Mass. Gen. Laws » Part I Title VII Chapter 41
Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, § 96B (2026)

Police training schools; supervisory training; attendance by persons exercising police powers; wages and expenses; exceptions; removal for failure to attend

✓ current as of July 2026
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Section 96B. Every person who receives an appointment to a position on a full-time basis in which he will exercise police powers in the police department of any city or town, shall, prior to exercising police powers, be assigned to and satisfactorily complete a prescribed course of study approved by the municipal police training committee. The provisions of chapter thirty-one and any collective bargaining agreement notwithstanding, any person so attending such a school shall be deemed to be a student officer and shall be exempted from the provisions of chapter thirty-one and any collective bargaining agreement for that period during which he is assigned to a municipal police training school, provided that such person shall be paid the regular wages provided for the position to which he was appointed and such reasonable expenses as may be determined by the appointing authority and be subject to the provisions of chapter one hundred and fifty-two.

Every police officer on a full-time basis in any such municipal police department, shall be assigned to and shall attend a prescribed course of study approved by the municipal police training committee for in-service officers training at such intervals and for such periods as said department may determine. Any such police officer who receives an appointment to a position of higher rank shall, in addition, complete such other courses of supervisory training as said committee may determine. While attending such school or completing such courses, such persons shall be paid his regular wages as a police officer and shall receive such reasonable expenses as may be determined by the appointing authority.

Each person appointed as a reserve, or intermittent police officer, in a city or town shall, prior to exercising police powers, satisfactorily complete a course of study prescribed by said committee.

Upon petition to the department of criminal justice training by the appointing authority, a person appointed to a position on a full-time basis in which he will exercise police powers in the police department of any city or town may be exempted by said committee, in whole or in part, from the provisions of this section prior to his exercising police powers. The requirement that training be completed prior to exercising any police powers may be waived by said committee.

Failure of an appointed person to comply with the provisions of this section prior to his exercising police powers, shall result in the appointed person's removal by the appointing authority, provided said person has not been exempted therefrom by said committee as herein provided. Failure of an appointed person to satisfactorily complete the prescribed course of study may result in his removal by the appointing authority.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1976–2023 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Vaidulas, 741 N.E.2d 450 (Mass. 2001).
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Commonwealth v. Vaidulas, 741 N.E.2d 450 (Mass. 2001). · cites it 5× “Pursuant to the motion in fimine, the judge struck the testimony of a police officer who had arrested the defendant before the officer completed the training requirements set forth in G. L. c. 41, § 96B. On appeal, the Commonwealth argues *248 that (1) the officer was exempt…”
City of Cambridge v. Cambridge Police Patrol Officers Ass'n, 791 N.E.2d 355 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 4× “” In a declaratory judgment action a Superior Court judge held that this stipend is also payable to police cadets as “regular wages” (as that term is used in G. L. c. 41, § 96B) while they are attending an initial course of training at the police academy before being granted…”
Gonsalves v. Commonwealth, 541 N.E.2d 366 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989). · cites it 2× “G. L. c. 41, § 96B. See Januskiewicz v. Selectmen of Shirley, 17 Mass.”
Bd. of Selectmen v. Smith, 792 N.E.2d 1050 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 3× “Not only does G. L. c. 41, § 96B, explicitly exempt student officers from the civil service law, but it also prohibits them from exercising any police powers until graduation.”
Tambolleo v. Town of West Boylston, 613 N.E.2d 127 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). “The “talk in town” that Sargent had not attended a police academy does not rise to the level of a showing of a violation of G. L. c. 41, § 96B, that is, that the defendants failed to require Sargent to attend a police training school.”
McLain v. City of Somerville, 424 F. Supp. 2d 329 (D. Mass. 2006). “See M.G.L. c. 41, § 96B. With no input from Somerville, the Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Council (“MJTC”) scheduled the eight Somerville hires who had not previously completed police training to attend the October 1 police academy, thus beginning their employment as…”
Jones v. Town of Wayland, 358 N.E.2d 822 (Mass. App. Ct. 1976). “147, §§ 17B and 17G), “full time” (G. L. c. 41, §§ 96B, 98D and 108L), “reserve” (G.”
Januskiewicz v. Bd. of Selectmen, 461 N.E.2d 1234 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984). · cites it 2× “The plaintiff received a seven-month appointment to the town’s police department, effective from December 1, 1980, to June 30, 1981, and was immediately assigned, as required by G. L. c. 41, § 96B, as appearing in St. 1977, c.”
Prall v. City of Boston, 985 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Mass. 2013). “The City has submitted evidence establishing that it trains its police officers both before and during their employment pursuant to Mass. Gen. L. c. 41 § 96B. (# 131, Exh. H, Exh.”
Lanctot v. Town of Brewster (Mass. App. Ct. 2023). · cites it 14× “" G. L. c. 41, § 96B. This case clarifies the meaning of that phrase.”
Cambridge Police Patrol Officers Ass'n v. City of Cambridge, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 197 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2001). · cites it 9× “1 Central to this dispute are the definition and scope of the term “regular wages” as used in G.L.c. 41, §96B. Both parties have moved for summary judgment and claim that there is no dispute of material fact.”
Papleacos v. Town of Tewksbury, 975 N.E.2d 456 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). · cites it 5× “31, § 34, and G.L. c.41, § 96B. 6 The town argues that Papleacos’s probationary period began upon his original appointment with a start date of October 27, 2003, relying on the civil service unit certification handbook for permanent intermittent police officers issued by the…”
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