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Mass. Gen. LawsPart III Title IV Chapter 258

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 4 (2026)

Instituting claims; final denial; limitation of actions

Edition and currency
text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1981–2026 286citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 286 opinions since 1981, 29 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (2) (1 case).

Section 4. A civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a claim for damages under this chapter unless the claimant shall have first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such public employer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose, and such claim shall have been finally denied by such executive officer in writing and sent by certified or registered mail, or as otherwise provided by this section; provided, however, that a civil action against a public employer which relates to the sexual abuse of a minor, as provided in section 4C of chapter 260, shall be governed by section 4C1/2 of said chapter 260 and shall not require presentment of such claim pursuant to this section. The failure of the executive officer to deny such claim in writing within six months after the date upon which it is presented, or the failure to reach final arbitration, settlement or compromise of such claim according to the provisions of section five, shall be deemed a final denial of such claim. No civil action shall be brought more than three years after the date upon which such cause of action accrued; provided, however, that an action which relates to the sexual abuse of a minor, as defined in said section 4C of said chapter 260, shall be governed by said section 4C1/2 of said chapter 260. Disposition of any claim by the executive officer of a public employer shall not be competent evidence of liability or amount of damages.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, in the case of a city or town, presentment of a claim pursuant to this section shall be deemed sufficient if presented to any of the following: mayor, city manager, town manager, corporation counsel, city solicitor, town counsel, city clerk, town clerk, chairman of the board of selectmen, or executive secretary of the board of selectmen; provided, however, that in the case of the commonwealth, or any department, office, commission, committee, council, board, division, bureau, institution, agency or authority thereof, presentment of a claim pursuant to this section shall be deemed sufficient if presented to the attorney general.

The provisions of this section shall not apply to such claims as may be asserted by third-party complaint, cross claim, or counter-claim, or to small claims brought against housing authorities pursuant to sections twenty-one to twenty-five, inclusive, of chapter two hundred and eighteen; provided however, that no small claim shall be brought against a housing authority more than three years after the date upon which the cause of action arose.

The 20 cases that cite Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 4 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSpring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke, 475 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. 1985).
cites § 4 10×cited by 167 cases
Where it cites § 4
“Because the plaintiff failed to comply with the presentment and notice requirements of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L.c. 258, § 4, as appearing in St. 1978, c.”
The case’s holding
A demand letter under the consumer protection act must reasonably describe the injury suffered and the relief demanded to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.
Later courts cite it for
“it is . . . essential that the complainant define the injury suffered and the relief demanded in a manner that provides the prospective defendant with an opportunity to review the facts and the law involved to see if the requested relief should be granted or denied' and enables him to make a reasonable tender of settlement.” · 5 citing courts
2
GREENHaley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011).
cites § 4 3×cited by 778 cases
Where it cites § 4
“at 392-93 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 4 ). Haley moved to alter or amend the judgment.”
The case’s holding
A police officer is not entitled to qualified immunity if they deliberately suppress material evidence to secure a conviction, as this violates clearly established due process rights.
Later courts cite it for
“may augment these facts and inferences with data points gleaned from documents incorporated by reference into the complaint, matters of public record, and facts susceptible to judicial notice.” · 64 citing courts
3
GREENJohn Doe v. Cambridge Pub. Schs.., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 482 (Mass. App. Ct. 2022).
cites § 4 18×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 4
“This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, on the basis of failure to comply with the presentment requirement of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA), G. L. c. 258,…”
4
GREENVasys v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 438 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1982).
cites § 4 6×cited by 126 cases
Where it cites § 4
“On that date, the defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment,” asserting, among other things, that the plaintiff had failed to comply with G. L. c. 258, § 4, “in that he [had] not first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of the…”
The case’s holding
Presentment under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act is a statutory condition precedent rather than a jurisdictional requirement.
Later courts cite it for
“when the legislature, in enacting a statute, adopts the language of a federal statute, we will ordinarily construe the massachusetts statute in accordance with the construction given the cognate federal statute by the federal courts.” · 6 citing courts
5
GREENGilmore v. Commonwealth, 632 N.E.2d 838 (Mass. 1994).
cites § 4 7×cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 4
“The defendants sought summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff’s letter of presentment under G. L. c. 258, § 4 (1992 ed.), was inadequate to advise them of his claim.”
The case’s holding
A presentment letter is sufficient if it is not so obscure that educated public officials are baffled or misled regarding the assertion of a claim.
Later courts cite it for
“not so obscure that educated public officials should find themselves baffled or misled with respect to his assertion of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.” · 6 citing courts
6
GREENIrwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984).
cites § 4 4×cited by 228 cases
Where it cites § 4
“Under G.L.c. 258, § 4, claimants are permitted to file notices of claims within two years of the dates on which their causes of action accrue.”
The case’s holding
A police officer does not perform a discretionary function when releasing a suspected drunk driver in violation of established policy and legislative mandates.
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant reasonably could foresee that he would be expected to take affirmative action to protect the plaintiff and could anticipate harm to the plaintiff from the failure to do so.” · 12 citing courts
7
GREENBerube v. City of Northampton, 602 N.E.2d 560 (Mass. 1992).
cites § 4 8×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 4
“), 2 he has essentially become a third-party plaintiff and, as such, is exempt from compliance with the two-year presentment requirement of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (tort claims act), G. L. c. 258, § 4 (1990 ed.). Summary judgment was granted because the plaintiff had…”
The case’s holding
A right of contribution is derivative and requires underlying tort liability because contribution arises only from those liable rather than those merely at fault.
Later courts cite it for
“contribution claims are derivative and not new causes of action. without liability in tort there is no right of contribution” · 5 citing courts
8
GREENGallant v. Worcester, 421 N.E.2d 1196 (Mass. 1981).
cites § 4 5×cited by 93 cases
Where it cites § 4
“Her complaint alleged negligent design, construction, and maintenance of Lincoln Square and further asserted "[p]roper request for investigation was made" pursuant to G.L.c. 258, § 4. See Pruner v. Clerk of the Superior Court in the County of Norfolk, 382 Mass.”
The case’s holding
The Tort Claims Act implicitly repeals specific wrongful death statutory limitations, allowing such claims to proceed under general tort liability principles.
Later courts cite it for
“there is no requirement that a complaint state the correct substantive theory of the case.” · 13 citing courts
9
GREENMcgrath v. Stanley Carver, 493 N.E.2d 832 (Mass. 1986).
cites § 4 8×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 4
“The issue involved in these two appeals is whether the defendants, as third-party plaintiffs, have a right to seek contribution from a public entity when the actions brought by the original plaintiffs against the public entity are barred because the plaintiffs failed to comply…”
The case’s holding
Proper notice is not a jurisdictional requirement but a condition precedent to recovery, so defective notice bars the right to recover without negating the existence of liability.
Later courts cite it for
“an action for contribution is not barred if, at the time the tortious activity occurred, the party from whom contribution is sought could have been held liable in tort” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENGarcia v. Essex Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
cites § 4 7×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 4
“At issue in this appeal is the frequently litigated location of the boundary between a sufficient and an insufficient presentment of a claim under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA), G. L. c. 258, § 4. We conclude, as did the motion judge in the Superior Court, that…”
11
GREENDaveiga v. Boston Pub. Health Comm'n, 869 N.E.2d 586 (Mass. 2007).
cites § 4 6×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 4
“We conclude that, under G. L. c. 258, § 4, presentment on the commission must be to its executive director, and not, as the plaintiff argues, to the mayor of Boston or to the Attorney General.”
Later courts cite it for
“the mtca contains a requirement of presentment, that is, it requires that a particular person be given written notice of a claim before initiation of suit.” · 1 citing court
12
GREENGeorge v. Town of Saugus, 474 N.E.2d 169 (Mass. 1985).
cites § 4 7×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 4
“The judge granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff had failed to make presentment of her claim within two years of the date the cause of action arose, *41 as required by G. L. c. 258, § 4. 1 The plaintiff contends that the two-year period did not…”
The case’s holding
Presentment is a statutory prerequisite and a condition precedent that must be satisfied regardless of the age of the claimant under the Tort Claims Act.
Later courts cite it for
“if the presentment requirement of the act is tolled during the minority of a claimant, it is conceivable that a municipality would not receive notice until a decade or more after the claim arose.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENWeaver v. Commonwealth, 438 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1982).
cites § 4 4×cited by 100 cases
Where it cites § 4
“G. L. c. 258, § 4. 2 The plaintiff’s intestate, Michael Weaver, a patient at Westborough State Hospital, took his own life on March 9, 1978.”
The case’s holding
A claim under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act must be presented in strict compliance with the statute to the appropriate executive officer within the prescribed time limit.
Later courts cite it for
“in strict compliance with the statute.” · 8 citing courts
14
GREENHernandez v. City of Boston, 474 N.E.2d 166 (Mass. 1985).
cites § 4 7×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 4
“At issue is the appropriate statute of limitations to be applied to claims by minors against a public employer: G. L. c. 258, § 4, the general statute applicable to actions against public employers, or G.”
Later courts cite it for
“if the person entitled thereto is a minor, or is insane or imprisoned when a right to bring an action first accrues, the action may be commenced within the time hereinbefore limited after the disability is removed.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENCommesso v. Hingham Hous. Auth. Hingham, 507 N.E.2d 247 (Mass. 1987).
cites § 4 9×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 4
“258, and that the plaintiff’s claim against the authority was barred for failure to comply with the notice requirements of G. L. c. 258, § 4. *807 The plaintiff in the present case claims that the authority is an independent body politic, and not a public employer entitled to…”
Later courts cite it for
“the definition of 'public employer,' has clearly included a town 'authority' since the statute was amended in 1981. see st. 1981, c. 179” · 1 citing court
16
GREENRodriguez v. City of Somerville, 33 N.E.3d 1240 (Mass. 2015).
cites § 4 6×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 4
“See G. L. c. 258, § 4. A judge of the Superior Court denied the motion, concluding that the letter satisfied the statutory requirements.”
17
GREENHolahan v. City of Medford, 474 N.E.2d 1117 (Mass. 1985).
cites § 4 5×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 4
“824 (1974), 1 arguing, inter alla, that Holahan had not complied with the presentment requirement of the statute, G. L. c. 258, § 4. 2 The judge granted the defendant’s motion, and Holahan appealed from that judgment.”
The case’s holding
Presentment of a claim to a city solicitor fails to satisfy the statutory requirement to present the claim to the executive officer authorized to settle claims.
Later courts cite it for
“(the purpose of the presentment requirement is to allow the public employer to investigate any claim in full and to 'arbitrate, compromise or settle' any such claims as it sees fit.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENBellanti v. Boston Pub. Health Comm'n, 874 N.E.2d 439 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 4 5×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 4
“2 Because it is undisputed that the plaintiff failed to make presentment upon the proper executive officer, as required by G. L. c. 258, § 4, and because no recognized exception to compliance with that section applies on the facts of this case, we are constrained to reverse the…”
Later courts cite it for
“under our precedents, notice to the executive officer will not be inferred or imputed from the fact that others with responsibility for investigation and settlement of the dispute received the plaintiff's presentment letter and were in contact with the plaintiff.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENRobinson v. Commonwealth, 584 N.E.2d 636 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
cites § 4 6×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 4
“2 The defendants filed a mo-, tion to dismiss the negligence claim (Count I) on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to make a proper presentment of his claim under G. L. c. 258, § 4, as amended through St.”
Later courts cite it for
“it is irrelevant that the defendant may not have suffered any prejudice by reason of the lack of actual no tice.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENFearon v. Commonwealth, 474 N.E.2d 162 (Mass. 1985).
cites § 4 7×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 4
“The plaintiff’s action was dismissed on the defendant Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment *51 because no timely presentment of the plaintiff’s claim had been made as required by G. L. c. 258, § 4. We transferred the plaintiff’s appeal to this court.”
Later courts cite it for
“unless exempted from the requirements of g.l. c. 258 by statute ..., we believe all actions based on such claims should be subject to the presentment requirement as stated in 4.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198120032026

One bar per year. Tallest: 14 cases in 1995. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Mass. Super. Ct.96D. Mass.63Mass. App. Ct.63Mass.49Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div.71st Cir.6D.D.C.1Tex.1
By subsection
(2)1 case
Howard v. North Cambridge Health Ctr., 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 405 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2004).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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