Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 239, § 2A (2026)

Reprisal for reporting violations of law, for tenant's union activity, or actions taken pursuant to laws protecting tenants who are victims of domestic violence, rape, sexual assault or stalking; defense; presumption

✓ current as of July 2026
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Section 2A. It shall be a defense to an action for summary process that such action or the preceding action of terminating the tenant's tenancy, was taken against the tenant for the tenant's act of commencing, proceeding with, or obtaining relief in any judicial or administrative action the purpose of which action was to obtain damages under or otherwise enforce, any federal, state or local law, regulation, by-law, or ordinance, which has as its objective the regulation of residential premises, or exercising rights pursuant to section one hundred and twenty-four D of chapter one hundred and sixty-four, or reporting a violation or suspected violation of law as provided in section eighteen of chapter one hundred and eighty-six, or organizing or joining a tenants' union or similar organization or making, or expressing an intention to make, a payment of rent to an organization of unit owners pursuant to paragraph (c) of section six of chapter one hundred and 83A, or a tenant, co-tenant or a member of the household taking action under section 3 of chapter 209A or section 3 of chapter 258E, seeking relief under sections 23 to 29, inclusive, of chapter 186, reporting to any police officer or law enforcement professional an incident of domestic violence, rape, sexual assault or stalking, as defined in said section 23 of said chapter 186, against a tenant, co-tenant or member of the household, or reporting to any police officer or law enforcement professional a violation of an order issued under said section 3 of said chapter 209A or said section 3 of said chapter 258E or any act of abuse as defined in section 1 of said chapter 209A or any act of harassment as defined in chapter 258E directed against the tenant, co-tenant or member of the household. The commencement of such action against a tenant, or the sending of a notice to quit upon which the summary process action is based, or the sending of a notice, or performing any act, the purpose of which is to materially alter the terms of the tenancy, within six months after the tenant has commenced, proceeded with or obtained relief in such action, exercised such rights, made such report, organized or joined such tenants' union, or made or expressed an intention to make a payment of rent to an organization of unit owners, or within six months after any other person has taken such action or actions on behalf of the tenant or relating to the building in which such tenant resides, shall create a rebuttable presumption that such summary process action is a reprisal against the tenant for engaging in such activities or was taken in the belief that the tenant had engaged in such activities. Such presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that such action was not a reprisal against the tenant and that the plaintiff had sufficient independent justification for taking such action, and would have in fact taken such action, in the same manner and at the same time the action was taken, even if the tenant had not commenced any legal action, made such report or engaged in such activity.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 34 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1970–2026 · leading case: Beacon Residential Mgmt., LP v. R.P., 477 Mass. 749 (Mass. 2017).
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Beacon Residential Mgmt., LP v. R.P., 477 Mass. 749 (Mass. 2017). · cites it 3× “II) (VAWA), and G. L. c. 239, § 2A, prohibited the eviction because it was predicated on domestic violence.”
Scofield v. Berman & Sons, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 1984). · cites it 4× “G.L.c. 239, § 2A. It is indisputable that a lessor has no legal duty to permit a tenant to occupy the demised premises following the termination of her lease or tenancy, and may bring an action for summary process against the tenant who wrongfully holds over in the premises.”
Adjartey v. Cent. Div. of the Hous. Court Departmentand, 120 N.E.3d 297 (Mass. 2019). “93A, § 2 ("unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful"); 12 , 13 (5) retaliation, see G. L. c. 239, § 2A (where landlord initiates summary process *320 in retaliation for tenant's lawful actions, tenant can assert…”
Rothman v. Begley, 2000 Mass. App. Div. 280 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 2000). · cites it 5× “The clear Legislative intent to protect tenants in this Commonwealth, who seek to enforce protected rights under health or housing laws, from reprisals by their landlords is codified in both G.L.c. 239, §2A and G.L.c. 186, §18. The first statute, G.”
Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045 (Mass. 1980). “186, § 20 (tenant’s recovery of attorney’s fees); G. L. c. 239, § 2A (reprisal against tenant for reporting violations of law or joining tenant’s union is defense to summary process action); G.”
Jablonski v. Casey, 835 N.E.2d 615 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). “186, § 18; G. L. c. 239, § 2A. Casey argues that her eviction was in retaliation for signing a petition in November, 2000, complaining of conditions in several of the apartments at Presidential Acres.”
Jablonski v. Clemons, 803 N.E.2d 730 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). “186, § 18; G. L. c. 239, § 2A. At trial, the tenants presented evidence that they had engaged in several protected activities in November, 2000 (organizing a tenants’ petition for submission to the landlord and to the board, filing a complaint regarding code violations *477 with…”
PGR Mgmt. Co. v. Credle, 694 N.E.2d 1273 (Mass. 1998). “186, § 18, and G. L. c. 239, § 2A; (2) conditions in the apartment violated the implied warranty of habitability, see Boston Hous.”
Cardoza v. Cardoza, 2006 Mass. App. Div. 137 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 2006). “G.L.c. 239, §2A; see Jablonski v. Clemons, 60 Mass.”
McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970). “The parties before this court seem to agree, and insofar as it is appropriate to do so, this court takes judicial notice, that as of now (that is, before there is an authoritative *1133 ruling by a federal court) the state district court would by custom and usage proceed to…”
Ingram v. Problem Pregnancy of Worcester, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 408 (Mass. 1986). “” The defendant acknowledges that G. L. c. 239, § 2A (1984 ed.), permits reprisal to be asserted as a defense only in residential tenancies.”
Curtis v. Surrette, 726 N.E.2d 967 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). “” On appeal, the tenants claim that the landlord’s complaint should have been dismissed because it was retaliatory under G. L. c. 239, § 2A. The judge made no findings in regard to this claim.”
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