Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32G (2026)

Counterfeit substances; unlawful creation, distribution, dispensing or possession with intent to distribute or dispense

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 32G. Any person who knowingly or intentionally creates, distributes, dispenses or possesses with intent to distribute or dispense a counterfeit substance shall be punished by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not more than one year or by a fine of not less than two hundred and fifty nor more than two thousand and five hundred dollars, or both such fine and imprisonment.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 12 cases, 1983–2017 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 923 N.E.2d 524 (Mass. 2010).

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Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 923 N.E.2d 524 (Mass. 2010). · cites it 2× “See also G. L. c. 94C, § 32G (prohibiting possession with intent to distribute counterfeit substance).”

United States v. Juan Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218 (5th Cir. 2017). “(e) a violation of any law regulating the use, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C § 32G makes the possession or sale of controlled substances .”

Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 455 N.E.2d 1183 (Mass. 1983). “That offense was punishable under G. L. c. 94C, § 32G (a), as appearing in St.”

Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 605 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1993). “G. L. c. 94C, § 32G (1990 ed.). Prior to trial the judge denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictments on the ground that the integrity of the grand jury proceeding had been impaired.”

Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 921 N.E.2d 108 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). “The defendant cites G. L. c. 94C, § 32G, penalizing the distribution of counterfeit substances, as indicating that counterfeit substances are being distributed.”

Commonwealth v. Perez, 922 N.E.2d 855 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). · cites it 2× “Melendez-Diaz, ante 229 (2010). It is unlikely that the form of packaging is necessarily proof that a substance is a particular drug.”

Commonwealth v. King, 960 N.E.2d 894 (Mass. 2012). “See G. L. c. 94C, § 32G. There also was no evidence introduced that the telephone number the defendant gave Morrissey was genuine, which is particularly relevant where the defendant offered a telephone number only after Morrissey requested it.”

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 918 N.E.2d 871 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009). “However, given the availability of counterfeit drugs, see G. L. c. 94C, § 32G, selling prices would not be conclusive evidence of the nature of a substance.”

Commonwealth v. Morales, 925 N.E.2d 551 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). “See G. L. c. 94C, § 32G. “It is unlikely that the form of packaging is necessarily proof that a substance is a particular drug.”

Commonwealth v. Pimentel, 921 N.E.2d 113 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). “It is a fair inference that a counterfeit drug, see G. L. c. 94C, § 32G, would be packaged in conventional ways and also might not be distinguishable by appearance.”

Commonwealth v. Lavelle, 596 N.E.2d 364 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). “G. L. c. 94C, § 32G. His argument focuses largely on claimed errors in the admission and exclusion of evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Cooper (Mass. App. Ct. 2017). “See also G. L. c. 94C, § 32G (prohibiting possession with intent to distribute counterfeit substance).”

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