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Mass. Gen. LawsPart IV Title II Chapter 279

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, § 24 (2026)

Indeterminate sentence to state prison; determination of sentence for offender aged fourteen through seventeen

Edition and currency
text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1926–2026 62citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 62 opinions since 1926, 15 of them in the last five years.

Section 24. If a convict is sentenced to the state prison, except as an habitual criminal, the court shall not fix the term of imprisonment, but shall fix a maximum and a minimum term for which he may be imprisoned. The maximum term shall not be longer than the longest term fixed by law for the punishment of the crime of which he has be convicted, and the minimum term shall be a term set by the court, except that, where an alternative sentence to a house of correction is permitted for the offense, a minimum state prison term may not be less than one year. In the case of a sentence to life imprisonment, except in the case of a sentence for murder in the first degree, and in the case of multiple life sentences arising out of separate and distinct incidents that occurred at different times, where the second offense occurred subsequent to the first conviction, the court shall fix a minimum term which shall be not less than 15 years nor more than 25 years.

In the case of a sentence of life imprisonment for murder in the first degree committed by a person on or after the person's fourteenth birthday and before the person's eighteenth birthday, the court shall fix a minimum term of not less than 20 years nor more than 30 years; provided, however, that in the case of a sentence of life imprisonment for murder in the first degree with extreme atrocity or cruelty committed by a person on or after the person's fourteenth birthday and before the person's eighteenth birthday, the court shall fix a minimum term of 30 years; and provided further, that in the case of a sentence of life imprisonment for murder in the first degree with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought committed by a person on or after the person's fourteenth birthday and before the person's eighteenth birthday, the court shall fix a minimum term of not less than 25 years nor more than 30 years.

The 20 cases that cite Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, § 24 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENCommonwealth v. Hogan, 456 N.E.2d 1162 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
cites § 24 23×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 24
“The issues so presented are matters of first impression in this Commonwealth.”
2
GREENCommonwealth v. Okoro, 26 N.E.3d 1092 (Mass. 2015).
cites § 24 10×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 24
“192, §§ 37-39 (providing that minimum parole term is now set according to G. L. c. 279, § 24); G. L. c. 279, § 24, as amended through St.”
The case’s holding
A mandatory life sentence with parole eligibility after fifteen years for a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder does not violate the Eighth Amendment or state constitutional protections.
Later courts cite it for
“legislature has clearly indicated that youth in the defendant's age group are considered capable of committing murder, and the trial judge was correct to preclude the defendant from putting forward evidence that would have suggested it was impossible for anyone the defendant's age to formulate the necessary intent to commit this crime” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENCommonwealth v. Lightfoot, 463 N.E.2d 545 (Mass. 1984).
cites § 24 11×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 24
“272, § 7, is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous because its provisions are in conflict with the clear mandate of G. L. c. 279, § 24. 3 First, he argues that the first paragraph of G.”
The case’s holding
Statutory language prescribing a specific term of imprisonment indicates the minimum sentence a judge may impose and ensures a mandatory minimum sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“the principal source of insight into legislative purpose.” · 5 citing courts
cites § 24 4×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 24
“See also G. L. c. 279, § 24. Our decision today does not undermine this relationship between sentencing and parole, but rather explores further the purpose that parole eligibility serves in the context of a juvenile homicide offender’s mandatory life sentence, and the additional…”
The case’s holding
Juvenile homicide offenders serving mandatory life sentences are entitled to appointed counsel, public funds for expert witnesses, and limited judicial review of parole decisions.
Later courts cite it for
“the question the parole board must answer for each inmate seeking parole is whether he or she is likely to reoffend . . .” · 1 citing court
5
GREENSharris v. Commonwealth, 106 N.E.3d 661 (Mass. 2018).
cites § 24 3×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 24
“265, § 2 ; G. L. c. 279, § 24. Accordingly, incompetent defendants who face a charge of murder in the second degree qualify for dismissal of charges pursuant to G.”
The case’s holding
Substantive due process requires dismissal of pending charges where an incompetent defendant will never regain competency and maintaining the charges does not serve the State's compelling interest in protecting the public.
Later courts cite it for
“substantive due process requires dismissal of the charges where a defendant will never regain competency and maintaining the charges does not serve the compelling state interest of protecting the public.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENCommonwealth v. Marrone, 442 N.E.2d 735 (Mass. 1982).
cites § 24 5×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 24
“The Commonwealth asserts that such a construction is consistent with G. L. c. 279, § 24, see note 6, infra, which requires a minimum and maximum to be fixed for each State prison term, and with Commonwealth v.”
The case’s holding
A criminal statute will not be construed to increase the penalty by supplying omitted terms or by implicitly repealing general sentencing requirements; ambiguity in penal statutes is resolved strictly against the Commonwealth.
Later courts cite it for
“we do not think that the legislature would repeal by implication the commonwealth's basic sentencing structure.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENCommonwealth v. Grassie, 65 N.E.3d 1199 (Mass. 2017).
cites § 24 2×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 24
“265, § 2; G. L. c. 279, § 24. 24 have never required such a statement of reasons when, as here, the judge denies a motion to reduce and leaves the jury’s verdict intact.”
The case’s holding
The prosecution establishes the absence of self-defense by proving the defendant did not actually believe he faced immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm requiring deadly force.
Later courts cite it for
“when reviewing a motion for a required finding of not guilty, the 'question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt' (emphasis in original).” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENCommonwealth v. Perez, 80 N.E.3d 967 (Mass. 2017).
cites § 24 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 24
“In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, which we discuss infra, this line must not be crossed to treat a juvenile convicted of a nonmurder offense, or multiple nonmurder offenses, more harshly than a 14 See G. L. c. 279, § 24, which provides in relevant part: "In the case…”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court must hold a hearing to determine if extraordinary circumstances justify an aggregate sentence for a juvenile that results in later parole eligibility than a murder conviction.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) the particular attributes of the juvenile, including 'immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences'; (2) 'the family and home environment that surrounds the juvenile from which he cannot usually extricate himself'; and (3) 'the circumstances of the . . . offense, including the extent of the juvenile's participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENCommonwealth v. Brown, 1 N.E.3d 259 (Mass. 2013).
cites § 24 2×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 24
“192, §§ 37-39; G. L. c. 279, § 24, as amended through St.”
The case’s holding
The unconstitutional provision excluding first-degree murder from parole eligibility is severable from the remainder of the statute, requiring a life sentence with the possibility of parole for juveniles.
Later courts cite it for
“a constitutional sentencing scheme for juvenile homicide defendants must . . . avoid imposing on juvenile defendants any term so lengthy that it could be seen as the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without parole” · 1 citing court
10
GREENCommonwealth v. Dupree, 453 N.E.2d 1071 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
cites § 24 6×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 24
“94C, § 32A(a) (as in effect prior to 1982), can be construed consistently with G. L. c. 279, § 24, 8 a question left undecided by Gagnon .”
11
GREENCarter, Bowie, McCullough v. State, 192 A.3d 695 (Md. 2018).
cites § 24 1×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 24
“12135 (20 years); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 279, § 24 (life with parole between 20 and 30 years); Wyo.”
The case’s holding
A lengthy term-of-years sentence that precludes parole consideration for fifty years or more is the functional equivalent of life without parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Later courts cite it for
“there is no constitutional requirement that a state have a parole system per se, so long as the state provides a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” · 5 citing courts
12
GREENCommonwealth v. Haley, 498 N.E.2d 1063 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
cites § 24 4×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 24
“The statute on indeterminate sentencing, G. L. c. 279, § 24, provides that a sentence to State prison (except for life or as an habitual criminal) shall fix a maximum term (not larger than the maximum prescribed by the particular statute punishing the offense) and a minimum (not…”
Later courts cite it for
“it was open for the jury to believe that the defendant was only under the influence to some perceptible degree - which is not sufficient - and that the negligent operation of the vehicle was not in any way related to alcohol, but was negligent or careless.” · 1 citing court
13
GREENCommonwealth v. Berte, 781 N.E.2d 14 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 24 3×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 24
“First, the defendant argues that the statute’s twenty-year fixed term for the aggravated home invasion portion of the statute conflicts with G. L. c. 279, § 24.* ** 4 Second, he claims that it inconsistently also mandates a ten-year minimum sentence.”
14
GREENJulio Bonilla v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 2019).
cites § 24 1×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 24
“3d 270 , 286 (2013), superseded by statute on other grounds , Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 279, § 24 (2016), as recognized in Commonwealth v.”
The case’s holding
Due process does not require a parole board to issue detailed findings of fact or conclusions of law following the denial of parole.
Later courts cite it for
“if a parole board determines that a juvenile offender has demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, parole or work release is required as a matter of law.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENCommonwealth v. Perez, 106 N.E.3d 620 (Mass. 2018).
cites § 24 1×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 24
“G. L. c. 279, § 24. "The resulting legislation establishes that, 'for murder in the first degree committed by a person on or after the person's fourteenth birthday and before the person's eighteenth birthday, the court shall fix a minimum term' before the individual becomes…”
16
GREENCommonwealth v. Brown, 715 N.E.2d 449 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999).
cites § 24 5×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 24
“) 1 The trial judge read the language above quoted to mean that twenty years was a mandatory minimum sentence that must be imposed, and, purporting to act under the Indeterminate Sentencing Act, G. L. c. 279, § 24, 2 she sentenced the defendant Brown upon his home invasion…”
17
GREENCommonwealth v. Pfeiffer, 121 N.E.3d 1130 (Mass. 2019).
cites § 24 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 24
“The applicable statutes were amended after the date the offense was committed here and now provide for life imprisonment, with eligibility for parole in not less than fifteen years nor more than twenty-five years, for a murder in the second degree conviction.”
Later courts cite it for
“mil jurisdictions where arson has been declared a specific intent crime, the statutes have been drafted or amended to achieve that end.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENCommonwealth v. Cole, 10 N.E.3d 1081 (Mass. 2014).
cites § 24 1×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 24
“Even this power of conditional release may be limited or nearly eliminated by the sentencing judge when a defendant is sentenced to State prison, because the judge must “fix a maximum and a minimum term for which [the defendant] may be imprisoned,” G. L. c. 279, § 24; and a…”
The case’s holding
A statute violates the separation of powers doctrine if it delegates the judicial power to impose mandatory terms of imprisonment to the executive branch.
Later courts cite it for
“is a function of the executive branch of government with which, if otherwise constitutionally exercised, the judiciary may not interfere.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENCrowell v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 74 N.E.3d 618 (Mass. 2017).
cites § 24 1×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 24
“Because judges sentencing on convictions for murder in the second degree now must fix a minimum term as a parole eligibility date, G. L. c. 279, § 24, if we adopted the defendant’s view it would essentially mean that no sentences other than a life sentence without the…”
Later courts cite it for
“consider whether the symptoms of a prisoner's disability mean that he or she has a heightened propensity to commit crime while released on parole.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENCommonwealth v. Semegen, 892 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
cites § 24 3×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 24
“Brown, supra, prescribes a sentence expressed in terms of a range (two and one-half to ten years), and so complies with the requirements of G. L. c. 279, § 24, which requires that sentences to State prison be expressed in terms of a maximum and minimum penalty.”

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Citing cases by year
192619762026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 8 cases in 1982–1983. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Mass.36Mass. App. Ct.15Mass. Super. Ct.5Alaska Ct. App.21st Cir.1Iowa1Md.1Tenn.1
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