THE WHISTLEBLOWERS' PROTECTION ACT
Act 469 of 1980
15.363 Civil action in circuit court for injunctive relief or actual damages; “damages” defined; clear and convincing evidence required.
Sec. 3.
(1) A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act.
(2) An action commenced pursuant to subsection (1) may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, the county where the complainant resides, or the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his or her principal place of business.
(3) As used in subsection (1), "damages" means damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorney fees.
(4) An employee shall show by clear and convincing evidence that he or she or a person acting on his or her behalf was about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body.
History: 1980, Act 469, Eff. Mar. 31, 1981 ;-- Am. 1982, Act 146, Eff. Mar. 30, 1983
Notes of Decisions
Bruce Millar v. Constr. Code Auth., 912 N.W.2d 521 (Mich. 2018).
· cites it 6× “Because his complaint was filed 87 days later, it was timely filed under MCL 15.363(1). We reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment in part, vacate the Lapeer Circuit Court's March 19, 2015 order granting summary disposition to the defendants, and remand this case to the Lapeer…”
Anzaldua v. Neogen Corp., 808 N.W.2d 804 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 4× “116(C)(7), (8), and (10), arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiffs claim arose under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.”
Phinney v. Perlmutter, 564 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 4× “” MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1); Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 81 ; 366 NW2d 76 (1985).”
Joliet v. Pitoniak, 715 N.W.2d 60 (Mich. 2006).
· cites it 4× “" MCL 15.363(1). The Jacobson Court held that the limitations period began to run on the date of the plaintiff's constructive discharge.”
Lash v. City of Traverse City, 735 N.W.2d 628 (Mich. 2007).
· cites it 2× “273 (permitting the recovery of up to $500 in damages against a public official for intentional violation of the act); the standards of conduct, MCL 15.”
Anzaldua v. Band, 578 N.W.2d 306 (Mich. 1998).
· cites it 4× “§ 15.363; M.S.A. § 17.428(3).] Section 4 delineates the potential remedies that are available to a successful claimant: A court, in rendering a judgment in an action brought pursuant to this act, shall order, as the court considers appropriate, reinstatement of the employee, the…”
Covell v. Spengler, 366 N.W.2d 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 5× “The trial court found that this claim was barred because plaintiff failed to initiate this action within the 90-day limitation *80 period set forth in MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1): "A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate…”
Kimmelman v. Heather Downs Mgmt. Ltd., 753 N.W.2d 265 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “Critically, the WPA provides 90 days in which to file suit, MCL 15.363(1), and plaintiff exceeded this window.”
Timko v. Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc, 625 N.W.2d 101 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 2× “"]; MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1) ["A person who alleges a violation of th[e Whistleblowers' Protection A]ct may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this act.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.363(1) — 40 cases
Bruce Millar v. Constr. Code Auth., 912 N.W.2d 521 (Mich. 2018).
“Because his complaint was filed 87 days later, it was timely filed under MCL 15.363(1). We reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment in part, vacate the Lapeer Circuit Court's March 19, 2015 order granting summary disposition to the defendants, and remand this case to the Lapeer…”
Joliet v. Pitoniak, 715 N.W.2d 60 (Mich. 2006).
“" MCL 15.363(1). The Jacobson Court held that the limitations period began to run on the date of the plaintiff's constructive discharge.”
Kimmelman v. Heather Downs Mgmt. Ltd., 753 N.W.2d 265 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
“Critically, the WPA provides 90 days in which to file suit, MCL 15.363(1), and plaintiff exceeded this window.”
Phinney v. Perlmutter, 564 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
“” MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1); Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 81 ; 366 NW2d 76 (1985).”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.363(2) — 3 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.363(3) — 4 cases
Phinney v. Perlmutter, 564 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
“” MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1); Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 81 ; 366 NW2d 76 (1985).”
Covell v. Spengler, 366 N.W.2d 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
“The trial court found that this claim was barred because plaintiff failed to initiate this action within the 90-day limitation *80 period set forth in MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1): "A person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.363(4) — 18 cases
Phinney v. Perlmutter, 564 N.W.2d 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
“” MCL 15.363(1); MSA 17.428(3)(1); Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 81 ; 366 NW2d 76 (1985).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.