Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A (2026)

Tort, contract to recover for personal injuries, and replevin actions

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 2A. Except as otherwise provided, actions of tort, actions of contract to recover for personal injuries, and actions of replevin, shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 664 cases (82 in the last 5 years), 1959–2026 · leading case: Koe v. Mercer, 450 Mass. 97 (Mass. 2007).

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Koe v. Mercer, 450 Mass. 97 (Mass. 2007). · cites it 7× “G. L. c. 260, § 2A. The plaintiff appealed.”

Fidler v. E. M. Parker Co., 476 N.E.2d 595 (Mass. 1985). · cites it 8× “There, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the applicable three-year statutes of limitations, G.L.c. 260, § 2A, and c. 106, § 2-318, barred her claims against Eastman Kodak.”

Passatempo v. McMenimen, 960 N.E.2d 275 (Mass. 2012). · cites it 6× “175, § 181 (§ 181), and G. L. c. 260, §§ 2A, 5A, and 12. We conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims were properly pleaded in tort and under G.”

Poy v. Boutselis, 352 F.3d 479 (1st Cir. 2003). · cites it 5× “at 273 ; the Massachusetts statute governing personal injury claims is Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A, providing that actions shall be commenced “within three years next after the cause of action accrues.”

Royal-Globe Ins. v. Craven, 585 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1992). · cites it 6× “Further, Royal-Globe asked for a declaration that the applicable statute of limitations was three years pursuant to G. L. c. 260, § 2A (1990 ed.), and hence the complaint, which was filed more than three years after the accident, was barred by the statute of limitations.”

Olsen v. Bell Tel. Labs., W. Elec. Co., 445 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1983). · cites it 6× “Since the plaintiffs have neither briefed nor argued the issue whether the warranty claims are barred, the only issue before us on appeal is whether their claims for negligence and loss of consortium are barred by the statute of limitations, G.L.c. 260, § 2A. We hold that the…”

Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 50 N.E.3d 778 (Mass. 2016). · cites it 2× “The plaintiff asserts that summary judgment should not have been granted because certain of Cohen’s allegedly discriminatory acts fall within the three-year limitations period.”

Loguidice v. Metro. Life Ins., 336 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003). · cites it 4× “260, § 2 (1992), and not the three-year statute generally used in tort actions and contract actions for personal injuries, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 260, § 2A (1992), or the four-year statute usually applied to actions under ch.”

Joseph A. Fortin Constr., Inc. v. Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency, 466 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1984). · cites it 5× “A judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs, on the basis that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, G. L. c. 260, § 2A. The plaintiffs appealed and the Appeals Court reversed the judgment.”

Frank Cooke, Inc. v. Hurwitz, 406 N.E.2d 678 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). · cites it 4× “4 They point specifically to claims arising out of the failures of the defendant Hurwitz: fully to disclose facts bearing on the soundness of the $57,000 and $35,000 loans; properly to investigate the financial conditions of Moynagh and Overmeyer; to obtain assignments of the…”

Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). · cites it 3× “Applying the three-year Massachusetts statute of limitations applicable to tort and replevin actions, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A, the district court held that the causes of action against the MFA accrued when the Reichel family and/or Seger-Thomschitz discovered or should…”

Int'l Mobiles Corp. v. Corroon & Black/Fairfield & Ellis, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 122 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990). · cites it 3× “First State agreed to “drop down” to $60,000 as the starting point of its excess coverage and to pay $320,000, provided Mobiles contributed $50,000.”

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