Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 1 (2026)

Murder defined

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 1. Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in the first degree. Murder which does not appear to be in the first degree is murder in the second degree. Petit treason shall be prosecuted and punished as murder. The degree of murder shall be found by the jury.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 419 cases (71 in the last 5 years), 1926–2026 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Paulding, 777 N.E.2d 135 (Mass. 2002).

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Commonwealth v. Paulding, 777 N.E.2d 135 (Mass. 2002). · cites it 35× “1 Represented by new counsel on appeal, the defendant argues *3 that the judge (1) violated G. L. c. 265, § 1, and his Federal due process rights, when she instructed the jury that they could find him guilty of murder in the second degree, but refused to instruct on the elements…”

Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 364 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 1977). · cites it 32× “He also appropriately prefaced the portion of his charge which was devoted to the murder indictment by instructing the jury as to the provisions of G.L.c. 265, § 1, which reads as follows: "Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme…”

Commonwealth v. Brown, 81 N.E.3d 1173 (Mass. 2017). · cites it 12× “Rather, felony-murder is limited to its statutory role under G. L. c. 265, § 1, as an aggravating element of murder, permitting a jury to find a defendant guilty of murder in the first degree where the murder was committed in the course of a felony punishable by life 4…”

Commonwealth v. Gould, 405 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 1980). · cites it 14× “The defendant concedes that the evidence, considered without regard to the defendant's mental disease, was sufficient to support a conviction of murder in the first degree.”

Commonwealth v. Matchett, 436 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 1982). · cites it 6× “At the close of all the evidence, the judge instructed the jury with respect to murder, including felony-murder in the first and second degree (G.L.c. 265, § 1). The instruction concerning felony-murder in the first degree rested on an armed assault in a dwelling with intent to…”

Commonwealth v. Brown, 467 N.E.2d 188 (Mass. 1984). · cites it 9× “He asserts that in capital cases the last sentence of G. L. c. 265, § 1, which states that “[t]he degree of murder shall be found by the jury,” requires a judge to instruct on murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree even if “it could be argued that the…”

Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 449 N.E.2d 658 (Mass. 1983). · cites it 4× “This has been our consistent interpretation of G.L.c. 265, § 1, St. 1858, c. 154, since Commonwealth v.”

Commonwealth v. Scott, 564 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1990). · cites it 6× “See G.L.c. 265, § 1 (1988 ed.). The judge explained to the jury that, in order to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on the theory of felony-murder, they must find that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed aggravated…”

Commonwealth v. McInerney, 365 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1977). · cites it 4× “On the subject of malice the defendant argues, in the alternative, first, that there was no evidence from which the jury could find that the killing of the victim was with "malice aforethought" (G.L.c. 265, § 1), and therefore it could not be murder in either degree, and,…”

Sanna v. DiPaulo, 265 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001). · cites it 2× “Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 1 . The jury found the petitioner guilty of first-degree murder by reason of extreme atrocity and cruelty.”

Sharris v. Commonwealth, 106 N.E.3d 661 (Mass. 2018). · cites it 3× “123, § 16 ( f ), read in conjunction with G. L. c. 265, § 1, excludes defendants charged with murder in the first degree from being eligible for dismissal of charges under that provision, substantive due process requires a statute affecting a fundamental right to be narrowly…”

Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d 112 (1st Cir. 2016). · cites it 2× “No more than twenty minutes passed between Harvey’s call to her father, which immediately followed the assault, and her statement.”

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