monsanto Co., 521 N.E.2d 728 (Mass. 1988). · cites it 16× “"May a discovery rule be applied in an action for wrongful death brought under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2 where, as a consequence of plaintiffs' good faith ignorance of the existence of grounds for a complaint, the action was commenced more than three years after the date of…”
Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 452 Mass. 1 (Mass. 2008). · cites it 7× “4 The defendants appealed, asserting, among other things, that loss of chance was not cognizable under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, see G. L. c. 229, §§ 2 and 6, 5 or otherwise.”
Santos v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 556 N.E.2d 983 (Mass. 1990). · cites it 10× “See G. L. c. 229, § 2 (1988 ed.). After certain coverage issues, which form the basis of this case, arose during the arbitration proceeding, the plaintiffs commenced this action in the Superior Court for Plymouth County under the Declaratory.”
Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 465 Mass. 411 (Mass. 2013). · cites it 6× “Under the wrongful death statute, G. L. c. 229, § 2, Lorillard is liable if its negligence or wilful, wanton, or reckless act caused Marie’s death, or if it “is responsible for a breach of warranty arising under Article 2 of [G.”
Hallett v. Town of Wrentham, 499 N.E.2d 1189 (Mass. 1986). · cites it 7× “258, § 2, and that the three children’s $50,000 awards be dismissed on the ground that there is no separate recovery for the children outside the wrongful death statute, G. L. c. 229, § 2. The judge combined Karen Hallett’s $25,000 consortium award with the $575,000 for loss of…”
Klairmont v. Gainsboro Restaurant, Inc., 465 Mass. 165 (Mass. 2013). · cites it 4× “228, § 1, distinct from their claims under the wrongful death act, G. L. c. 229, § 2, but that they may recover damages under c.”
Beausoleil v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 138 F. Supp. 2d 189 (D. Mass. 2001). · cites it 12× “In addition, the general standard of care imposed by statute and common law as to foreseeable child trespassers is superseded by the railroad exemption contained in M.G.L. c. 229, § 2. Where, as here, Danielle Beausoleil was a trespasser on the tracks at the Attleboro station,…”
Marco v. Green, 615 N.E.2d 928 (Mass. 1993). · cites it 8× “), has the legal authority to maintain or compromise a wrongful death action under G. L. c. 229, § 2 (1990 ed.). We summarize the relevant facts established by statements, affidavits, and other materials in the record.”
Miga v. City of Holyoke, 497 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1986). · cites it 7× “The plaintiff, the mother of the decedent, brought suit against the city of Holyoke, its chief of police, and various police officers, seeking recovery for wrongful death, G. L. c. 229, § 2 (1984 ed.), and for the deprivation of the decedent’s civil rights, 42 U.”
McIntyre v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. Mass. 2006). · cites it 6× “§ 1346 (b)(1); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2 . In addition, to be imputed to the United States, the act or omission of the government employee must have been committed within the scope of his or her employment.”
Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972). · cites it 7× “The wrongful death statute in effect at the time of Gaudette’s death, G. L. c. 229, § 2, as appearing in St. 1958, c.”
Est. of Gavin v. Tewksbury State Hosp., 9 N.E.3d 299 (Mass. 2014). · cites it 8× “258 and G. L. c. 229, § 2. 5 On May 27, 2011, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss, arguing that the presentment requirement of § 4 had not been met because presentment had not been made by a duly appointed personal representative of the estate and, as a separate matter, that the…”
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— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, § 2(2) — 1 case
McGrath v. Tavares, 104 N.E.3d 684 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018).
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