Michigan Compiled Laws
Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.1118 (2026)
Recovery against fund; limitation of action; notice.
✓ current as of July 2026
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MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT CLAIMS ACT
Act 198 of 1965
257.1118 Recovery against fund; limitation of action; notice.
Sec. 18.
In all actions in which recovery is to be sought against the fund, said action must be commenced within 3 years from the time the cause of action accrues. Recovery from the fund shall not be allowed in any event unless notice of intent to claim against the fund is served upon the secretary, on a form prescribed by him, within 6 months of the date that the cause of action shall accrue.
History: 1965, Act 198, Eff. Nov. 1, 1965 ;-- Am. 1968, Act 223, Eff. July 1, 1968
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 35
cases, 1969–2018 · leading case: Boodt v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 751 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 2008).
Boodt v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 751 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 2008). “2d 188 (1972), the plaintiff gave the Secretary of State notice of a potential claim, as required by MCL 257.1118, which stated: [9] In all actions in which recovery is to be sought against the [motor vehicle accident claims] fund, said action must be commenced within 3 years…”
Lisee v. Sec'y of State, 199 N.W.2d 188 (Mich. 1972). “Their claims were denied because they had failed to file the requisite notice of intent to file claim within one year (MCLA 257.1118; MSA 9.2818). [1] On January 30, 1969, the Howells brought action in Wayne Circuit Court against Lillian Lazaruk, copies of the summons and…”
Mccahan v. Brennan, 822 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. 2012). “12 The Court explained that if the notice provision served some purpose other than to prevent prejudice, it could be considered an unconstitutional legislative requirement.”
Rowland v. Washtenaw Cnty. Road Comm'n, 731 N.W.2d 41 (Mich. 2007). “The reasoning was that while some notice provisions may be constitutionally permitted some may not be, depending on the purpose the notice serves. Thus, if notice served a permissible purpose, such as to prevent prejudice, it passed constitutional muster.”
Forest v. Parmalee, 262 N.W.2d 653 (Mich. 1978). “The Court only required the state to make a showing of prejudice by plaintiff's failure to give such notice before the plaintiff's claim could be dismissed. In Hobbs , the Court reached the identical conclusion as in Carver regarding a 120-day notice provision in the…”
Atkins v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg'l Transp., 822 N.W.2d 522 (Mich. 2012). “8 MCL 257.1118. 9 Carver, 390 Mich at 100 .”
Mullas v. Sec'y of State, 189 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971). “MCLA § 257.1118 (Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp § 9.”
Lambert v. Calhoun, 210 N.W.2d 796 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973). “2805, and moved for accelerated judgment alleging plaintiff's claim against the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set out in MCLA 257.”
Stacey v. Sankovich, 173 N.W.2d 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969). “On December 20, 1966, the three other injured persons, through their own attorneys, sent formal “notices of intent to claim and applications for payment” to the Secretary of State pursuant to MCLA § 257.1118 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2818), which states: “In all actions in which…”
Neal v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 575 N.W.2d 68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). “Accord Lisee v Secretary of State, 388 Mich 32, 41-42 ; 199 NW2d 188 (1972) (one-year notice of intent to claim against the motor vehicle accident claims fund, MCL 257.1118; MSA 9.2818, is not jurisdictional); see also Hosp Corp of America v Lindberg, 571 So 2d 446, 448 (Fla,…”
McCahan v. Brennan, 804 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011). “Indeed, one of the cases that Rowland reviewed and rejected, Carver v McKernan, 390 Mich 96 ; 211 NW2d 24 (1973), overruled by Rowland, 477 Mich 197 , dealt with a six-month notice requirement under the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, MCL 257.1118. In rejecting Carver and…”
May v. Dep't of Nat. Resources, 365 N.W.2d 192 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). “Thus, in order to obtain accelerated judgment based on lack of the statutory notice, a government agency must sustain its burden of establishing actual prejudice by competent, relevant, and material evidence.”
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