Michigan Compiled Laws

Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.402 (2026)

Rear end collision; prima facie evidence of negligence.

✓ current as of July 2026

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MICHIGAN VEHICLE CODE

Act 300 of 1949

257.402 Rear end collision; prima facie evidence of negligence.

Sec. 402.

(a) In any action, in any court in this state when it is shown by competent evidence, that a vehicle traveling in a certain direction, overtook and struck the rear end of another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, or lawfully standing upon any highway within this state, the driver or operator of such first mentioned vehicle shall be deemed prima facie guilty of negligence. This section shall apply, in appropriate cases, to the owner of such first mentioned vehicle and to the employer of its driver or operator.

(b) This section may not be invoked by the owner of any vehicle, the rear of which was struck under the circumstances above mentioned, if the accident occurred between 1 hour after sunset and 1 hour before sunrise, and the vehicle so struck did not, at the time, have a lighted lamp or lantern reasonably visible to the drivers of vehicles approaching from the rear.

History: 1949, Act 300, Eff. Sept. 23, 1949

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 84 cases (15 in the last 5 years), 1951–2026 · leading case: White v. Taylor Distrib. Co., 739 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).

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White v. Taylor Distrib. Co., 739 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 8× “402(a) provides: In any action, in any court in this state when it is shown by competent evidence, that a vehicle traveling in a certain direction, overtook and struck the rear end of another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, or lawfully standing upon any highway within…”

White v. Taylor Distrib. Co., Inc., 753 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 2008). · cites it 3× “Plaintiff filed a suit alleging that defendant was presumed negligent under MCL 257.402(a) because he had struck plaintiffs vehicle from the rear.”

Moore v. Spangler, 258 N.W.2d 34 (Mich. 1977). · cites it 4× “The case finally was tried before a jury in the 52nd Judicial District Court on May 23 and May 24, 1974.”

Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 581 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. 1998). · cites it 4× “§ 257.402; M.S.A. § 9.2102. See, generally, M.”

Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1976). · cites it 2× “2343 [16] and MCLA 257.402; MSA 9.2102. [17] Although the language of the latter two statutes raises the possibility of excuse, we think our review of the precedents indicates Lucas was correct in not distinguishing among the statutes as to acceptable standards of excuse, and in…”

Garrigan v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 106 N.W.2d 807 (Mich. 1961). · cites it 5× “CLS 1956, § 257.402 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2102). The ultimate facts are these: Plaintiff's truck collided with the rear of defendant's truck on US-23 near the intersection of Coggins road.”

Vander Laan v. Miedema, 188 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. 1971). · cites it 2× “” 5 MCLA § 257.402 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev §9.2102): “(a) In any action, in any court in this state when it is shown by competent evidence, that a vehicle traveling in a certain direction, overtook and struck the rear end of another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, or…”

Precopio v. City of Detroit, 330 N.W.2d 802 (Mich. 1982). “2 See MCL 257.402(a); MSA 9.2102(a). 3 Tuttle v Dep’t of State Highways, 397 Mich 44, 46 ; 243 NW2d 244 (1976), quoting United States v United States Gypsum Co, 333 US 364, 395 ;”

Bettner v. Boring, 764 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1988). · cites it 2× “2d 658, 659 (1974); Mich.Comp.Laws § 257.402(a) (1981). In light of these decisions, we cannot conclude that the rear-end collision instruction is required as a matter of law in all cases, regardless of the circumstances of the collision, solely because the front of one vehicle…”

Brownell v. Brown, 319 N.W.2d 664 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). · cites it 2× “2327 and MCL 257.402; MSA 9.2102, the defendants could introduce evidence to establish that no traffic citation was issued in order to refute those allegations.”

LaCroix v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 152 N.W.2d 656 (Mich. 1967). · cites it 2× “, for example, the prima facie case of negligence that arises in a rear-end collision (CLS 1961, § 257.402 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2102]) or the rule of conduct imposed by the assured clear distance statute (CLS 1961, § 257.”

Sun Oil Co. v. Seamon, 84 N.W.2d 840 (Mich. 1957). · cites it 2× “NOTES [*] See PA 1949, No 300, § 402 (CLS 1954, § 257.402 [Stat Ann 1955 Cum Supp § 9.2102]).”

Show all 84 citing cases →

— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.402(1) — 2 cases

Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 581 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. 1998). “§ 257.402; M.S.A. § 9.2102. See, generally, M.”

Est. of Evania Barbara Schobloher v. Christopher John Cieslak (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).

— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.402(a) — 36 cases

White v. Taylor Distrib. Co., 739 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007). “402(a) provides: In any action, in any court in this state when it is shown by competent evidence, that a vehicle traveling in a certain direction, overtook and struck the rear end of another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, or lawfully standing upon any highway within…”

White v. Taylor Distrib. Co., Inc., 753 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 2008). “Plaintiff filed a suit alleging that defendant was presumed negligent under MCL 257.402(a) because he had struck plaintiffs vehicle from the rear.”

Bettner v. Boring, 764 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1988). “2d 658, 659 (1974); Mich.Comp.Laws § 257.402(a) (1981). In light of these decisions, we cannot conclude that the rear-end collision instruction is required as a matter of law in all cases, regardless of the circumstances of the collision, solely because the front of one vehicle…”

Harmon v. Stanley, 224 N.W.2d 658 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).

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