Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, § 94 (2026)

Impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease, resulting in disability or death of paid fire or police department member; presumption

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 94. Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or special law to the contrary affecting the non-contributory or contributory system, any condition of impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in total or partial disability or death to a uniformed member of a paid fire department or permanent member of a police department, or of the police force of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, or of the state police, or of the public works building police, or to any employee in the department of correction or a county correctional facility whose regular or incidental duties require the care, supervision or custody of prisoners, criminally insane persons or defective delinquents, or to any permanent crash crewman, crash boatman, fire controlman or assistant fire controlman employed at the General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport, members of the 104th fighter wing fire department, members of the Devens fire department established pursuant to chapter 498 of the acts of 1993 or members of the Massachusetts military reservation fire department, shall, if he successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, or subsequently successfully passed a physical examination, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of such condition, be presumed to have been suffered in the line of duty, unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence.

As used in this section the words ''permanent member of a police department'' shall include a permanent member of the park police of a city or town.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 22 cases, 1961–2016 · leading case: Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).

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Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001). · cites it 2× “The court discussed the purpose of the smoking ban for police and firefighters: “There is material in the record suggesting that the purpose of § 101A is to prevent police officers and fire fighters from increasing their risk of hypertension and heart disease by smoking and,…”

Arthur Joseph Sheehan v. James Marr, Police Chief, City of Gloucester, 207 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2000). · cites it 2× “Based upon the medical panel’s determinations and a statutory presumption that hypertension and heart disease are job-related, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 32, § 94 , PERA concluded that Sheehan qualified for accidental disability and recommended that he be retired from the…”

Town of Ware v. Town of Hardwick, 853 N.E.2d 599 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 3× “6 Witkos was successful in obtaining a disability retirement pension on October 22, 1997, at thirty-one years of age. That pension was granted from Hampshire County in connection with his full-time job as a Ware fire fighter under the so-called “heart law,” G.”

Lisbon v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 670 N.E.2d 392 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). “” 4 Because the medical panel suggested that it had, to some extent, relied on the “heart law,” G. L. c. 32 § 94, 5 in reaching its decision, despite Lisbon’s ineligibility under that law, the board sought clarification from the medical panel.”

Town of Plymouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 13 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 650 (Mass. 1997). · cites it 2× “There is material in the record suggesting that the purpose of § 101A is to prevent police officers and fire fighters from increasing their risk of hypertension and heart disease by smoking and, therefore, their eligibility for disability retirement benefits under G. L. c. 32, §…”

Noone v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 616 N.E.2d 126 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). “In Humphrey CRAB reversed the negative finding of causation by the medical panel.”

Buteau v. Norfolk Cnty. Ret. Bd., 394 N.E.2d 993 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). “That the relationship of the heart attack to the plaintiffs duty must be proved without the benefit of the presumption of G. L. c. 32, § 94, does not make the heart attack any the less an "injury.”

Blair v. Bd. of Selectmen, 508 N.E.2d 628 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987). “The trial judge had there allowed sick-leave pay under § 111F by giving the officer the benefit of the statutory presumption set out in G. L. c. 32, § 94, as amended through St.”

City of Lawrence v. Lawrence Patrolmen's Ass'n, 780 N.E.2d 92 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). “That put in play G. L. c. 32, § 94, the so-called “Heart Law.”

Thibeault v. City of New Bedford, 174 N.E.2d 444 (Mass. 1961). “’ ’ No presumption aided the petitioner such as is applicable in the case of heart injuries to permanent members of the force under G. L. c. 32, § 94.”

Malden Ret. Bd. v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 298 N.E.2d 902 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973). “Is said disability such as might be the natural and proximate result of the accident or hazard undergone on account of which retirement is claimed? No.”

Sugrue v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 694 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). “41, § 111F, that the court was constrained to resolve while noting the matter was “not free from doubt”), he advances no policy reasons for rejecting the traditional identity of the “personal injury” concepts in c.”

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