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Mich. Comp. LawsMichigan Compiled LawsChapter 15Act 469 of 1980

Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.363 (2026)

Civil action in circuit court for injunctive relief or actual damages; “damages” defined; clear and convincing evidence required.

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Aug. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Aug. 2026) cited 1985–2026 84citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 84 opinions since 1985, 22 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (40 cases).

THE WHISTLEBLOWERS' PROTECTION ACT


Act 469 of 1980


15.363 Civil action in circuit court for injunctive relief or actual damages; “damages” defined; clear and convincing evidence required.

Sec. 3.

    (1) A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act.

    (2) An action commenced pursuant to subsection (1) may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county where the complainant resides, or the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his or her principal place of business.

    (3) As used in subsection (1), "damages" means damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorney fees.

    (4) An employee shall show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she or a person acting on his or her behalf was about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body.

History: 1980, Act 469, Eff. Mar. 31, 1981 ;-- Am. 1982, Act 146, Eff. Mar. 30, 1983

The 20 cases that cite Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.363 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBruce Millar v. Constr. Code Auth., 912 N.W.2d 521 (Mich. 2018).
cites § 15.363 6×subsections: (1) 6×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“Because his complaint was filed 87 days later, it was timely filed under MCL 15.363(1). We reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment in part, vacate the Lapeer Circuit Court's March 19, 2015 order granting summary disposition to the defendants, and remand this case to the Lapeer…”
The case’s holding
The statutory limitations period begins to run on the date of an adverse employment action rather than the date the employer decides to implement the action.
Later courts cite it for
“means that we review the issue independently, without any required deference to the trial court.” · 5 citing courts
2
GREENAnzaldua v. Neogen Corp., 808 N.W.2d 804 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 15.363 4×subsections: (1)cited by 105 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“116(C)(7), (8), and (10), arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiffs claim arose under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.”
The case’s holding
The Whistleblowers' Protection Act provides the exclusive remedy for retaliatory discharge claims arising from protected activities and preempts common-law public-policy claims based on the same activity.
Later courts cite it for
“a motion under mcr 2.116(c)(10) tests the factual support for a claim and should be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” · 15 citing courts
3
YELLOWPhinney v. Perlmutter, 564 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 15.363 4×subsections: (1) 2× (3) (4)cited by 158 cases
Overruled by Garg v. MacOmb County Community Mental Health Services on other grounds: 12 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 15.363
“” MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1); Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 81 ; 366 NW2d 76 (1985).”
The case’s holding
The continuing violations doctrine applies to claims under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, allowing recovery for a series of related retaliatory acts if one act falls within the limitation period.
Later courts cite it for
“awards of costs and attorney fees are recoverable only where specifically authorized by a statute, a court rule, or a recognized exception.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 15.363 2×cited by 278 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“149, § 185(d) (West 2004) (catchall for tort actions for personal injuries; retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.363 (1) (West 2004) (retaliation action for whistle-blowers); Minn.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff need not allege that a defendant submitted a false claim to state a retaliation claim under the False Claims Act.
Later courts cite it for
“we have repeatedly recognized that congress legislates against the 'standard rule that the limitations period commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” · 14 citing courts
5
GREENJoliet v. Pitoniak, 715 N.W.2d 60 (Mich. 2006).
cites § 15.363 4×subsections: (1) 4×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“" MCL 15.363(1). The Jacobson Court held that the limitations period began to run on the date of the plaintiff's constructive discharge.”
The case’s holding
Claims for discrimination and misrepresentation accrue when the adverse acts occur rather than when the employee resigns.
Later courts cite it for
“a defense that a plaintiff interposes to preclude the defendant from claiming that the plaintiff voluntarily left employment.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENLash v. City of Traverse City, 735 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 2007).
cites § 15.363 2×cited by 170 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“273 (permitting the recovery of up to $500 in damages against a public official for intentional violation of the act); the standards of conduct, MCL 15.”
The case’s holding
A private cause of action for money damages against a governmental entity requires express legislative authorization.
Later courts cite it for
“to do so, we begin with the language of the statute, ascertaining the intent that may reasonably be inferred from its language.” · 8 citing courts
7
REDJacobson v. Parda Fed. Credit Union, 577 N.W.2d 881 (Mich. 1998).
cites § 15.363 6×subsections: (1) 6×cited by 27 cases
Overruled by Joliet v. Pitoniak: 1 citing opinion says overruled.
Where it cites § 15.363
“§ 15.363(1); M.S.A. § 17.428(3)(1), in the context of a constructive discharge claim.”
The case’s holding
The statute of limitations for a constructive discharge claim under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act begins to run on the date of the employee's resignation.
Later courts cite it for
“differentiate between employees who were constructively discharged and those who were actually discharged.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENAnzaldua v. Band, 578 N.W.2d 306 (Mich. 1998).
cites § 15.363 4×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“§ 15.363; M.S.A. § 17.428(3).] Section 4 delineates the potential remedies that are available to a successful claimant: A court, in rendering a judgment in an action brought pursuant to this act, shall order, as the court considers appropriate, reinstatement of the employee, the…”
The case’s holding
The state waives its immunity from jury trials when the Whistleblowers' Protection Act authorizes suits against it in circuit court rather than the Court of Claims.
Later courts cite it for
“even if a jury right exists generally under the act, msu is immune from suit before a jury because it is an arm of the state.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENMcneill-marks v. Midmichigan Med. Ctr.-gratiot, 891 N.W.2d 528 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 15.363 1×subsections: (4)cited by 115 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“” MCL 15.363(4); see also Chandler, 456 Mich at 400 .”
The case’s holding
A report to a licensed attorney who is a member of the State Bar of Michigan constitutes a report to a public body under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act.
Later courts cite it for
“circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact, but mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient.” · 55 citing courts
10
GREENCovell v. Spengler, 366 N.W.2d 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 15.363 5×subsections: (1) 4× (3)cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“The trial court found that this claim was barred because plaintiff failed to initiate this action within the 90-day limitation *80 period set forth in MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1): "A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate…”
The case’s holding
The Whistleblowers' Protection Act's 90-day filing period is a mandatory statute of limitations barring all remedies, and the Act is the exclusive remedy for retaliatory discharge.
11
GREENKimmelman v. Heather Downs Mgmt. Ltd., 753 N.W.2d 265 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 15.363 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“Critically, the WPA provides 90 days in which to file suit, MCL 15.363(1), and plaintiff exceeded this window.”
The case’s holding
A statute that explicitly proscribes a particular adverse employment action serves as the exclusive remedy, precluding any other common law public policy claim for wrongful discharge.
Later courts cite it for
“where there exists a statute explicitly proscribing a particular adverse employment action, that statute is the exclusive remedy, and no other 'public policy' claim for wrongful discharge can be maintained.” · 6 citing courts
12
REDTimko v. Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc, 625 N.W.2d 101 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 15.363 2×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 46 cases
Overruled: 2 citing opinions say overruled.
Where it cites § 15.363
“"]; MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1) ["A person who alleges a violation of th[e Whistleblowers' Protection A]ct may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act.”
The case’s holding
Terms of an employment application constitute part of an employment contract (holding that terms of an employment application are part of an employment contract).
Later courts cite it for
“no inherent unreasonableness accompanies a six-month period of limitation.” · 3 citing courts
13
GREENShallal v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 566 N.W.2d 571 (Mich. 1997).
cites § 15.363 2×subsections: (4) 2×cited by 129 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“§ 15.363(4); M.S.A. § 17.428(3)(4). The face of the statute, however, does not explain what constitutes "about to" report, thereby lending itself to more than one interpretation.”
The case’s holding
Remedial statutes are liberally construed to favor the persons the legislature intended to benefit.
Later courts cite it for
“the primary motivation of an employee pursuing a whistleblower claim 'must be a desire to inform the public on matters of public concern, and not personal vindictiveness.” · 9 citing courts
14
GREENMcNeil v. Charlevoix Cnty., 772 N.W.2d 18 (Mich. 2009).
cites § 15.363 2×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“MCL 15.363 and 15.364. As discussed in Part II of this opinion, I do not think that it is appropriate for this Court to decide now to what extent §§ 1010(F) and 1012(F) of the CIAR affect the availability of any private remedies, so it is unclear at this point whether the CIAR…”
The case’s holding
A court may review an unpreserved issue if it is a question of law and the facts necessary for resolution have been presented.
Later courts cite it for
“this court may review an unpreserved issue if it is one of law and the facts necessary for resolution of the issue have been presented.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENBBF Eng'g Servs., PC v. State of Mich., 573 F. App'x 377 (6th Cir. 2014).
cites § 15.363 1×cited by 119 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 15.363
“Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.363 (1). Although they claim that there are questions of fact regarding this statute of limitations, Appellants do not identify any adverse actions that Judnic or Stuecher allegedly took after Foster first filed her complaints in June 2010.”
The case’s holding
Official-capacity suits against agency employees are superfluous when the state and the agency are also named as defendants.
Later courts cite it for
“where the entity is named as a defendant, an official-capacity claim is redundant.” · 21 citing courts
16
GREENMadugula v. Taub, 853 N.W.2d 75 (Mich. 2014).
cites § 15.363 1×subsections: (1)cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“26 MCL 15.363(1). 27 MCL 15.364. 28 Anzaldua, 457 Mich at 536 .”
The case’s holding
Statutory provisions must be interpreted in the context of the law as a whole by reading individual words and phrases within the entire legislative scheme.
Later courts cite it for
“broad power to fashion relief as the circumstances require,” · 6 citing courts
17
GREENJones v. City of Allen Park, 167 F. App'x 398 (6th Cir. 2006).
cites § 15.363 2×cited by 15 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 15.363
“See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.363 (1) (stating that a plaintiff may bring a civil action “within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act,” not within ninety days of the event giving rise to the violation of the act).”
18
GREENState Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Corby Energy Servs., Inc., 722 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 15.363 1×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“See MCL 15.363. In contrast, the MISS-DIG act does not create an express cause of action against a class defined to include governmental entities.”
The case’s holding
The MISS-DIG Act does not waive governmental immunity because it imposes notification duties on public agencies without establishing a general cause of action against them.
Later courts cite it for
“in order to avoid summary disposition pursuant to mcr 2.116(c)(7), a plaintiff must plead facts in avoidance of immunity.” · 7 citing courts
19
GREENChandler v. Dowell Schlumberger Inc., 572 N.W.2d 210 (Mich. 1998).
cites § 15.363 1×subsections: (4)cited by 118 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“See MCL 15.363(4); MSA 17.428(3)(4). As we noted above, the statute reflects the intent of the Legislature that the further an employee is from reporting, the harder it is for an employee to prove a violation under the wpa.”
The case’s holding
Whistleblower protection applies only to employees who report a violation to a public body, are about to report a violation, or participate in a public investigation.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) reporting to a public body a violation of a law, regulation, or rule; (2) being about to report such a violation to a public body; or (3) being asked by a public body to participate in an investigation.” · 10 citing courts
20
GREENJennings v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 475 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
cites § 15.363 2×subsections: (4) 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 15.363
“To establish a claim under the “about to report” prong of the statute, Plaintiff must show (1) by clear and convincing evidence that she or a person acting on her behalf was about to report a violation or suspected violation of a law of this state, see M.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198520052026

One bar per year. Tallest: 8 cases in 2017. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Mich. Ct. App.43E.D. Mich.16Mich.146th Cir.5W.D. Mich.5SCOTUS1
By subsection
(1)40 cases
Bruce Millar v. Constr. Code Auth., 912 N.W.2d 521 (Mich. 2018).“Because his complaint was filed 87 days later, it was timely filed under MCL 15.363(1). We reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment in part, vacate the Lapeer Circuit Court's March 19, 2015 order granting summary disposition to the defendants, and remand this case to the Lapeer…”
Joliet v. Pitoniak, 715 N.W.2d 60 (Mich. 2006).“" MCL 15.363(1). The Jacobson Court held that the limitations period began to run on the date of the plaintiff's constructive discharge.”
Jacobson v. Parda Fed. Credit Union, 577 N.W.2d 881 (Mich. 1998).“§ 15.363(1); M.S.A. § 17.428(3)(1), in the context of a constructive discharge claim.”
Kimmelman v. Heather Downs Mgmt. Ltd., 753 N.W.2d 265 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).“Critically, the WPA provides 90 days in which to file suit, MCL 15.363(1), and plaintiff exceeded this window.”
Phinney v. Perlmutter, 564 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).“” MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1); Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 81 ; 366 NW2d 76 (1985).”
Showing the top 5 of 40. More in the list view →
(2)3 cases
Driver v. Hanley, 523 N.W.2d 815 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
Anzaldua v. Band, 550 N.W.2d 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
Chilingirian v. City of Fraser, 451 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
(3)4 cases
Phinney v. Perlmutter, 564 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
Covell v. Spengler, 366 N.W.2d 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).“The trial court found that this claim was barred because plaintiff failed to initiate this action within the 90-day limitation *80 period set forth in MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1): "A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate…”
Theodore Cadwell v. City of Highland Park, No. 341284 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2019).
Theodore Cadwell v. City of Highland Park, No. 346886 (Mich. Ct. App. June 11, 2020).
(4)18 cases
Mcneill-marks v. Midmichigan Med. Ctr.-gratiot, 891 N.W.2d 528 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).“” MCL 15.363(4); see also Chandler, 456 Mich at 400 .”
Shallal v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 566 N.W.2d 571 (Mich. 1997).“§ 15.363(4); M.S.A. § 17.428(3)(4). The face of the statute, however, does not explain what constitutes "about to" report, thereby lending itself to more than one interpretation.”
Phinney v. Perlmutter, 564 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
Chandler v. Dowell Schlumberger Inc., 572 N.W.2d 210 (Mich. 1998).“See MCL 15.363(4); MSA 17.428(3)(4). As we noted above, the statute reflects the intent of the Legislature that the further an employee is from reporting, the harder it is for an employee to prove a violation under the wpa.”
Jennings v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 475 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Mich. 2007).“To establish a claim under the “about to report” prong of the statute, Plaintiff must show (1) by clear and convincing evidence that she or a person acting on her behalf was about to report a violation or suspected violation of a law of this state, see M.”
Showing the top 5 of 18. More in the list view →

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Aug. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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