Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 31 (2026)

Actions by commonwealth

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 31. No action for the recovery of land shall be commenced by or in behalf of the commonwealth, except within twenty years after its right or title thereto first accrued, or within twenty years after it or those under whom it claims have been seized or possessed of the premises; but this section shall not apply to the province lands in the town of Provincetown lying north and west of the line fixed by section twenty-five of chapter ninety-one, to the Back Bay lands, so called, in Boston, or to any property, right, title or interest of the commonwealth below high water mark or in the great ponds; provided, further, that this section shall not bar any action by or on behalf of the commonwealth, or any political subdivision thereof, for the recovery of land or interests in land held for conservation, open space, parks, recreation, water protection, wildlife protection or other public purpose.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 17 cases, 1971–2014 · leading case: Aaron v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 850 N.E.2d 1105 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).

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Aaron v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 850 N.E.2d 1105 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 13× “The question presented in this appeal is whether the provisions of G. L. c. 260, § 31, in effect, insulate against an adverse possession claim land held by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) for the purposes of effectuating an urban renewal plan.”

Lawrence v. Town of Concord, 788 N.E.2d 546 (Mass. 2003). · cites it 3× “The town argues that, because the locus was given to the town and held for a public purpose it is exempt from adverse possession, under G. L. c. 260, § 31, 8 and that Frazier’s claim of adverse possession fails because he had not occupied the locus for the requisite twenty years…”

Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979). · cites it 4× “" G.L.c. 260, § 31. Earlier in this opinion, we have discussed at length the special nature of property rights *651 to land along the shore.”

Beaconsfield Towne House Condo. Trust v. Zussman, 517 N.E.2d 816 (Mass. 1988). · cites it 2× “The town argued that, if any statute of limitations applied to its action, it was G.L.c. 260, § 31, governing actions by the Commonwealth for the recovery of land.”

Town of Nantucket v. Beinecke, 398 N.E.2d 458 (Mass. 1979). “We conclude that the essence of an action under the statute is breach of official duty, and the fact that the plaintiff seeks to recover land as opposed to money or some specific chattel is only of subsidiary importance.”

City of Boston v. Roxbury Action Prog., Inc., 862 N.E.2d 763 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). · cites it 2× “The city’s cause of action accrued on that date when RAP failed to perform. Whether the action is viewed as one upon a contract under seal, see G.”

Town of Sandwich v. Quirk, 566 N.E.2d 614 (Mass. 1991). · cites it 3× “The Quirks do not cite G. L. c. 260, § 31 (1988 ed.), which states a general rule that the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions may lose rights to land through twenty years of adverse possession.”

McCarthy v. Town of Oak Bluffs, 419 Mass. 227 (Mass. 1994). · cites it 2× “s decision, the judge made reference to (1) the registration decree, which described the locus as bounded on the west by the 1903 low water mark of the harbor; (2) the stipulation by the Bergerons that the westerly boundary of their property was to the east, or landward, side of…”

Cohen v. Elephant Rock Beach Club, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D. Mass. 2014). “Under the circumstances, I assume—and the record as a matter of law supports—the proposition for purposes of this motion that the Beach Club does not have title or right in the rock. . The Beach Club further asserts that it could not have adversely possessed the rock because…”

Opinion of the Justices to the Governor, 274 N.E.2d 336 (Mass. 1971). “448, § 1; G. L. c. 260, § 31 A, as amended through St.”

Wigglesworth v. Cowles, 648 N.E.2d 1289 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). “The provisions of this section shall constitute the sole method for the voluntary dissolution of any such charitable corporation.” In light of our decision, we do not consider the Attorney General’s contention that the heirs’ claims are barred by operation of G.”

Manning v. New England Mut. Life Ins., 399 Mass. 730 (Mass. 1987). “Commonwealth, supra at 651-652 (discussing application of G. L. c. 260, § 31 A, to submerged land).”

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