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Mich. Comp. LawsMichigan Compiled LawsChapter 257Act 300 of 1949

Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625b (2026)

Arraignment of person arrested for misdemeanor violation; pretrial conference; advising accused of maximum penalty before acceptance of plea; screening, assessment, and rehabilitative services; assessment for medication-assisted treatment; action by secretary of state pending appeal.

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Aug. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Aug. 2026) cited 1969–2015 45citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 45 opinions since 1969. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (6 cases).

MICHIGAN VEHICLE CODE


Act 300 of 1949


257.625b Arraignment of person arrested for misdemeanor violation; pretrial conference; advising accused of maximum penalty before acceptance of plea; screening, assessment, and rehabilitative services; assessment for medication-assisted treatment; action by secretary of state pending appeal.

Sec. 625b.

    (1) A person arrested for a misdemeanor violation of section 625(1), (3), (6), (7), or (8) or section 625m or a local ordinance substantially corresponding to section 625(1), (3), (6), or (8) or section 625m must be arraigned on the citation, complaint, or warrant not more than 14 days after the arrest for the violation or, if an arrest warrant is issued or reissued, not more than 14 days after the issued or reissued arrest warrant is served, whichever is later. The court shall not dismiss a case or impose any other sanction for a failure to comply with this time limit. The time limit does not apply to a violation of section 625(1), (3), (7), or (8) or section 625m punishable as a felony or a violation of section 625(1), (3), (6), (7), or (8) or section 625m joined with a felony charge.

    (2) The court shall schedule a pretrial conference between the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's attorney in each case in which the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor violation of section 625(1), (3), (6), (7), or (8) or section 625m or a local ordinance substantially corresponding to section 625(1), (3), (6), or (8) or section 625m. The pretrial conference must be held not more than 35 days after the person's arrest for the violation or, if an arrest warrant is issued or reissued, not more than 35 days after the issued or reissued arrest warrant is served, whichever is later. If the court has only 1 judge who sits in more than 1 location in that district, the pretrial conference must be held not more than 42 days after the person's arrest for the violation or, if an arrest warrant is issued or reissued, not more than 42 days after the date the issued or reissued arrest warrant is served, whichever is later. The court shall not dismiss a case or impose any other sanction for a failure to comply with the applicable time limit. The 35- and 42-day time limits do not apply to a violation of section 625(1), (3), (7), or (8) or section 625m punishable as a felony or a violation of section 625(1), (3), (6), (7), or (8) or section 625m joined with a felony charge. The court shall order the defendant to attend the pretrial conference and may accept a plea by the defendant at the conclusion of the pretrial conference. The court may adjourn the pretrial conference upon the motion of a party for good cause shown. Not more than 1 adjournment shall be granted to a party, and the length of an adjournment must not exceed 14 days.

    (3) Except for delay attributable to the unavailability of the defendant, a witness, or material evidence or due to an interlocutory appeal or exceptional circumstances, but not a delay caused by docket congestion, the court shall finally adjudicate, by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, entry of a verdict, or other final disposition, a case in which the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor violation of section 625(1), (3), (6), (7), or (8) or section 625m or a local ordinance substantially corresponding to section 625(1), (3), (6), or (8) or section 625m, within 77 days after the person is arrested for the violation or, if an arrest warrant is issued or reissued, not more than 77 days after the date the issued or reissued arrest warrant is served, whichever is later. The court shall not dismiss a case or impose any other sanction for a failure to comply with this time limit. The 77-day time limit does not apply to a violation of section 625(1), (3), (7), or (8) or section 625m punishable as a felony or a violation of section 625(1), (3), (6), (7), or (8) or section 625m joined with a felony charge.

    (4) Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere under section 625 or a local ordinance substantially corresponding to section 625(1), (2), (3), (6), or (8), the court shall advise the accused of the maximum possible term of imprisonment and the maximum possible fine that may be imposed for the violation and shall advise the defendant that the maximum possible license sanctions that may be imposed will be based upon the master driving record maintained by the secretary of state under section 204a.

    (5) Before imposing sentence for a violation of section 625(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), or (8) or a local ordinance substantially corresponding to section 625(1), (3), (6), or (8), the court shall order the person to undergo screening and assessment by a person or agency designated by the office of substance abuse services to determine whether the person is likely to benefit from rehabilitative services, including alcohol or drug education and alcohol or drug treatment programs. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the court may order the person to participate in and successfully complete 1 or more appropriate rehabilitative programs as part of the sentence. If the person was convicted under section 625(1)(c) or has 1 or more prior convictions, the court shall order the person to participate in and successfully complete 1 or more appropriate rehabilitative programs as part of the sentence, including, but not limited to, an alcohol treatment program or a self-help program for a period of not less than 1 year. The treatment plan must be devised from an assessment performed by an appropriately licensed alcohol assessor and approved by the court. If the person has 2 or more prior convictions, the court shall order the person to undergo an assessment that uses a standardized evidence-based instrument performed by a provider or other licensed or certified substance use disorder professional to determine whether he or she has a diagnosis for alcohol dependence and would likely benefit from a United States Food and Drug Administration approved medication-assisted treatment that is indicated for the treatment of alcohol dependence, as specified in the most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association. A person may request an independent assessment that uses a standardized evidence-based instrument and that is performed by a provider or other licensed or certified substance use disorder professional to determine whether he or she has a diagnosis for alcohol dependence and would likely benefit from a United States Food and Drug Administration approved medication-assisted treatment that is indicated for the treatment of alcohol dependence, as specified in the most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association. A court shall grant a request for an independent assessment and shall consider the results of the independent assessment along with the assessment required under this subsection when determining if the court will refer the person to a rehabilitative program that offers 1 or more forms of United States Food and Drug Administration-approved medications for the treatment of alcohol dependence. Only a provider may recommend that a person take medication-assisted treatment. A person always maintains the right to refuse ingestion or injection of medication. Only a provider may determine the type, dosage, and duration of the medication-assisted treatment. If the person refuses to take the medication-assisted treatment, the court shall not hold that person in contempt. As used in this subsection, "provider" means an individual with prescribing authority under the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.1101 to 333.25211, who regularly communicates with the treatment team during the defendant's recovery and who has training or experience that demonstrates the provider's ability to treat and manage patients with alcohol dependency. If no other identified funding source is available, the person shall pay for the costs of the screening, assessment, or assessments, as applicable, and rehabilitative services ordered under this subsection. This subsection does not require the person to successfully complete an ordered rehabilitative program before driving a vehicle with an ignition interlock device on a restricted license. As used in this subsection, "other licensed or certified substance use disorder professional" means an individual or organization licensed or credentialed in this state to treat substance use disorders, including individuals certified by the Michigan certification board for addiction professionals and individuals who have training in providing assessments for alcohol dependency.

    (6) If the judgment and sentence are appealed to circuit court, the court may ex parte order the secretary of state to stay the suspension, revocation, or restricted license issued by the secretary of state pending the outcome of the appeal.

History: Add. 1966, Act 243, Eff. Mar. 10, 1967 ;-- Am. 1976, Act 285, Eff. Apr. 1, 1977 ;-- Am. 1980, Act 515, Eff. Apr. 1, 1981 ;-- Am. 1982, Act 309, Eff. Mar. 30, 1983 ;-- Am. 1987, Act 109, Eff. Mar. 30, 1988 ;-- Am. 1991, Act 93, Eff. Jan. 1, 1992 ;-- Am. 1991, Act 100, Eff. Jan. 1, 1993 ;-- Am. 1993, Act 359, Eff. Sept. 1, 1994 ;-- Am. 1994, Act 211, Eff. Nov. 1, 1994 ;-- Am. 1994, Act 450, Eff. May 1, 1995 ;-- Am. 1998, Act 357, Eff. Oct. 1, 1999 ;-- Am. 2004, Act 62, Eff. May 3, 2004 ;-- Am. 2008, Act 462, Eff. Oct. 31, 2010 ;-- Am. 2018, Act 657, Eff. Mar. 28, 2019

Compiler's Notes:

    Section 2 of Act 309 of 1982 provides: “All proceedings pending and all rights and liabilities existing, acquired, or incurred at the time this amendatory act takes effect are saved and may be consummated according to the law in force when they are commenced. This amendatory act shall not be construed to affect any prosecution pending or initiated before the effective date of this amendatory act, or initiated after the effective date of this amendatory act for an offense committed before that effective date.”

The 20 cases that cite Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.625b most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENPeople v. Seeburger, 571 N.W.2d 724 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 257.625b 8×subsections: (7) 3× (7)(a) 2× (6) (7)(b)cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“MCL 257.625b(10); MSA 9.2325(2)(10) provides the conditions that must be met before a restricted license may be issued: The court shall not order the secretary of state to issue a restricted license unless the person states under oath, and the court finds pursuant to testimony…”
Later courts cite it for
“this court reviews a question of statutory interpretation de novo as an issue of law.” · 1 citing court
2
GREENPeople v. Callon, 662 N.W.2d 501 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 257.625b 1×cited by 352 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“Before 1991, the offense of impaired driving was found in MCL 257.625b. See People v Pomeroy (On Rehearing), 419 Mich 441, 446 ; 355 NW2d 98 (1984), overruled in part People v Wood, 450 Mich 399, 405 ; 538 NW2d 351 (1995).”
The case’s holding
A recidivist statute does not violate the ex post facto clause if it applies to conduct committed after the law's effective date by attaching consequences to future acts.
Later courts cite it for
“reversal is warranted only when plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” · 46 citing courts
3
GREENIn re Bail Bond Forfeiture, 852 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. 2014).
cites § 257.625b 2×subsections: (1)cited by 48 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“However, Smith and Yarema actually stand for the exact opposite proposition, because in those cases the Court of Appeals held that the defendant was entitled to a remedy for the government’s failure to follow statutory time limits. That is, in Smith and Yarema, the Court of…”
The case’s holding
Failure to comply with a mandatory statutory notice period intended to protect third-party rights bars the forfeiture of a bail bond.
Later courts cite it for
“questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENPeople v. Pomeroy, 276 N.W.2d 904 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
cites § 257.625b 8×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2). [1] He was fined $100 and placed on probation.”
5
GREENPeople v. Keskimaki, 521 N.W.2d 241 (Mich. 1994).
cites § 257.625b 4×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“The vehicle has a standard transmission; it was in neutral.”
6
GREENPeople v. Pomeroy, 355 N.W.2d 98 (Mich. 1984).
cites § 257.625b 3×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“In each case, the defendant was arrested while asleep in his stationary car.”
Later courts cite it for
“a person sleeping in a motionless car cannot be held to be presently operating a vehicle while sleeping.” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENPeople v. Wickham, 503 N.W.2d 701 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 257.625b 2×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“The people appeal by leave granted a circuit court order affirming a district court's dismissal, on speedy trial grounds, of a charge of operating a motor vehicle while impaired, third offense, MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2). We reverse. Defendant was arrested on January 18, 1990,…”
The case’s holding
A presumptively prejudicial delay triggers a balancing test of competing interests to determine if a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.
Later courts cite it for
“presumptively prejudicial delay triggers an inquiry into the other factors to be considered in the balancing of the competing interests to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.” · 11 citing courts
8
GREENPeople v. Yarema, 527 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 257.625b 4×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“At a November 5, 1993, pretrial conference, defense counsel moved for dismissal for failure to arraign defendant within fourteen days or to hold the pretrial conference within thirty-five days as required by § 625b of the Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2). That motion…”
9
GREENPeople v. Walters, 407 N.W.2d 662 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 257.625b 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“Following a jury trial in district court, defendant was convicted of driving while his ability was visibly impaired (dwi), MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2). Defendant was sentenced on the conviction to probation and fines and costs or to seventy days in the county jail.”
Later courts cite it for
“addresses the problem of the driver whose ability has been impaired, not eliminated.” · 1 citing court
10
GREENPeople v. Pipkin, 287 N.W.2d 352 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
cites § 257.625b 3×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“Prior to trial, the defendant moved the court to determine whether the jury would be instructed on the lesser included offense of driving while one’s ability is visibly impaired due to the consumption of intoxicating liquor (DWI), MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2), during the first…”
11
GREENCollins v. Sec'y of State, 187 N.W.2d 423 (Mich. 1971).
cites § 257.625b 2×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“1 MCLA § 257.625b (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2325[2]).”
The case’s holding
Under the implied consent statute, the arresting officer initially chooses which chemical test to administer, and an arrestee's conditional acceptance of that test is an unreasonable refusal.
12
GREENPeople v. Leonowicz, 350 N.W.2d 770 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 257.625b 3×subsections: (1)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“Over objection of the prosecutor, the district judge permitted defendant to plead guilty to a second charge of operating a vehicle while impaired (DWI), MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2), and subsequently dismissed the charge of DUIL.”
13
GREENPeople v. Pettit, 276 N.W.2d 878 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
cites § 257.625b 1×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“A second count was added to the information: driving while impaired, MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2). *205 Pursuant to negotiations between the prosecutor and defense counsel, defendant pleaded guilty to count II and the prosecutor moved to dismiss count I.”
The case’s holding
Restitution ordered as a probation condition requires persuasive record support that the losses were caused by the defendant's criminal conduct, though civil-style proof is not required.
14
GREENPeople v. Lambert, 235 N.W.2d 338 (Mich. 1975).
cites § 257.625b 1×cited by 68 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“8 MCLA 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2). 9 With the amendments to MCLA 257.”
The case’s holding
Driving under the influence requires proof that the driver's ability to operate a vehicle is substantially and materially affected by the consumption of intoxicating liquor.
Later courts cite it for
“ability to drive is substantially and materially affected by consumption of intoxicating liquor.” · 5 citing courts
15
GREENPeople v. Hurn, 518 N.W.2d 502 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 257.625b 2×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“The circuit court denied the application on the basis of its belief that the seventy-seven-day time limit for adjudication set forth in MCL 257.625b(2); MSA 9.2325(2X2) had expired.”
16
GREENPeople v. Willis, 446 N.W.2d 562 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 257.625b 1×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“2604, and with operating a vehicle while his ability to do so was visibly impaired due to the consumption of intoxicating liquor, MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2). Following his arrest, Collopy was taken to the police station and was requested to submit to two Breathalyzer tests.”
17
GREENPeople v. Smith, 504 N.W.2d 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 257.625b 1×subsections: (1)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“The original complaint and warrant had been dismissed when defendant was not arraigned within fourteen days of her arrest, and the district court refused to authorize reissuance of the complaint and warrant on the theory that under MCL 257.”
Later courts cite it for
“the time limits were created not to protect the rights of accused drunk drivers, but to prod the judiciary, and the prosecutors who handle drunk driving cases, to move such cases with dispatch.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENPharris v. Sec'y of State, 323 N.W.2d 652 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
cites § 257.625b 1×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“In addition, plaintiff had been convicted within the past ten years on three occasions of driving while impaired, in violation of MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2). The *204 hearing examiner found the plaintiff incompetent to safely operate a motor vehicle, MCL 257.”
19
GREENPeople v. Duke, 357 N.W.2d 775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 257.625b 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“2325, subds (1) and (3) and MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2). Before trial the defendant moved to suppress evidence of his refusal to take a Breathalyzer test.”
20
GREENPeople v. Pomeroy, 329 N.W.2d 697 (Mich. 1982).
cites § 257.625b 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 257.625b
“James Pomeroy was charged with violation of MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2), which then read: "A person shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or any other place open to the general public, including an area designated for the parking of motor vehicles, within this state when,…”

Show all 45 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196919922015

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 1979. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Mich. Ct. App.38Mich.6W.D. Mich.1
By subsection
(1)6 cases
In re Bail Bond Forfeiture, 852 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. 2014).“However, Smith and Yarema actually stand for the exact opposite proposition, because in those cases the Court of Appeals held that the defendant was entitled to a remedy for the government’s failure to follow statutory time limits. That is, in Smith and Yarema, the Court of…”
People v. Smith, 504 N.W.2d 21 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).“The original complaint and warrant had been dismissed when defendant was not arraigned within fourteen days of her arrest, and the district court refused to authorize reissuance of the complaint and warrant on the theory that under MCL 257.”
City of Plymouth v. McIntosh, 804 N.W.2d 859 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
People v. Leonowicz, 350 N.W.2d 770 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).“Over objection of the prosecutor, the district judge permitted defendant to plead guilty to a second charge of operating a vehicle while impaired (DWI), MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2), and subsequently dismissed the charge of DUIL.”
People v. Smith, 453 N.W.2d 257 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(2)4 cases
People v. Yarema, 527 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).“At a November 5, 1993, pretrial conference, defense counsel moved for dismissal for failure to arraign defendant within fourteen days or to hold the pretrial conference within thirty-five days as required by § 625b of the Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625b; MSA 9.2325(2). That motion…”
People v. Hurn, 518 N.W.2d 502 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).“The circuit court denied the application on the basis of its belief that the seventy-seven-day time limit for adjudication set forth in MCL 257.625b(2); MSA 9.2325(2X2) had expired.”
People v. Bidwell, 522 N.W.2d 138 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
People v. Weatherholt, 533 N.W.2d 24 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
(3)1 case
People v. Smith, 453 N.W.2d 257 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
(4)1 case
People v. Bennett, 491 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
(5)2 cases
Broadwell v. Dep't of State, 539 N.W.2d 585 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
People of Michigan v. Lawrence Clifton Douglas, No. 321474 (Mich. Ct. App. July 30, 2015).
(5)(b)(iii)1 case
People v. Vezina, 550 N.W.2d 613 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
(6)1 case
People v. Seeburger, 571 N.W.2d 724 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).“MCL 257.625b(10); MSA 9.2325(2)(10) provides the conditions that must be met before a restricted license may be issued: The court shall not order the secretary of state to issue a restricted license unless the person states under oath, and the court finds pursuant to testimony…”
(6)(b)(iii)1 case
People v. Vezina, 550 N.W.2d 613 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
(7)1 case
People v. Seeburger, 571 N.W.2d 724 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
(7)(a)1 case
People v. Seeburger, 571 N.W.2d 724 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
(7)(b)1 case
People v. Seeburger, 571 N.W.2d 724 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).

Show all 45 citing cases (list view) →

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Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Aug. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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