ELLIOTT-LARSEN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Act 453 of 1976
37.2103 Definitions.
Sec. 103.
As used in this act:
(a) "Age" means chronological age except as otherwise provided by law.
(b) "Commission" means the civil rights commission established by section 29 of article V of the state constitution of 1963.
(c) "Commissioner" means a member of the commission.
(d) "Department" means the department of civil rights or its employees.
(e) "Familial status" means 1 or more individuals under the age of 18 residing with a parent or other person having custody or in the process of securing legal custody of the individual or individuals or residing with the designee of the parent or other person having or securing custody, with the written permission of the parent or other person. For purposes of this definition, "parent" includes an individual who is pregnant.
(f) "Gender identity or expression" means having or being perceived as having a gender-related self-identity or expression whether or not associated with an individual's assigned sex at birth.
(g) "National origin" includes the national origin of an ancestor.
(h) "Person" means an individual, agent, association, corporation, joint apprenticeship committee, joint stock company, labor organization, legal representative, mutual company, partnership, receiver, trust, trustee in bankruptcy, unincorporated organization, this state or a political subdivision of this state or an agency of this state, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(i) "Political subdivision" means a county, city, village, township, school district, or special district or authority of this state.
(j) "Race" is inclusive of traits historically associated with race, including, but not limited to, hair texture and protective hairstyles. For purposes of this definition, "protective hairstyles" includes, but is not limited to, such hairstyles as braids, locks, and twists.
(k) Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment. Sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the following conditions:
(i) Submission to the conduct or communication is made a term or condition either explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing.
(ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual's employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing.
(iii) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment, public accommodations, public services, educational, or housing environment.
(l) "Sexual orientation" means having an orientation for heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality or having a history of such an orientation or being identified with such an orientation.
History: 1976, Act 453, Eff. Mar. 31, 1977 ;-- Am. 1980, Act 202, Imd. Eff. July 18, 1980 ;-- Am. 1992, Act 124, Imd. Eff. June 29, 1992 ;-- Am. 1999, Act 202, Eff. Mar. 10, 2000 ;-- Am. 2023, Act 6, Eff. Feb 13, 2024 ;-- Am. 2023, Act 45, Imd. Eff. June 15, 2023
Compiler's Notes:
Enacting section 1 of Act 202 of 1999 provides:
“Enacting section 1. This amendatory act is curative and intended to correct any misinterpretation of legislative intent in the court of appeals decision Neal v Department of Corrections, 232 Mich App 730 (1998). This legislation further expresses the original intent of the legislature that an individual serving a sentence of imprisonment in a state or county correctional facility is not within the purview of this act. ”
Notes of Decisions
Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 681 N.W.2d 342 (Mich. 2004).
· cites it 20× “It cannot be said by any understanding of the language of MCL 37.2103 that plaintiff was subject to "sexual harassment.”
Hamed v. Wayne Cnty., 803 N.W.2d 237 (Mich. 2011).
· cites it 17× “Nowhere did the Legislature indicate that the “societal burden” or the financial burden on employers is a valid consideration when interpreting and applying the act. In fact, the CRA indicates that the Legislature intended that governmental employers bear the cost of eliminating…”
Chambers v. Trettco, Inc, 614 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 2000).
· cites it 24× “[MCL 37.2103(f); MSA 3.548(103)(i).] The statute expressly addresses an employer’s vicarious liability for sexual harassment committed by its employees by defining “employer” to include both the employer and the employer’s agents.”
Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 697 N.W.2d 851 (Mich. 2005).
· cites it 11× “As previously set forth, the statute expressly defines an "employer" as a "person," which is defined under MCL 37.2103(g) to include a corporation, and also states that an "employer" includes an "agent of that person.”
Rymal v. Baergen, 686 N.W.2d 241 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 12× “[14] We reject defendants' argument that plaintiff did not engage in protected activity because she did not specify the sexual nature of Baergen's misconduct when speaking to Fraser.”
Rymal v. Baergen, 262 Mich. App. 274 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 12× “While we acknowledge that plaintiffs deposition testimony did not specify sexual misconduct, MCL 37.2103 and MCL 37.2202 prohibit sexual harassment and discriminatory practices, and plaintiff testified that she expressly communicated to Fraser, an attorney, that she was being…”
McClements v. Ford Motor Co., 702 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 2005).
· cites it 14× “Accordingly, there is no common-law claim for negligent retention in the context of workplace sexual harassment. [7] Plaintiff invokes M.”
Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993).
· cites it 10× “[MCL 37.2103(h); MSA 3.548(103)(h).][ [14] ] Sexual harassment was targeted by the Civil Rights Act because it is both "pervasive" and "destructive, entailing unacceptable personal, organizational, and societal costs.”
Zsigo v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 716 N.W.2d 220 (Mich. 2006).
· cites it 8× “In Champion, supra, the plaintiff was raped by her supervisor and sought to impose liability on their employer for quid pro quo sexual harassment under the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2103(i). The employer attempted to avoid liability under the Civil Rights Act on the…”
Diamond v. Witherspoon, 696 N.W.2d 770 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 7× “MCL 37.2103(g) and (h); MCL 37.2302. The CRA defines “public service” as being essentially some “agency established to provide service to the public .”
Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 673 N.W.2d 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 14× “2202(1); MCL 37.2103(f); Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 309 ; 614 NW2d 910 (2000); Chambers v Trettco, Inc (On Remand), 244 Mich App 614, 617 ; 624 NW2d 543 (2001).”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(1) — 7 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(a) — 2 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(e) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(f) — 13 cases
Chambers v. Trettco, Inc, 614 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 2000).
“[MCL 37.2103(f); MSA 3.548(103)(i).] The statute expressly addresses an employer’s vicarious liability for sexual harassment committed by its employees by defining “employer” to include both the employer and the employer’s agents.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(g) — 34 cases
Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 697 N.W.2d 851 (Mich. 2005).
“As previously set forth, the statute expressly defines an "employer" as a "person," which is defined under MCL 37.2103(g) to include a corporation, and also states that an "employer" includes an "agent of that person.”
Rymal v. Baergen, 686 N.W.2d 241 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
“[14] We reject defendants' argument that plaintiff did not engage in protected activity because she did not specify the sexual nature of Baergen's misconduct when speaking to Fraser.”
Rymal v. Baergen, 262 Mich. App. 274 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
“While we acknowledge that plaintiffs deposition testimony did not specify sexual misconduct, MCL 37.2103 and MCL 37.2202 prohibit sexual harassment and discriminatory practices, and plaintiff testified that she expressly communicated to Fraser, an attorney, that she was being…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(h) — 29 cases
Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993).
“[MCL 37.2103(h); MSA 3.548(103)(h).][ [14] ] Sexual harassment was targeted by the Civil Rights Act because it is both "pervasive" and "destructive, entailing unacceptable personal, organizational, and societal costs.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(h)(i) — 3 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(h)(i)(ii) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(h)(ii) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(h)(iii) — 9 cases
Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993).
“[MCL 37.2103(h); MSA 3.548(103)(h).][ [14] ] Sexual harassment was targeted by the Civil Rights Act because it is both "pervasive" and "destructive, entailing unacceptable personal, organizational, and societal costs.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(i) — 63 cases
Hamed v. Wayne Cnty., 803 N.W.2d 237 (Mich. 2011).
“Nowhere did the Legislature indicate that the “societal burden” or the financial burden on employers is a valid consideration when interpreting and applying the act. In fact, the CRA indicates that the Legislature intended that governmental employers bear the cost of eliminating…”
Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 681 N.W.2d 342 (Mich. 2004).
“It cannot be said by any understanding of the language of MCL 37.2103 that plaintiff was subject to "sexual harassment.”
McClements v. Ford Motor Co., 702 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 2005).
“Accordingly, there is no common-law claim for negligent retention in the context of workplace sexual harassment. [7] Plaintiff invokes M.”
Zsigo v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 716 N.W.2d 220 (Mich. 2006).
“In Champion, supra, the plaintiff was raped by her supervisor and sought to impose liability on their employer for quid pro quo sexual harassment under the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2103(i). The employer attempted to avoid liability under the Civil Rights Act on the…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(i)(i) — 8 cases
Chambers v. Trettco, Inc, 614 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 2000).
“[MCL 37.2103(f); MSA 3.548(103)(i).] The statute expressly addresses an employer’s vicarious liability for sexual harassment committed by its employees by defining “employer” to include both the employer and the employer’s agents.”
Diamond v. Witherspoon, 696 N.W.2d 770 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
“MCL 37.2103(g) and (h); MCL 37.2302. The CRA defines “public service” as being essentially some “agency established to provide service to the public .”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(i)(ii) — 6 cases
Chambers v. Trettco, Inc, 614 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 2000).
“[MCL 37.2103(f); MSA 3.548(103)(i).] The statute expressly addresses an employer’s vicarious liability for sexual harassment committed by its employees by defining “employer” to include both the employer and the employer’s agents.”
Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 681 N.W.2d 342 (Mich. 2004).
“It cannot be said by any understanding of the language of MCL 37.2103 that plaintiff was subject to "sexual harassment.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(i)(iii) — 19 cases
Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 681 N.W.2d 342 (Mich. 2004).
“It cannot be said by any understanding of the language of MCL 37.2103 that plaintiff was subject to "sexual harassment.”
McClements v. Ford Motor Co., 702 N.W.2d 166 (Mich. 2005).
“Accordingly, there is no common-law claim for negligent retention in the context of workplace sexual harassment. [7] Plaintiff invokes M.”
Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 673 N.W.2d 776 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
“2202(1); MCL 37.2103(f); Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297, 309 ; 614 NW2d 910 (2000); Chambers v Trettco, Inc (On Remand), 244 Mich App 614, 617 ; 624 NW2d 543 (2001).”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(i)(m) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(i)(n) — 2 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(k) — 4 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(k)(i) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(k)(ii) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(k)(iii) — 4 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2103(l)(a) — 1 case
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